Ex parte Anderson (2003)

Citation: 867 So. 2d 1125. Decided: May 16, 2003. Docket: 1020177. Full majority and Moore’s partial dissent retrieved; source is an unofficial reproduction of the court’s opinion, not an official currentness certificate. Full opinion.

Facts and posture

Angela inherited an interest in a 1956 Thunderbird after her mother’s death; the Andersons possessed and restored it, while executor Elias Fonda retained the certificate in his name. A repairer left it with Smith’s Towing and supplied contact information. The Smiths sold it without notice to Fonda or the Andersons. Fonda’s later power of attorney was an alternative litigation theory. The trial court entered a Rule 54(b) summary judgment only against the Andersons; Fonda’s claims were not adjudicated in this appeal. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. Opinion, factual history and note 1.

Complete holding

  • Conversion: reversed the affirmance of summary judgment. The Andersons offered substantial evidence of a possessory interest sufficient against these defendants, who were neither the true owner nor a person wrongfully deprived of possession. Section 6-5-261 protects that possession against an intermeddler. This did not abolish the ordinary title/right-to-possession formulation or decide rights against Fonda. The alternative power-of-attorney theory did not need decision. Part III and conclusion, 1128–1131, 1133–1134.
  • Negligence per se: affirmed. Under the historical Abandoned Motor Vehicles Act, these mere possessors/heirs were not owners, registrants, secured parties or lienholders in the protected notice class. Definitions read in context did not make them conditional purchasers, lessees or debtors in possession. Conversion entitlement therefore did not establish statutory negligence entitlement. Part IV, 1131–1133.
  • Separate opinion: Chief Justice Moore agreed with the negligence disposition but dissented from reversal on conversion, considering the requisite title/possession elements unsatisfied. This is not the majority rule. Partial dissent, 1134 ff..

Treatment and current application

alabama-morgungenko-v-dewaynes-paint-body-2011 expressly distinguishes Anderson: its contractual purchaser had more than the Andersons’ bare possessory interest and could contest the sale despite another person’s record title. Anderson itself cites deramus-exxon-v-wyatt-1994 for statutory protection of owners. Neither proposition says every possessor receives every statutory notice. Morgungenko, ownership discussion, slip pp. 11–15; Anderson, part IV.

Full-holding verification and this identified subsequent treatment are complete as of October 17, 2026; this is not a comprehensive still-good-law/citator certificate. Current notice, court and bonded-seller rules come from current §§32-8-84 and 32-13-3–4, not the historical quoted enactment. The opinion does not hold that every private abandoned sale is constitutional state action, or that every sale defect automatically voids a present-day transfer. Current §32-13-3; current §32-13-4.

Practical impact

Record title alone cannot defeat every wrongful-disposition claim; separately test possessory conversion rights and the precise protected statutory class. Opinion, parts III–V.

Applies in →

alabama

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