Propert v. District of Columbia (1991)
Citation: 948 F.2d 1327 · Decided: November 19, 1991 · Opinion: Edwards, J.
Source note (2026-10-18):
- Links on this page to
https://static.case.law/f2d/948/cases/1327-01.jsonare an (unofficial Caselaw Access Project copy, retrieved before 2026-10-18; host disallows automated access); no official or otherwise permitted full-text copy was located on 2026-10-18.
Facts and disposition
An officer classified Propert’s currently registered, licensed and inspected Karmann Ghia as junk based on appearance. The District used a windshield sticker, then towed and immediately destroyed it without adequate owner notice or a neutral hearing. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, directed judgment for Propert on § 1983 liability against the District, and remanded for damages and further proceedings. It expressly decided neither the damages amount nor the officer’s qualified immunity. Complete opinion.
Complete holding and reasoning
- Protected ownership/finality: a registered owner’s vehicle cannot be finally destroyed on this subjective junk determination without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opinion’s holding is expressly limited to properly licensed/registered vehicles identified as junk. Opinion.
- Notice: where registry records readily identify the owner, a windshield sticker is less likely to reach the owner than feasible direct notice. Even assuming a sticker could justify the initial tow, it did not justify immediate destruction without post-towing, pre-destruction process. Opinion.
- Neutral hearing: trying to persuade the same officer as a matter of grace was not an entitlement to meaningful review before a neutral decisionmaker. The subjective classification created substantial error risk. Opinion.
- Balancing/limits: the government had a removal interest but had not justified immediate destruction or shown that cost excused missing process. The court left choice of constitutionally adequate replacement procedures to local authorities; it did not mandate a single precise new hearing design, newspaper schedule or damages measure. Opinion.
Verified later treatment and practical limits
Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Service, 766 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 2014), official opinion pp. 11–12, discusses Propert and distinguishes its particularly subjective junk-vehicle judgment/review by the same officer from the objective medical-qualification process before it. That treatment supports the context-specific neutral-review rationale, not a rule that every administrative decision needs a second reviewer. Full later official opinion.
Current DPW notice/reclamation/title provisions are §§ 50-2455–50-2459, not the historical junk regulations reviewed in 1991. The no-valid-VIN/recognizable-registration disposal exception in § 50-2465 expressly excludes vehicles removed after traffic collisions. These statutes are separate present-law authority; Propert was a destruction/due-process case, not an auction priority or purchaser clean-title decision. § 50-2455, § 50-2456, § 50-2458, § 50-2459, § 50-2465.
Full primary opinion and the specified later treatment were checked on 2026-10-17, with actual reporter JSON and court/GovInfo PDF bodies retained in schema/verification/district-of-columbia-evidence-2026-10-17/. This is not a comprehensive subsequent-history or no-negative-treatment certificate.
Applies in →
district-of-columbia, motor-vehicles, towing-storage-and-mechanics-lien-sales
Legal information, not legal advice. Verify the current statutory route and actual notice record before relying on this summary.