Buying a business at a forced sale in Washington

▸ For Buyers / Operators — Sale channels, title documents, surviving liens, taxes and the checklist appear below.

▸ For Owners / Debtors — Notice, redemption, proceeds and unsettled questions appear in the channel descriptions below.

How these sales happen in Washington

Court and execution sales

  • Writ and levy: The sheriff executes the court writ. 1 Manually deliverable goods are levied by taking custody; concealed property requires the writ’s authority for the described forced entry. 1 Stock follows UCC § 8-112; jointly owned personalty is reached only to the debtor’s interest. 1 Serve the statutory execution/ exemption material under RCW 6.17.130. 1 Personalty sale provisions also apply in district courts under RCW 6.21.010. 1

  • Notice: At least 30 days before sale, the creditor sends the debtor both regular and certified return-receipt mail, sends the attorney regular mail, and files a compliance affidavit. 2 The sheriff posts in three county public places for at least four weeks. 2 RCW 6.21.020 does not require the realty newspaper advertisement of .030. 2

  • Auction, payment and postponement: Auction is between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.; manually deliverable goods not held by a third person are sold in view of attendees, in parcels likely to obtain the highest price. 3 Stop when enough has sold. 3 Neither sheriff nor deputy may buy. 3 One-week postponements require proclamation and posting; the creditor-consented extension past the writ return is limited by .050. 3 Online-only is not a general ordinary-personalty execution option: .050’s electronic option expressly covers realty/franchises, while .070 affirmatively requires manually deliverable goods not held by a third person to be in attendees’ view. 3 For other personalty .070’s separate bill-of-sale rule applies, but .050 is not an affirmative electronic-personalty grant. 3 This bounded statutory-scope answer does not declare every possible hybrid bid or specially authorized court sale illegal. 3 A sale-specific order must actually authorize its procedure and preserve applicable statutory conditions; an auction platform’s capabilities alone supply no authority. 3 The distinct county treasurer electronic power in RCW 36.16.145 and 84.56.070(5) does not turn the sheriff’s ordinary .070 sale into a treasurer’s tax sale. 3

Administrative and tax sales

  • State tax execution: A filed DOR warrant has judgment effect; DOR may issue execution to the sheriff, or to its revenue agent with sheriff powers. 4 RCW 82.32.220–.230 adopts superior-court execution procedure/effect, including the debtor’s surplus. 4 The execution notice/document/lien cautions in 12.1 apply; a tax-warrant label alone does not establish discharge of every senior interest. 4 Section .210(2) also expressly creates a specific business-personalty lien, including described third-person-owned property when that owner has a beneficial interest in the business. 4 Under (3), bona fide interests vested before warrant filing remain senior if their holders have no such beneficial interest beyond debt security or ordinary equipment rent, subject to the stated creditor-trustee exclusion. 4 The lien’s additional judgment- effect reach under (4) is not a second lien type. 4

  • County personal-property tax distraint: The treasurer’s RCW 84.56.070 process includes tax-roll notice, distraint papers, postings at three county places including the courthouse, and auction at least 10 days after taking. 5 Subsection (5) allows electronic auction under its incorporated authority. 5 Special nonmanual property has different publication/registered-mail requirements; jeopardy removal/disposal has a special route. 5 Excess is payable on application to the owner identified at issuance of distraint notice; unclaimed excess goes to county current expense after three years. 5 The buyer’s lien-cleansing title rule beyond this sale authority remains unresolved (WA04). 5

  • RCW 84.60.010 gives the tax imposed on the subject property priority over the specified mortgages/judgments/debts, with equal-rank statutory deferral liens. 6 Section .020 separately fixes the item-assessment lien and the later lien created by distraint of other property for the taxpayer’s taxes. 6 The latter does not obtain .010’s item-tax superpriority merely because the treasurer seized the goods. 6 The full official AGO 1957 No. 15 explains the item-versus- distraint distinction; its statement that old .010 covered realty only is historical, superseded by the actual 1969 first-extraordinary-session c. 6 251 addition of personal property. 6 Full AGLO 1975 No. 56 explains why that amendment did not give every separate .020 cross-charge lien .010 priority. 6 DOR’s full 2003 newsletter, page 7, likewise distinguishes the item’s assessed tax from the total-tax lien imposed by distraint and preserves the earlier mortgage against the latter. 6 Section .020 also preserves tax liens through ordinary transfers. 6 Neither priority nor proceeds alone establishes all non-home distraint purchaser effects, so WA04 remains open for that aggregate. 6

  • RCW 84.68.080–.100 expressly govern recovery of any property sold for taxes: the claimant must first pay/tender taxes, penalties, interest and costs justly due on that property; the complaint must specially plead the required payment/ tender, including the purchaser’s tax payments when suing the possessor. 7 These are additional conditions on recovery, not automatic validation of every sale. 7 For a challenge to the tax itself, .010 limits injunctions to its stated void-law, exempt-property and county-error/order cases; .020 supplies written-protest payment and recovery, .060 has its June 30 of the next succeeding year deadline, and .070 preserves its exceptions/valid foreclosure defenses. 7 A distinct tort damages claim against the county is subject to ch. 4.96’s presentment and sixty-calendar-day waiting requirement. 7 These positive statutory consequences answer the defect field; complete non-home purchaser discharge remains unresolved. 7 Lender notice has the conditional constitutional answer below, not an empty field or a blanket purchaser immunity. 7

Lienholder sales

  • Self-service storage: RCW 19.150.020 creates the facility lien for rent/labor/ fees/preservation/sale costs; vehicle/boat title liens expressly outrank it. 8 For other collateral, apply the lien’s actual attachment date under .060(1), the current Article 9A scope and Washington priority law, not an assumed warehouse superpriority: .180 expressly moves a document-of-title transaction into Article 7 instead of this chapter. 8 For a nonpossessory statutory lien, Brazier directs statutory/common-law priority; Levitch applies first in time where the creating act grants no contrary priority. 8 An otherwise valid earlier perfected security interest is therefore not displaced merely by a later self-storage lien. 8 If a particular claim instead meets .333(a)‘s ordinary-course, possession-dependent definition, Washington’s .333(b) likewise requires express statutory priority over security; possession alone is insufficient. 8 Section .090 permits the secured party to recover possession by paying noticed storage charges; that retrieval condition is not an express reversal of lien rank. 8 Attachment, actual perfection and any subordination are transaction predicates, not missing universal priority law. 8 No numeric general lien cap appears in .020. 8 After 14 consecutive days unpaid, send the preliminary notice under .040 and its cure period. 8 Final notice under .060 gives a sale date no earlier than the later of 14 days after final notice or 42 days after first unpaid charges, with personal/verified-mail or qualifying e-mail service. 8 The act supplies alternatives; actual receipt/e-mail conditions cannot be assumed from a sent message alone. 8

  • Transportation, wharfage and storage lien — ch. 60.60: A commission merchant, carrier, wharfinger or storage-warehouse operator retaining possession has a lien for the specified advances/carriage/storage charges. 9 A written special contract governs under .050; this is not proof every parking or hangar landlord is a warehouse operator. 9 The ordinary-course possessory service-lien branch is governed by RCW 62A.9A-333(b): ch. 60.60 supplies no express priority over a perfected security interest, so possession does not displace that lender. 9 This conclusion applies the positive statutory priority test, not an inference that silence makes priority legally unsettled. 9 A holder separately qualifying under Article 7 uses the warehouse/carrier rules below; the agreement and actual services determine qualification, not an unresolved universal priority fact. 9 Livestock/perishables have .020’s ten-day notice minimum; other goods must remain uncalled for 30 days after charges become due under .030, which also requires ten-day notice. 9 Ten days is not an exclusive maximum that prevents meeting these longer incorporated notice requirements. 9 This is a textual application of cumulative requirements, not a holding attributed to AGO 9

  • Article 9 dispositions: Washington enacted RCW 62A.9A-609–.627: judicial recovery or peaceful repossession, commercially reasonable public/private sale, notice to debtor/secondary obligors and designated secured parties, and consumer- goods notice content. 10 The 10-day safe harbor in .612 is nonconsumer-only; it does not replace ch. 60.10’s separate text. 10 Section .617 discharges selling/ subordinate interests and protects a good-faith transferee despite noncompliance, while senior interests survive. 10 Section .615 pays expenses, debt, qualifying juniors and surplus; .623 permits redemption before disposition/contract or acceptance; .625 provides injunction/damages, and .626 treats nonconsumer deficiency proof separately. 10 No fixed dollar cap governs the consensual debt. 10 The nonuniform possessory priority in .333 is stated above. 10

Business assets and ownership interests

  • Receivership: Ch. 7.60 distinguishes general from custodial receivers. 11 Outside-ordinary-course sale requires court approval after notice/hearing; master-mailing-list parties ordinarily receive 30 days’ notice under .190. 11 A general receiver’s sale can be free of liens/redemption rights under .260, with the stated real-property/homestead and timely-objector protections. 11 Liens attach to net proceeds in prior priority; a secured credit bid must tender cash covering senior allowed claims. 11 An unstayed good-faith sale is protected from later reversal/modification. 11 Separate post-authorization confirmation and closing conditions must be taken from the actual sale-authorization order: .260(1) requires approval after notice/hearing, not a substitute sheriff-realty confirmation under RCW 6.21.110. 11 Current CR 66 is reserved and refers to ch. 7.60; do not apply its superseded receivership procedure. 11 This identifies the governing approval/confirmation route without assuming an individual order has no additional closing conditions. 11 Uniform-act classification: no, for this ordinary general/custodial route. Washington uses its own 2004 c. 11 165 / ch. 7.60 codification, not an enactment of the later 2015 Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act. 11 The full enacted 2004 law and current chapter establish the applicable statutory regime; the full final model act’s prefatory note identifies Washington’s preexisting comprehensive statute as a predecessor. 11 The model text is used only for that identity comparison, not as operative Washington law or as a substitute for any special-sector receivership statute. 11

  • ABC: Under ch. 7.08 the statutory assignment becomes effective with the superior-court petition; the assignee becomes general receiver, administering the estate under ch. 7.60, with the creditor replacement process. 12 Thus sale/free-clear authority and buyer survival depend on the receivership order and .260 conditions, not simply a private assignment instrument. 12

  • LLCs and partnerships: RCW 25.15.256 and 25.05.215 expressly allow foreclosure of a charged transferable interest, with transferee rights for the buyer. 13 They permit preforeclosure redemption by the debtor and the specified member/ partner/company arrangements, and state exclusivity. 13 Neither cited provision supplies a sole-member automatic management-transfer rule in the charging section itself. 13 RCW 25.15.116(2)(d) does supply a sole-member admission rule for a transferee acquiring all of the transferor’s LLC interest, effective on transfer. 13 A charging sale under .256 conveys the transferable interest, defined in .006 as distribution rights; .251 normally withholds management rights. 13 Purchase of the distribution interest is not title to entity-owned inventory. 13 UCC stock levy follows RCW 62A.8-112: certificate seizure, issuer process or intermediary process as appropriate. 13

  • Bulk-sale repeal and successor tax: Article 6 is repealed. 14 RCW 82.32.140 requires the selling/quitting taxpayer’s return/payment within 10 days and successor withholding pending receipt/no-tax certificate. 14 The notice-to-DOR six-month assessment provision is not an immediate clearance merely because notice was sent. 14 WAC 458-20-216 expressly excludes acquisitions through insolvency proceedings, regular legal lien/security/judgment enforcement or repossession from its successor definition. 14 Establish that the actual transaction fits that exception; an informal asset purchase is not transformed by an auction label. 14

  • Licences: WAC 314-07-100 requires the receiver/trustee/assignee to notify the Liquor and Cannabis Board. 15 WAC 458-02-201 generally prohibits transfer of the business licence and endorsements unless the individual agency permits it. 15 A sale of over ten percent of a liquor- licensed corporation’s stock also requires prior board approval under RCW 66.24.025. 15

Where sales are announced

  • Official postings observed (checked 18 Oct 2026) — Execution: Creditor’s 30-day mailings plus sheriff’s four-week/three-place posting. 16 Snohomish’s personal-property procedure identifies local posting boards; it is not a statewide newspaper mandate. 16

What the buyer gets

  • Challenges and adverse claims: A challenge to the authorizing judgment or order can use CR 60(b): mistake/irregularity, specified incapacity, newly discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, satisfaction and other listed grounds. 17 The ordinary motion must be within a reasonable time, with a one-year outer limit for grounds (1)–(3); it does not itself suspend the order. 17 Void judgments are different: a CR 60(b)(5) attack on an actually void judgment may be brought at any time; elapsed time alone and laches do not validate the void judgment. 17 In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 618–620 (1989), supplies that rule, not a holding that every sale irregularity makes the underlying judgment void or that every purchaser necessarily loses title. . 17 This is not a universal deadline or automatic title-vacatur rule for every completed chattel sale. 17 A conversion/recovery-of- personalty action ordinarily has the three-year limitation in RCW 4.16.080(2). 17 For a completed sale’s equitable challenge, the court also retains supervisory power over its own execution process: Paglia allowed relief from a sheriff’s bill of sale that put both sides of pending litigation under the adversary’s control. 17 MP Medical later recognized that exception while rejecting the suggestion that all nonexempt claims had ceased to be executable. 17 These are actual sale-relief grounds, distinct from vacating the underlying judgment; they do not supply a universal fixed filing period. 17 Equitable timeliness is conditional, not a missing universal day count. Apply the limitation governing the substantive cause of action under ch. 4.16, rather than automatically starting a real-estate confirmation clock: .080(2) covers recovery/detention of personalty, .080(4) governs fraud with its discovery rule, and .130 is the two-year residual for relief not otherwise provided for. 17 CR 60(c) preserves independent relief; it does not itself create a new universal limitation or erase substantive defenses. 17 Equitable relief also requires diligence: laches requires knowledge/reasonable discovery opportunity, unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice, not lapse of time alone. 17 The complete official Dalziell decision applies those Washington elements and explains that shortening an otherwise applicable statutory period requires unusual circumstances or a controlling equity. 17 Its actual case concerns an old mortgage-debt claim, not a sheriff’s chattel sale; using its stated general timeliness rule here is an application alongside Paglia’s actual execution-supervision remedy. 17 An actually void judgment remains subject to Leslie’s different rule above; a valid protected purchaser and RAP 12.8 remain separate merits limits. 17 Actual grounds, accrual/discovery and prejudicial delay are transaction/case facts, not an unanswered requirement to identify one clock for all remedies. 17

  • For appellate reversal/modification, RAP 12.8 directs restoration of property, value or appropriate restitution, but preserves an intervening good-faith purchaser’s interest. 18 An appeal is not itself a stay; RAP 8.1 provides the stay/ security process. 18 Historically, Benney v. Clein allowed replevin after vacation of the irregularly obtained judgment against the execution creditors who bought the chattels; it did not treat those creditors as innocent purchasers. 18 This closes a concrete completed-sale/restitution branch, without turning RAP 12.8 into a universal shield for a defective auction or a new filing deadline. 18 Ch. 6.19 separately lets an adverse claimant deliver an ownership/ immediate-possession affidavit and double-value bond; without bond the claimant may move within seven days after delivering the affidavit for a probable- validity hearing. 18 Trial, return/value judgments and costs follow that chapter, which preserves other remedies before/after levy or sale. 18 The real-estate confirmation objection period is not used as a personalty deadline. 18

  • Receivership: Ch. 7.60 distinguishes general from custodial receivers. 11 Outside-ordinary-course sale requires court approval after notice/hearing; master-mailing-list parties ordinarily receive 30 days’ notice under .190. 11 A general receiver’s sale can be free of liens/redemption rights under .260, with the stated real-property/homestead and timely-objector protections. 11 Liens attach to net proceeds in prior priority; a secured credit bid must tender cash covering senior allowed claims. 11 An unstayed good-faith sale is protected from later reversal/modification. 11 Separate post-authorization confirmation and closing conditions must be taken from the actual sale-authorization order: .260(1) requires approval after notice/hearing, not a substitute sheriff-realty confirmation under RCW 6.21.110. 11 Current CR 66 is reserved and refers to ch. 7.60; do not apply its superseded receivership procedure. 11 This identifies the governing approval/confirmation route without assuming an individual order has no additional closing conditions. 11 Uniform-act classification: no, for this ordinary general/custodial route. Washington uses its own 2004 c. 11 165 / ch. 7.60 codification, not an enactment of the later 2015 Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act. 11 The full enacted 2004 law and current chapter establish the applicable statutory regime; the full final model act’s prefatory note identifies Washington’s preexisting comprehensive statute as a predecessor. 11 The model text is used only for that identity comparison, not as operative Washington law or as a substitute for any special-sector receivership statute. 11

  • ABC: Under ch. 7.08 the statutory assignment becomes effective with the superior-court petition; the assignee becomes general receiver, administering the estate under ch. 7.60, with the creditor replacement process. 12 Thus sale/free-clear authority and buyer survival depend on the receivership order and .260 conditions, not simply a private assignment instrument. 12

  • LLCs and partnerships: RCW 25.15.256 and 25.05.215 expressly allow foreclosure of a charged transferable interest, with transferee rights for the buyer. 13 They permit preforeclosure redemption by the debtor and the specified member/ partner/company arrangements, and state exclusivity. 13 Neither cited provision supplies a sole-member automatic management-transfer rule in the charging section itself. 13 RCW 25.15.116(2)(d) does supply a sole-member admission rule for a transferee acquiring all of the transferor’s LLC interest, effective on transfer. 13 A charging sale under .256 conveys the transferable interest, defined in .006 as distribution rights; .251 normally withholds management rights. 13 Purchase of the distribution interest is not title to entity-owned inventory. 13 UCC stock levy follows RCW 62A.8-112: certificate seizure, issuer process or intermediary process as appropriate. 13

  • Bulk-sale repeal and successor tax: Article 6 is repealed. 14 RCW 82.32.140 requires the selling/quitting taxpayer’s return/payment within 10 days and successor withholding pending receipt/no-tax certificate. 14 The notice-to-DOR six-month assessment provision is not an immediate clearance merely because notice was sent. 14 WAC 458-20-216 expressly excludes acquisitions through insolvency proceedings, regular legal lien/security/judgment enforcement or repossession from its successor definition. 14 Establish that the actual transaction fits that exception; an informal asset purchase is not transformed by an auction label. 14

  • Licences: WAC 314-07-100 requires the receiver/trustee/assignee to notify the Liquor and Cannabis Board. 15 WAC 458-02-201 generally prohibits transfer of the business licence and endorsements unless the individual agency permits it. 15 A sale of over ten percent of a liquor- licensed corporation’s stock also requires prior board approval under RCW 66.24.025. 15

Taxes and fees

  • General purchase/use tax: Retail state sales tax is 6.5% of selling price, plus local components. 19 Casual/isolated sales may be sales-tax exempt under RCW 82.08.0251, but use tax is not exempt merely because the sale was casual. 19 RCW 82.12.020 reaches tangible goods acquired in any manner, expressly including casual sales. 19 WAC 458-20-159 ordinarily requires auctioneers/bailees to collect retail tax on taxable gross price despite another’s ownership, with its stated agency-reporting and farm-auction exceptions. 19 Forced-sale status alone is not a general exemption. 19

Step-by-step checklist

  1. Identify execution, chattel lien, impound, moorage, airport, tax or receiver authority; compare its document and lien-survival rule (12.1–12.5). 20

  2. Retain both creditor-mailing affidavit and sheriff posting proof for execution; request the RCW 6.21.070 bill of sale (12.1). 21

  3. Read the actual personalty payment terms; Snohomish’s noon realty deadline is not stated for its personalty sales (12.1). 22

  4. At a ch. 60.10 sale require prior-lien disclosure before bidding and obtain releases or a title preserving superior liens (12.3–12.4). 23

  5. For business assets establish the regular-legal-enforcement successor-tax exception or withhold/obtain clearance as required (12.5). 24

  6. At receiver sale inspect free-clear authorization, creditor objections, senior cash payments and any appellate stay (12.5). 25

Open questions

Section 12 leaves the following matters unsettled (needs_verification).

  • County personal-property tax distraint: The treasurer’s RCW 84.56.070 process includes tax-roll notice, distraint papers, postings at three county places including the courthouse, and auction at least 10 days after taking. 5 Subsection (5) allows electronic auction under its incorporated authority. 5 Special nonmanual property has different publication/registered-mail requirements; jeopardy removal/disposal has a special route. 5 Excess is payable on application to the owner identified at issuance of distraint notice; unclaimed excess goes to county current expense after three years. 5 The buyer’s lien-cleansing title rule beyond this sale authority remains unresolved (WA04). 5

  • RCW 84.60.010 gives the tax imposed on the subject property priority over the specified mortgages/judgments/debts, with equal-rank statutory deferral liens. 6 Section .020 separately fixes the item-assessment lien and the later lien created by distraint of other property for the taxpayer’s taxes. 6 The latter does not obtain .010’s item-tax superpriority merely because the treasurer seized the goods. 6 The full official AGO 1957 No. 15 explains the item-versus- distraint distinction; its statement that old .010 covered realty only is historical, superseded by the actual 1969 first-extraordinary-session c. 6 251 addition of personal property. 6 Full AGLO 1975 No. 56 explains why that amendment did not give every separate .020 cross-charge lien .010 priority. 6 DOR’s full 2003 newsletter, page 7, likewise distinguishes the item’s assessed tax from the total-tax lien imposed by distraint and preserves the earlier mortgage against the latter. 6 Section .020 also preserves tax liens through ordinary transfers. 6 Neither priority nor proceeds alone establishes all non-home distraint purchaser effects, so WA04 remains open for that aggregate. 6

  • RCW 84.68.080–.100 expressly govern recovery of any property sold for taxes: the claimant must first pay/tender taxes, penalties, interest and costs justly due on that property; the complaint must specially plead the required payment/ tender, including the purchaser’s tax payments when suing the possessor. 7 These are additional conditions on recovery, not automatic validation of every sale. 7 For a challenge to the tax itself, .010 limits injunctions to its stated void-law, exempt-property and county-error/order cases; .020 supplies written-protest payment and recovery, .060 has its June 30 of the next succeeding year deadline, and .070 preserves its exceptions/valid foreclosure defenses. 7 A distinct tort damages claim against the county is subject to ch. 4.96’s presentment and sixty-calendar-day waiting requirement. 7 These positive statutory consequences answer the defect field; complete non-home purchaser discharge remains unresolved. 7 Lender notice has the conditional constitutional answer below, not an empty field or a blanket purchaser immunity. 7

  • Statutory posting and fragmented operator/locality channels explain why absence from a newspaper repository cannot establish that no sale exists. This module creates no property listing or collection service.

washington, businesses-and-going-concerns, snohomish-wa

Primary sources


Legal information, not legal advice. Verify against the cited primary sources before acting. Last verified: 2026-10-17.

Footnotes

  1. RCW 6.17.130, .160, .180; 6.21.010 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  2. RCW 6.21.020 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. RCW 6.21.050–.070; Full treasurer electronic-auction authority ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  4. RCW 82.32.210–.230 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  5. RCW 84.56.070 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  6. Full RCW 46.12.700; full ch. 84.60; Full AGO 1957 No. 15; full AGLO 1975 No. 56; full enacted 1969 c. 251; full dated DOR newsletter, p. 7 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18

  7. Full ch. 84.68; full local-government claim statute ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12

  8. Full Article 9A; RCW 19.150.020–.060 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  9. RCW 6.21.020; Chs. 6.21; Full Article 9A; full ch. 6.21; RCW 62A.9A-333; Full Article 9A scope/priority; Full ch. 60.60; Ch. 62A.9A; Full Article 9A scope ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  10. Ch. 62A.9A ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  11. RCW 7.60.015, .190, .260; current CR 66; Full enacted 2004 c. 165; complete final model, prefatory note p. 2, official legislative-hosted copy ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24

  12. RCW 7.08.030; RCW 7.60.260 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  13. LLC; LLC definitions/admission/transfer; partnership; securities ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14

  14. Article 6 disposition; RCW 82.32.140; WAC 458-20-216 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  15. WAC 314-07-100; WAC 458-02-201; RCW 66.24.025 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  16. RCW 6.21.020; officer procedure ↩ ↩2

  17. Full official Dalziell decision, pp. 7–9; CR 60, full rule; RCW 4.16.080 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16

  18. Full RAP 12.8; full RAP 8.1; Ch. 6.19 RCW; RCW 6.21.110 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  19. Ch. 82.08; ch. 82.12; auctioneer rule ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  20. Full official Dalziell decision, pp. 7–9; CR 60, full rule; RCW 4.16.080; RCW 6.15.060; Snohomish personal-property procedure; RCW 6.21.070 ↩

  21. RCW 6.21.070; RCW 6.21.070, .080, .110; Chs. 6.21; full ch. 6.21 ↩

  22. RCW 6.15.060; Snohomish personal-property procedure; RCW 6.21.070; RCW 6.21.070, .080, .110; Snohomish ↩

  23. Full ch. 60.10; full ch. 60.10 RCW ↩

  24. Article 6 disposition; RCW 82.32.140; WAC 458-20-216; WAC 314-07-100; WAC 458-02-201; RCW 66.24.025 ↩

  25. RCW 7.60.015, .190, .260; current CR 66; Full enacted 2004 c. 165; complete final model, prefatory note p. 2, official legislative-hosted copy; RCW 7.08.030; RCW 7.60.260 ↩