Final review 2026-10-18: the full opinion could not be retrieved from a permitted source (the court site returns a bot challenge, Justia returns a security challenge, and CounselStack is not used). The summary below is from the 2026-10-17 reading and is not counted as a verified holding in this review.
Jones v. Hicks (2010)
Citation: No. E2009-00844-COA-R3-CV · Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville, on appeal from the Sullivan County Chancery Court · Filed: February 24, 2010 · Opinion: Susano, J. (Franks, P.J., and Swiney, J., joining)
Source: official court opinion PDF at source_url, attributed by the earlier reviewer to an actual
2026-10-16 browser retrieval; that provenance is retained. Independent full-text review on 2026-10-17
used the (reproduction link removed: CounselStack is not used). A later blocked official-host fetch does not invalidate the earlier retrieval.
Facts
An owner left a Jeep with a body shop in 2005 for restorative work that was to start once he supplied parts. Three years later the shop wrote that the Jeep would be “auctioned unless all repair and storage fees are paid in full within fifteen (15) days.” The shop had done no repairs and had never discussed storage fees. The owner sued for replevin; the shop counterclaimed to sell the vehicle as an abandoned vehicle under § 66-19-103. The trial court awarded the shop USD 564 for labor and 90 days’ storage as a condition of returning the Jeep.
Holding
Reversed; judgment for the owner. The evidence preponderated against any repair or storage charges, so the shop “had no lien against the vehicle that he could enforce by sale.”
Reasoning
- Section 66-19-103(a)(1)(A) (2009 Supp.) gives garagekeepers a lien enforceable by sale only “until all reasonable charges due are paid”; with no charges due there is no lien (citing Roberson v. West Nashville Diesel).
- The shop admitted no work was done and no storage fee was ever agreed or disclosed.
Practical impact
The case involved a threatened sale and recovery of the Jeep, not a completed auction purchaser’s title. It supports testing whether repair or storage charges are actually due before asserting the lien. The 2026 repair-storage amendment requires separate analysis; the holding does not establish that written consent is indispensable in every later statutory storage case.
Good-law status
needs_verification. No comprehensive later-treatment research was completed. The independent review
retrieved the 2025 statutory reproduction and the 2026 Pub. Ch. 661 original-bill/adopted-amendment
record. The latter creates a defined consent-attempt/notice route for repair-related storage; signed-
chapter comparison remains pending. The opinion’s 2009 statutory quotation is historical.