Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v. North Shore Collision, LLC (2011)
Citation: 2011 WI App 38, 332 Wis. 2d 201, 796 N.W.2d 832 · Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals, No. 2010AP761 · Decided: February 17, 2011 · Opinion: Sherman, J. (panel: Vergeront, P.J., Lundsten and Sherman, JJ.)
Source note (2026-10-18):
- source replaced 2026-10-18: static.case.law robots-disallowed; official copy at Wisconsin Court System official opinion (No. 2010AP761) (replaces
https://static.case.law/wis-2d/332/cases/0201-01.json; retrieval dates stated elsewhere on this page refer to the earlier copy).
Opinion text retrieved 2026-10-17 from the Caselaw Access Project’s static copy of the Wisconsin Reports, 2d series (static.case.law, volume 332), an unofficial host. The official annotation to Wis. Stat. § 779.43 (2023-24 statutes, published 2026-10-01, docs.legis.wisconsin.gov) summarizes the holding.
Facts
A 2006 Toyota Camry financed by Toyota Motor Credit was towed, with the owner’s permission, to North Shore Collision for accident repairs, which the owner’s insurer paid less a USD 500 deductible. A sign in the shop, readable at 15 feet, announced a USD 300 administration fee and USD 99.95 per day storage on cars left after repairs. Repairs were finished about September 28, 2009. The owner then told the shop he was “walking away” from the car. On October 13, 2009, Toyota obtained a replevin judgment against the owner and became title holder. The shop called Toyota repeatedly and in November demanded USD 5,594.42 in storage. Toyota sued the shop in replevin. The circuit court awarded possession to Toyota on payment of USD 1,799.35 (deductible plus storage to October 10).
Holding
Reversed and remanded. A garage keeper that posts the notice required by Wis. Stat. § 779.43(3) has a lien for storage only for periods when the title holder consented to the bailment. The shop had a lien from completion of repairs until October 12, while the consenting owner held title, and Toyota took title subject to those charges. After Toyota became owner, the original owner’s consent was not imputed to it; a new lien arose only from the date Toyota learned the car was at the shop and left it there (implied consent). That date was a disputed fact.
Reasoning
- Section 779.43(3) modified the common-law bailee’s lien by dispensing with the requirement that the bailee have increased the property’s value, but it kept the common-law requirement that the owner consent to the bailment (Bob Ryan Leasing v. Sampair, 125 Wis. 2d 266 (Ct. App. 1985)) (¶¶ 10–12).
- Consent may be express (a signed work order) or implied from the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence (¶ 14).
- A successor owner, including a lender that takes title by replevin, takes subject to lien charges already accrued (¶ 16).
Practical impact
- Buyers of repossessed or lien-sale vehicles: storage charges claimed under § 779.43(3) attach only for periods of title-holder consent and only if the 15-foot posted notice or a signed service order disclosed the storage rate.
- Lenders: prompt action after learning where a vehicle is held limits storage exposure.
- Shops: documenting the title holder’s knowledge supports later storage charges.
Good-law status
The full opinion holding was independently checked on 2026-10-17 against the official court body. Prior CAP retrieval and its unofficial-host disclosure above are preserved. The current official statutory annotation remains relevant evidence of citation, but is not a complete subsequent-history/citator check. Good-law status remains needs_verification; this does not negate verification of the decision’s narrow historical holding.
Rechecked 2026-10-18: a CourtListener citation search (results retained in schema/verification/wisconsin-evidence-2026-10-18/) for “2011 WI App 38” returned no later opinion citing it; § 779.43(3) is unchanged in the statutes updated through 2025 Wis. Act 247. No negative treatment located. Not a commercial citator check.
Applies in →
wisconsin · towing-storage-and-mechanics-lien-sales · motor-vehicles · premier-community-bank-v-schuh-2010
Legal information, not legal advice. Verify current primary sources before acting.