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Capson v. Superior Court (Ariz. 1984)

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Capson v. Superior Court (1984)

Citation: 139 Ariz. 113, 677 P.2d 276 · Court: Arizona Supreme Court (Cameron, J.; Holohan, C.J., Gordon, V.C.J., Hays and Feldman, JJ., concurring) · Decided: February 8, 1984

Source note (2026-10-18):

  • Links on this page to https://static.case.law/ariz/139/cases/0113-01.json are an (unofficial Caselaw Access Project copy, retrieved before 2026-10-18; host disallows automated access); no official or otherwise permitted full-text copy was located on 2026-10-18.

Facts

A driver parked on posted private property near a Phoenix apartment complex. Signs said violators would be towed and charged a USD 75 towing fee. Galaxy Towing, the petitioner’s company, towed the car and refused to release it until the fee was paid; it released the car only after police threatened to cut the lot chain. The petitioner was charged with theft under A.R.S. § 13-1802(A) and sought special-action review of the denial of his motion to dismiss.

Holding

  1. Arizona gives a tower no lien for towing. At common law a garageman had no lien for towing or storage; “Any lien for towing or storage of an automobile in Arizona must have a statutory basis.” The garage-lien statute (then A.R.S. § 33-1022(B), now § 33-1022(A)) “does not authorize a lien for the towing of automobiles.” Even if it covers storage of a towed car, “there must be an agreement as to the storage charges,” and a parking sign cannot supply agreement on storage charges.
  2. No landlord’s lien under A.R.S. § 33-362 (parking did not create a tenancy) and no common-law possessory lien: “A possessory lien must be consensual in nature,” and a landowner “cannot … confer upon the towing company the right to impose a lien for towing and storage of the vehicle.”
  3. Withholding the car until payment, without a lien, satisfied the elements of theft; because the petitioner acted on a “plausible, though incorrect, interpretation of the statute,” the theft holding was made prospective only and did not apply to him.

Reasoning

The court read the lien statute strictly because a storage lien is “in derogation of the common law” (quoting Fitzhugh v. City of Douglas, 122 Ariz. 599 (App. 1979)), and followed Currie v. Dooley, 132 Ariz. 584 (App. 1982), in requiring an agreed amount for storage.

Practical impact

  • Buyers: this particular nonconsensual private tow supplied no asserted lien-sale authority. Modern § 28-4842 provides a distinct conditional administrative ownership-transfer route; the 1984 case did not decide its current operation or guarantee every tower eligibility.
  • Owners: the court’s theft analysis was prospective only and did not apply to Capson. It was not an affirmance of his conviction.
  • Towers / operators: do not treat Capson as an adjudication of every present impound/release-charge rule. Current § 28-4837 addresses reasonable towing/storage charges; entitlement to charges is distinct from possession, a statutory lien and authority to sell.

Good-law status

No overruling located. Beck v. Hy-Tech Performance, Inc., 236 Ariz. 354 (App. 2015), cites Capson for the common-law rule on garage liens. A full citator check was not run (needs_verification). The statutory subsection cited in the opinion has since been renumbered (§ 33-1022(A)); the operative wording retrieved 2026-10-17 from https://www.azleg.gov/ars/33/01022.htm is materially the same but now also covers aircraft.

Applies in →

arizona · see towing-storage-and-mechanics-lien-sales, motor-vehicles, beck-v-hy-tech-performance-2015

Sources

This page provides general legal information, not legal advice. Verify the holding and its current treatment against the primary source and consult a licensed Arizona attorney before acting. Last verified: 2026-10-17.

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