First State Bank of Odessa, N.A. v. Arsiaga (1991)

Citation: 804 S.W.2d 343 · Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland (No. 11-90-151-CV) · Decided: February 28, 1991; rehearing overruled March 21, 1991 · Opinion: Arnot, J.

Source note (2026-10-18):

  • Links on this page to https://static.case.law/sw2d/804/cases/0343-01.json are an (unofficial Caselaw Access Project copy, retrieved before 2026-10-18; host disallows automated access); no official or otherwise permitted full-text copy was located on 2026-10-18.

Source: opinion text from the Caselaw Access Project at the source_url, retrieved 2026-10-16. On 2026-10-18 the full opinion text was retrieved again, with raw body and hash kept in the Texas final-review evidence, from an unofficial verbatim reproduction (neochart catalog of 804 S.W.2d 343); the 2026-10-17 midpage reader view had no preserved raw body and is not relied on.

Facts

The bank financed a pickup and its lien was noted on the certificate of title. After an accident the owner left the truck at Arsiaga’s body shop, then defaulted on the loan. The bank demanded the truck without offering to pay for repairs or storage; Arsiaga refused, claiming possessory repair and storage liens under Property Code ch. 70. Arsiaga had told the bank orally of its lien but never sent the written § 70.006 notice. The bank sued for conversion; the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment for both sides.

Holding

Affirmed. “The notice requirement contained in Section 70.006 is not required to perfect a possessory lien. Section 70.006 notice is required before a possessory lien-holder can nonjudicially foreclose on the collateral.” Nor is the notice required to keep the possessory lien’s priority over the bank’s perfected security interest under the UCC priority rule then codified at Bus. & Com. Code § 9.310.

Reasoning

  • Section 9.310 (as then in force) gave a possessory lien for services or materials priority over a perfected security interest “unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise”; ch. 70 did not provide otherwise.
  • The bank’s concern that a shop could run up storage charges in silence goes to the reasonableness and necessity of the charges, which the bank could contest; it does not defeat the lien.
  • Because the shop held a valid lien, refusing to surrender the truck was not conversion.

Practical impact

For a title lienholder, a repair shop’s lien can outrank the loan even before any sale notice is sent; the defence is to contest the reasonableness of the charges. For a buyer at a later repair-lien sale, the case explains why the shop’s lien can carry the sale ahead of the bank — but see the current statute below.

Good-law status

The original CAP retrieval of 2026-10-16 is preserved. A new CAP attempt returned HTTP 403; the full published opinion was read through the public independent_source_url on 2026-10-17 (ordinary terminal retrieval there returned 429; web retrieval delivered the opinion through its affirmance). This independently confirms the narrow holding, not later treatment.

Later legislation qualifies the priority discussion. Revised Article 9 now states the priority rule at Bus. & Com. Code § 9.333(b), and Property Code § 70.006(b-1)–(b-2) now provides that if a non-franchised repairer’s notice to a title lienholder omits the required contents, “a lien recorded on the certificate of title of the motor vehicle is superior to the possessory lienholder’s lien” (current text retrieved 2026-10-16 from statutes.capitol.texas.gov). The holding that notice is not an element of perfection is consistent with the current text; the priority consequence of a defective notice has changed. The relevant current text was independently retrieved from the official Property Code ch. 70 and Business & Commerce Code ch. 9 on 2026-10-17. No court’s later distinguishing treatment or complete good-law clearance is asserted.

Applies in →

texas