Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc. (1997)

Citation: 326 S.C. 103, 484 S.E.2d 593 · Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina · Decided: April 21, 1997 · Opinion: Moore, J. (Finney, C.J., Toal, Waller and Burnett, JJ., concurring)

Source note (2026-10-18):

  • Links on this page to https://static.case.law/sc/326/cases/0103-01.json are an (unofficial Caselaw Access Project copy, retrieved before 2026-10-18; host disallows automated access); no official or otherwise permitted full-text copy was located on 2026-10-18.

Source: opinion text from the Caselaw Access Project (Harvard Law School Library) at the source_url, originally retrieved 2026-10-16 and independently retrieved in full 2026-10-17. CAP is an unofficial verbatim primary-opinion copy; the independent review retains the raw JSON, retrieval metadata and checksum.

Facts

A landlord subleased a warehouse to a tenant that fell USD 41,666 behind on rent and began collection by distraint under S.C. Code § 27-39-210 — a magistrate’s distress warrant after a predistress hearing, seizure by an officer of property on the premises, and public auction if the tenant neither pays nor bonds. Cotton-baling equipment on the premises belonged to a third party, TRP Cotton, which moved for its release. The master held that third-party property was not subject to distraint.

Holding

Reversed and remanded. Under § 27-39-250 as it then read, “all property upon the rented premises is subject to distress,” and the statute required only that a third party with substantiated ownership receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before its property was sold. Frady v. Smith was overruled to the extent it limited distress to the tenant’s own property.

TRP also raised a substantive-due-process challenge. The master did not reach that question, and the Supreme Court’s reversal/remand decided statutory construction, not the constitutionality of taking third-party goods. The opinion’s Pettigrew footnote describes procedural notice/hearing history, not resolution of TRP’s separate substantive challenge.

Reasoning

  • The plain language of § 27-39-250 made all property on the premises distrainable, with the tenant’s own property applied first.
  • Frady’s statement that distraint lies only for property belonging to the tenant came from an earlier statute that had been repealed in 1946.
  • The notice-and-hearing provision had been added after a federal court held the earlier version violated procedural due process (Pettigrew v. Womble, 589 F. Supp. 242 (D.S.C. 1984), cited in a footnote).

Practical impact

For an owner of equipment kept at a tenant’s premises, the 1997 rule exposed it to sale for the tenant’s rent; for a buyer at a distress sale, it meant third-party goods could be offered. Both points changed in 2000 (below).

Good-law status

Superseded in part by statute. S.C. Code §§ 27-39-230(4) and 27-39-250, as amended by 2000 Act No. 409, now exempt third-party property unless the magistrate finds, after a hearing, that ownership was transferred from the tenant “for the purpose of avoiding distraint” (current text retrieved 2026-10-16 from scstatehouse.gov). The Supreme Court in Greenwood Petroleum Co. v. Wingard (Ex parte J.M. Smith Corp.) (2000) also confined Tolemac to third-party owners, not perfected secured creditors.

Independent treatment sources retrieved in full on 2026-10-17 are 2000 Act 409, H.4460, current §§ 27-39-230/-250, and the official Ex parte J.M. Smith opinion. These establish statutory supersession and a judicial distinction, not exhaustive citator clearance. The distinguished frontmatter value does not erase the material statutory supersession. The online statutes are the legislature’s unofficial compilation through 2025; the independent review also checked 2026 enacted texts.

Applies in →

south-carolina

Legal information, not legal advice. Verify the opinion, current statutes and subsequent treatment before acting. Holding verified: 2026-10-17; exhaustive negative-treatment clearance is not certified.