General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Washington Trust Co. (1978)

Citation: 120 R.I. 197, 386 A.2d 1096 · Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island (opinion by Bevilacqua, C.J.) · Decided: May 22, 1978

Source note (2026-10-18):

• Links on this page to https://static.case.law/ri/120/cases/0197-01.json are an (unofficial Caselaw Access Project copy, retrieved before 2026-10-18; host disallows automated access); no official or otherwise permitted full-text copy was located on 2026-10-18.

Text retrieved from the Caselaw Access Project’s static copy, an unofficial reproduction of the reported opinion.

Facts

A dealer sold a 1972 Cadillac; Rosemary Lounsbury was the registered owner, while her husband David signed, alone, an installment sales contract later assigned to GMAC. Washington Trust lent the down payment (plus a pre-existing debt) to both spouses and took a security agreement signed by both. Washington Trust filed a financing statement naming both spouses; GMAC’s financing statement named only David. After default, Washington Trust repossessed the car; by agreement it was sold for USD 4,500 before trial and the parties litigated priority to the proceeds.

Holding

Reversed. GMAC’s security interest attached (David had rights in the collateral) but was unperfected, because a financing statement on a vehicle owned by someone other than the obligor must name both the debtor and the owner; Washington Trust’s statement naming both perfected its interest — for the full loan, since securing a pre-existing claim is “value” — and it had priority.

Reasoning

Under the code then in force, perfection of a security interest in an automobile required filing a financing statement (former § 6A-9-302(1)(d)) signed by the “debtor,” which includes the owner of the collateral where owner and obligor differ (former §§ 6A-9-105(1)(d), 6A-9-402(1)); filing in the obligor’s name alone gave no notice to the owner’s creditors.

Practical impact

All three steps matter: the installment agreement was a security agreement; the nonowner obligor had sufficient rights for attachment; and attachment did not establish perfection. The registered owner was Rosemary, not a finding that the spouses were simply equal titled co-owners. The bank’s security for antecedent debt also constituted value for its full loan. The case reversed and remanded for judgment consistent with bank priority; it did not resolve every statutory-sale notice or buyer-title issue.

Current Rhode Island-titled vehicle perfection follows § 31-3.1-19, subject to § 31-3.1-18 exceptions. Modern attachment/value are separately governed by § 6A-9-203 and § 6A-1-204.

Good-law status

Full reported pages 197–203, including notes and disposition, independently retrieved and read October 18, 2026. Bounded name/citation searches and current-code comparison support the stated historical-perfection limitation; no verified judicial overruling was found. The complete five-page official Schnipkoweit opinion, Case 87-2952, Adv. 88-0009 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, October 1988; printed day blank), cites GMAC for rights in collateral not necessarily equaling ownership. It upheld FDIC’s lien on all USD 16,000 of machinery based on the spouse’s authorization, without deciding sole ownership. That is affirmative treatment of attachment, not adoption of historical Rhode Island vehicle filing rules. No comprehensive current citator certification is asserted.

Applies in →

rhode-island · Topic: ucc-article-9-dispositions

Legal information, not legal advice.