Washington — Tax & Mortgage Foreclosure
Legal information, not legal advice. Verify against the cited primary sources before acting. Last verified: 2026-06-02.
Washington is a tax-deed state: counties do not sell tax-lien certificates to private parties. After three years of delinquency the county treasurer issues a certificate of delinquency to the county (RCW 84.64.050), the county forecloses the lien judicially in superior court, and the treasurer sells the property itself at public auction to the highest bidder for a deed (RCW 84.64.080). There is no post-sale redemption for ordinary owners — the redemption right runs before the day of sale, plus a three-year window for minors and legally incompetent persons (RCW 84.64.070). Surplus from a sale that exceeds the tax debt is, by statute, refunded to the former record owner (RCW 84.64.080(10)) — a structure that already aligned Washington with tyler-v-hennepin-county. Mortgage foreclosure is predominantly non-judicial under the Deeds of Trust Act (ch. 61.24 RCW), with judicial foreclosure available under ch. 61.12 RCW.
0. Identity & Classification
- Recording unit: county (count: 39)
- Tax sale type: tax deed (no lien-certificate sales to investors; the lien certificate is issued to the county, RCW 84.64.050)
- Tax foreclosure process: judicial — foreclosed in superior court in the name of the county by the treasurer with the prosecuting attorney (RCW 84.64.050)
- Mortgage foreclosure process: both — predominantly non-judicial under the Deeds of Trust Act (ch. 61.24 RCW); judicial mortgage foreclosure available under ch. 61.12 RCW
- Selling authority: county treasurer (RCW 84.64.080)
- Statutory home: Title 84 (Property Taxes), Ch. 84.64 RCW (Lien Foreclosure) — https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64&full=true ; collection/interest in Ch. 84.56 RCW; tax-title land disposition in Ch. 36.35 RCW
- Tyler v. Hennepin compliance: compliant — RCW 84.64.080(10) requires the excess over the minimum bid to be refunded to the record owner (the person who held title on the date the certificate of delinquency issued); the county may only escheat the surplus if unclaimed for three years. The state therefore did not retain surplus equity even before Tyler (2023). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.080
1. Tax Sale Mechanics
- What is sold: the deed (fee title) to the property, sold “as is,” conveyed by treasurer’s tax deed under RCW 84.64.080. No investor lien certificates.
- Bidding method: highest-bid deed (oral/online auction to the “highest and best bidder”), RCW 84.64.080(4). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.080
- Interest / penalty (on the delinquent tax, not a bid-down): delinquent property taxes accrue interest monthly from the date of delinquency. Since Jan 1, 2023 the rate is 9% per annum on residential real property with four or fewer units (incl. manufactured/mobile homes per RCW 59.20.030) and 12% per annum on all other property (it was 12% across the board through 2022). RCW 84.56.020. https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.56.020
- Minimum bid composition: “the total amount of taxes, interest, and costs” due on the whole property in the certificate of delinquency, RCW 84.64.080(4).
- Sale frequency: annual in most counties (after the foreclosure judgment).
- Typical month: varies by county; commonly November–December (e.g., King, Snohomish, Pierce treasurer calendars).
- Venue: both — historically in-person courthouse auctions; many counties now use online auction platforms.
- Platform vendors: county-specific (e.g., Bid4Assets used by several WA counties); confirm on each county treasurer page → see county pages.
- Registration & deposit: set by county; the property is sold “as is” with no warranty (RCW 84.64.080).
- Subsequent taxes (“subs”): not applicable in the investor sense — there are no certificate holders. The county simply forecloses all delinquent years embraced in the certificate of delinquency.
2. Right of Redemption → see right-of-redemption
- Pre-sale right: YES. Any person owning a recorded interest may pay the taxes, interest, and costs at any time before the day of the sale and stop the foreclosure as to that property (RCW 84.64.060); the treasurer issues a receipt or certificate of payment. https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.060 Redemption is permitted up to the close of business the day before the day of sale (RCW 84.64.070). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.070
- Post-sale period (ordinary owners): NONE. Washington has no general statutory right of redemption after a tax-foreclosure sale. Title vests in the grantee on the treasurer’s deed (RCW 84.64.080).
- Post-sale period (minors / legally incompetent persons): three years after the date of sale to redeem, on payment of the purchase amount plus statutory interest and the reasonable value of good-faith improvements (less value of use), RCW 84.64.070.
- Who may redeem (pre-sale): the owner and any person owning a recorded interest or holding a lien of record (RCW 84.64.060, .070).
- Redemption amount formula (pre-sale): certificate amount + statutory interest from issuance + all taxes, interest, and costs accruing after issuance (RCW 84.64.070).
- Premium to certificate holder: N/A (no private certificate holders).
- Extinguishment: the right to redeem ends at close of business the day before the sale; the treasurer’s deed then conveys absolute title (RCW 84.64.070–.080).
- Special tolling: minors and legally incompetent persons — three years post-sale (RCW 84.64.070). Bankruptcy automatic stay and SCRA apply as elsewhere → see bankruptcy-automatic-stay, scra-protections.
3. Surplus / Excess Proceeds → see surplus-funds, third-party-recovery-rules
- Belongs to: the former record owner (the person who held title on the date the certificate of delinquency issued), after recorded water-sewer district liens are paid, RCW 84.64.080(10). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.080
- Claim waterfall: (1) minimum bid (taxes, interest, costs) retained by county; (2) recorded water-sewer district liens; (3) record owner receives the excess on application (RCW 84.64.080(10)).
- Filing venue: the county treasurer’s office that conducted the sale (the treasurer mails the record owner a letter and claim application).
- Claim deadline: three years after the date of the sale (RCW 84.64.080(10)).
- Escheat: if no claim is received within three years, the treasurer deposits the excess into the county current expense fund, which extinguishes all owner claims to it (RCW 84.64.080(10)). (Note: this is a county-fund deposit, not escheat to the state unclaimed-property administrator.)
- Documentation required: treasurer’s claim application; proof of record ownership on the certificate-of-delinquency date; identity. (County-specific; King County directs claimants to the Treasury office — see Operations.)
- Third-party recovery (surplus recovery agents):
- fee cap: 5% of the value returned to the owner. It is unlawful to seek, receive, or contract for a fee “in excess of five percent of the value thereof returned to such owner” for locating “funds held by a county that are proceeds from a foreclosure for delinquent property taxes, assessments, or other liens.” Originally RCW 63.29.350; the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (ch. 63.29) was repealed effective Jan 1, 2023 and the prohibition was re-enacted by ESHB 1637 (2023) with the same 5% cap and added to the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (ch. 63.30 RCW). https://wa-law.org/bill/2023-24/hb/1637/S.E/
- licensing_required: no specific surplus-recovery license identified (the conduct is policed by the fee cap + Consumer Protection Act rather than licensure).
- assignment_of_claim_allowed: statute regulates locating-fee agreements, not outright purchase of the right; see needs_verification.
- cooling_off_period: under the recovery-agreement rules, agreements to locate property held by the unclaimed-property administrator are enforceable only if in a signed record disclosing recovery before/after the fee (RCW 63.30.780); ESHB 1637 voids agreements over the cap. https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=63.30.780
- contract_disclosure_rules: written, signed agreement stating the property, services, and the amount expected before and after the fee (RCW 63.30.780).
- prohibited_practices: charging more than 5% — a misdemeanor (fine of not less than the fee and up to 10× the fee, and/or up to 30 days), and an unfair/deceptive act under the Consumer Protection Act, ch. 19.86 RCW (ESHB 1637 (2023)).
- citation: ESHB 1637 (2023) (re-enacting former RCW 63.29.350); RCW 63.30.780.
- Notice to former owner required? Yes — the treasurer notifies the record owner of available excess funds and provides a claim application (RCW 84.64.080(10); confirmed by King County Treasury practice).
▸ For Investors / Operators — A Washington tax-foreclosure overbid generates excess that the treasurer refunds, after recorded water-sewer district liens, to the record owner as of the certificate-of-delinquency date — not to the purchaser (RCW 84.64.080(10)). Before committing capital, weigh the absence of post-sale redemption (§2/2b — only minors and incompetents have a three-year window), the path to marketable/insurable title (§5b — superior-court quiet title under ch. 7.28 RCW, plus the seven-year RCW 7.28.070/.080 color-of-title seasoning most insurers require), and which liens survive the deed (§7b — the IRS § 7425 120-day redemption is the principal trap; HOA/condo assessment liens do not survive a tax sale).
▸ For Former Owners — When a Washington tax-foreclosure sale brings more than the taxes, interest, and costs, that excess belongs to you as the record owner on the certificate date (RCW 84.64.080(10)); a later sale or assignment of the property does not redirect it. File with the county treasurer that conducted the sale within three years of the sale, or the excess is deposited into the county current expense fund and all owner claims are extinguished.
4. Mortgage Foreclosure
- Process: both. The dominant method is non-judicial trustee’s sale under the Deeds of Trust Act, ch. 61.24 RCW; judicial foreclosure of a mortgage is available under ch. 61.12 RCW.
- Timeline (non-judicial, ch. 61.24): Notice of Default (≥30 days before recording notice of sale), then Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded/served, with the sale not less than 190 days from default; sale held no sooner than the statutory window. (Confirm exact day counts against RCW 61.24.030/.040 — see needs_verification.) https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24&full=true
- Reinstatement right: YES — the borrower may cure the default up to 11 days before the trustee’s sale (RCW 61.24.090). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.090
- Redemption after sale:
- Non-judicial trustee’s sale: NO redemption — “no person has any right, by statute or otherwise, to redeem the property sold at a trustee’s sale” (RCW 61.24.050). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.050
- Judicial mortgage foreclosure (ch. 61.12): statutory redemption applies under ch. 6.23 RCW — 8 months after sale where the mortgage (post-June 30, 1961) states the property is not principally agricultural and the creditor waived a deficiency, otherwise 1 year (RCW 6.23.020). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=6.23&full=true
- Deficiency judgment: non-judicial trustee’s sale generally bars a deficiency; a limited deficiency is allowed only for waste / wrongful retention of rents, insurance, or condemnation awards, and not against a borrower-occupied principal residence (RCW 61.24.100). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.100 Judicial foreclosure allows a deficiency subject to the redemption framework.
- Surplus distribution: trustee applies proceeds to sale costs, then the secured obligation; surplus is deposited with the clerk of the superior court, junior liens/interests attach to the surplus in their prior order of priority, and the clerk disburses only on court order after a motion with ≥20 days’ notice (RCW 61.24.080). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.080
- Sale officer: trustee (non-judicial); sheriff (judicial decree of sale).
5. Sale Procedure Playbooks
- Treasurer / tax-collector sale — ordered steps → see treasurer-sale:
- Taxes become delinquent; interest accrues monthly (RCW 84.56.020).
- After 3 years’ delinquency, treasurer issues a certificate of delinquency to the county for all years’ taxes, interest, costs (RCW 84.64.050).
- Treasurer files certificates with the superior court clerk and, with the prosecuting attorney, forecloses in the name of the county (RCW 84.64.050).
- Notice & summons served / given in a manner reasonably calculated to inform the owner and any recorded interest/lien holder; 30 days to appear and pay or defend (RCW 84.64.050).
- Court enters judgment and order of sale; treasurer sells to highest bidder at a minimum bid of taxes + interest + costs (RCW 84.64.080).
- Treasurer issues and records the tax deed; surplus refunded to record owner; unclaimed after 3 years → county current expense fund (RCW 84.64.080).
- Sheriff sale (judicial mortgage) — ordered steps → see sheriff-sale: decree of foreclosure → order of sale → sheriff publishes/posts notice → public auction → confirmation → sheriff’s deed (or certificate of sale, with redemption under ch. 6.23).
- Notice requirements (tax): notice/summons by personal service or publication once in a newspaper of general circulation plus certified mail to owners and recorded interest holders; content must comply with RCW 84.64.050 (defects are jurisdictional — see Case Law).
- Upset bid / confirmation: tax sales — no upset-bid period; sale is to the highest bidder and the deed issues (RCW 84.64.080). Judicial mortgage sales are confirmed by the court.
- Payment terms: tax sale — payment at auction per county terms; “as is.”
- Deed issued: treasurer’s tax deed, recorded by the county auditor; vests title in the grantee with no warranty of title, fitness, zoning, or condition (RCW 84.64.080).
6. Due Process & Notice → see due-process-notice
- Standard: notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties” (mullane-v-central-hanover) — codified in RCW 84.64.050’s “reasonably calculated to inform” language; failure to comply is jurisdictional.
- Required attempts: notice and summons to the owner and every person with a recorded interest or lien of record, by personal service or publication + certified mail, with the correct address and an adequate property description (RCW 84.64.050). Returned mail triggers the jones-v-flowers duty to take additional reasonable steps.
- Consequence of defective notice: VOID — a county’s failure to comply with the statutory content/manner of notice deprives the court of jurisdiction and renders the foreclosure judgment, sale, and tax deed void (see In re King County below).
- Leading cases: in-re-king-county-foreclosure-of-liens-1991, in-re-foreclosure-of-liens-1996, mullane-v-central-hanover, jones-v-flowers, mennonite-v-adams, tyler-v-hennepin-county.
7. Title & Marketability
- Deed warranty level: none — tax deed conveys “as is,” without warranty of title, condition, zoning, buildability, or fitness (RCW 84.64.080).
- Marketable immediately? No — title insurers commonly decline to insure a fresh tax title; practitioners typically quiet title and/or rely on the passage of time before clean insurable title is available.
- Quiet title required? Practically yes for marketable/insurable title (quiet-title action under ch. 7.28 RCW); tax-title land sold by the county can be cleared under ch. 36.35 RCW.
- SOL to challenge deed: RCW 84.64.180 makes a tax judgment conclusive in collateral proceedings except where the tax was paid or the property was not taxable, and estops pre-judgment objections; however, void judgments (e.g., for defective notice) may be attacked notwithstanding the estoppel statute (In re King County, 1991). https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.180 — see needs_verification for the precise limitations period for a direct challenge.
- Title insurance availability: limited until title is quieted / time has run.
- Common defects: defective statutory notice (jurisdictional/void), incorrect property description, omitted recorded interest holders, and chain-of-title gaps.
8. Case Law (real, verified)
| Case | Year | Topic | Holding (plain English) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| in-re-king-county-foreclosure-of-liens-1991 (In re King County for Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Real Property Taxes 1985–1988, 117 Wn.2d 77, 811 P.2d 945) | 1991 | due_process, sale_procedure | A county’s failure to comply with the statutory content/manner of tax-foreclosure notice (here, wrong street address / inadequate property description) deprives the court of jurisdiction and renders the foreclosure judgment, sale, and tax deed void; the estoppel-by-deed statute (RCW 84.64.180) does not bar setting aside a sale on a void judgment. | https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/king-county-for-foreclosure-887094737 |
| in-re-foreclosure-of-liens-1996 (In re Foreclosure of Liens, 130 Wn.2d 142, 922 P.2d 73) | 1996 | due_process, redemption | A county foreclosing the separately-assessed undivided fractional interest of one tenant-in-common need not give notice to the other cotenants; statutory and due-process notice ran only to the delinquent cotenant whose interest was foreclosed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1287473/in-re-foreclosure-of-liens/ |
| tyler-v-hennepin-county (Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631) | 2023 | surplus, due_process | Retaining the surplus equity from a tax-foreclosure sale beyond the tax debt is a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Washington’s RCW 84.64.080(10) already refunds the excess to the record owner, so WA is consistent with Tyler. | https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/631/ |
(See needs_verification re: a directly-on-point Washington appellate decision construing the RCW 84.64.080(10) surplus statute and a published case construing RCW 84.64.070 pre-sale redemption.)
9. Edge Cases (state-specific notes)
- bankruptcy-automatic-stay — a Chapter 7/13 filing stays the tax foreclosure; the 3-year delinquency/foreclosure timeline is affected by the stay (general federal rule).
- federal-tax-lien-redemption — the United States retains a 120-day right to redeem after a sale that discharges a junior federal tax lien (26 U.S.C. § 7425); applies to WA tax-deed sales like any other.
- heirs-property — fractional/cotenancy interests can be separately assessed and foreclosed without notice to other cotenants (In re Foreclosure of Liens, 1996).
- manufactured-homes — manufactured/mobile homes (RCW 59.20.030) get the lower 9% delinquency interest rate as “residential real property with four or fewer units” (RCW 84.56.020).
- hoa-super-priority — Washington’s condominium-assessment lien has a six-month super-priority over mortgages (RCW 64.34.364), but that lien is expressly junior to real-property tax liens, so it does not survive a Chapter 84.64 tax foreclosure, and the super-priority is forfeited if the association forecloses non-judicially. See §7b. Recorded water-sewer district liens are the statutorily prioritized senior claim against tax-sale surplus (RCW 84.64.080(10)).
- void-vs-voidable — defective statutory notice in a WA tax foreclosure is jurisdictional/void, not merely voidable (In re King County, 1991).
- scra-protections — Servicemembers Civil Relief Act protections apply.
10. Operations
- Where records live: county treasurer (delinquency, certificates, sales, excess funds), county auditor/recorder (deeds), superior court clerk (foreclosure judgments; mortgage-sale surplus deposits).
- Public access URLs:
- RCW Ch. 84.64 (Lien Foreclosure): https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64&full=true
- RCW 84.64.080 (sale, surplus, deed): https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.080
- RCW 84.56.020 (interest rates): https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.56.020
- RCW Ch. 61.24 (Deeds of Trust): https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24&full=true
- King County tax-foreclosure excess funds: https://kingcounty.gov/en/dept/executive-services/buildings-property/treasury-operations/tax-foreclosures/excess-auction-money
- DOR special notice (delinquent-tax interest changes): https://dor.wa.gov/forms-publications/publications-subject/special-notices/legislative-changes-delinquent-property-taxes-0
- Typical costs: treasurer collects a deed-preparation fee plus the auditor recording fee at deed issuance (RCW 84.64.080); surplus-recovery fees capped at 5% (ESHB 1637).
- Typical timelines: ~3 years delinquency before certificate issues; foreclosure
- judgment + sale typically completes within months thereafter; 3 years to claim surplus before county-fund deposit.
- Key agencies: county treasurer; county prosecuting attorney; superior court; county auditor/recorder; Washington Department of Revenue (interest-rate guidance); Washington DOR Unclaimed Property (general unclaimed-property, ch. 63.30 RCW).
- Useful forms: county treasurer excess-funds / surplus claim application (county-specific); foreclosure summons/notice forms (prosecuting attorney).
2b. Redemption Advanced
Assignability of the redemption right:
- Who holds the right: the property may be redeemed before the sale by the owner, a tenant-in-common or joint tenant (as to their interest), or any person owning a recorded interest or holding a lien of record, on payment of the certificate amount plus statutory interest and all taxes/interest/costs accruing after issuance. “No fee may be charged for any redemption.” (RCW 84.64.070, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- Is the right assignable? The pre-sale right to redeem is not personal to the owner — any person who acquires a recorded interest or lien of record may redeem in that capacity. A third party therefore typically gains redemption standing by taking a conveyance (e.g., a quitclaim deed) or an assignment of a lien from the owner, becoming a person “owning a recorded interest.” RCW 84.64.070 imposes no heirs-only or relatives-only restriction. needs_verification — no retrieved Washington appellate decision squarely holding that a stranger-investor’s owner-deed taken solely to acquire pre-sale redemption standing is or is not subject to attack.
- Purchase mechanism: a deed or recorded interest from the owner; no court approval is required for the pre-sale right. For the minor/incompetent three-year post-sale right, redemption requires paying the purchase amount plus statutory interest and the reasonable value of the purchaser’s good-faith improvements (less the value of use) (RCW 84.64.070).
Equitable vs. statutory redemption:
- Washington’s tax-foreclosure redemption is purely statutory (RCW 84.64.070). There is no separate equitable right of redemption that survives the statutory cutoff (close of business the day before the sale) for ordinary owners; once the treasurer’s deed issues, title vests in the grantee (RCW 84.64.080) and no equitable redemption remains.
- Available pre-sale only: Yes, for ordinary owners. The lone post-sale exception is the three-year statutory window for minors and legally incompetent persons (RCW 84.64.070) — itself statutory, not equitable.
Installment redemption:
- Chapter 84.64 provides no installment-payment plan for redeeming a parcel in foreclosure; redemption requires payment of the full certificate amount plus accrued interest, taxes, and costs before the sale (RCW 84.64.070). (Counties may offer pre- certificate payment arrangements for current-year delinquency under separate collection authority — that is payment to avoid foreclosure, not statutory installment redemption.) needs_verification — no WA primary source retrieved authorizing installment redemption of a parcel already in foreclosure.
Assignment of the certificate of delinquency / deed mid-redemption:
- The certificate of delinquency is issued only to the county and the foreclosure proceeds “in the name of the county” — Washington has no private certificate-holder market, so there is no investor certificate to assign mid-redemption. (RCW 84.64.050, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- A tax-deed purchaser takes title at the sale; there is no redemption period running against an ordinary owner during which the purchaser would hold a redeemable interest to assign. Post-sale, the grantee holds fee title (subject only to the narrow minor/incompetent window) and may convey it like any other deed.
3b. Surplus Advanced
Claim assignability — surplus (RCW 84.64.080(10)):
- Full assignment permitted? The statute returns the excess to “the record owner of the property” and expressly provides that “later assignments or deeds do not affect the payment of excess funds to the record owner” — i.e., the underlying property conveyance does not move the surplus entitlement off the certificate-date record owner. (RCW 84.64.080, retrieved 2026-06-02) Chapter 84.64 does not itself prohibit the record owner from assigning the surplus claim to a recovery agent; the practice is policed instead by the surplus-locating-fee cap (below). needs_verification — whether an outright assignment of the surplus claim (versus a locating-fee agreement) is permitted or capped; the fee-cap statute regulates “locating” agreements, not a bare assignment of the fund.
- Assignment vs. fee agreement: the operative WA distinction is the 5% cap on locating fees for “funds held by a county that are proceeds from a foreclosure for delinquent property taxes, assessments, or other liens.” It is unlawful to seek, receive, or contract for more than “five percent of the value thereof returned to such owner.” Originally RCW 63.29.350 (repealed eff. 1/1/2023 with the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act); re-enacted with the same 5% cap by ESHB 1637 (2023). (ESHB 1637 (2023), retrieved 2026-06-01)
- Fee cap applies to assignments? The cap is framed around fees for locating/returning the funds; whether it reaches a discounted outright purchase of the claim is not settled by a retrieved primary source. needs_verification.
Statute of limitations on the surplus claim:
- Period / trigger: the excess must be claimed within three years after the date of the sale; if no claim is received, the treasurer deposits the excess into the county current expense fund, “which extinguishes all claims by any owner to the excess funds.” (RCW 84.64.080(10), retrieved 2026-06-02)
- Trigger is the date of the sale (not the date of deposit or deed). This is a county-fund cutoff, not an escheat to the state unclaimed-property administrator, so the general unclaimed-property reclaim route does not apply once the three years run.
Competing claimant procedure:
- RCW 84.64.080(10) directs the excess first to recorded water-sewer district liens, then to the record owner; it does not prescribe a formal interpleader. Where competing claimants (e.g., a lienholder and the record owner) assert overlapping rights, the treasurer in practice withholds disbursement and the dispute is resolved judicially in superior court. needs_verification — Chapter 84.64 does not set an interpleader or first-to-file rule for tax-foreclosure surplus; practice is county-specific. (By contrast, the non-judicial mortgage surplus statute, RCW 61.24.080, does deposit surplus with the superior-court clerk and require a noticed motion — see §4.)
- No strict filing-race: entitlement is statutory (record owner as of the certificate date), so first-to-file does not defeat the true record owner.
Deceased-owner procedure:
- The excess belongs to the certificate-date “record owner.” Where that owner is deceased, the estate is entitled; a personal representative with letters from the probate court has standing to claim. Heirs generally must open probate (or use a small-estate procedure) to establish standing; Washington’s intestacy statute (Title 11 RCW, the probate/trust code) governs distribution. needs_verification — whether WA county treasurers accept a direct-heir surplus claim without probate letters when ownership is unambiguous, and the small-estate affidavit threshold under ch. 11.62 RCW.
Fraudulent-conveyance exposure:
- An assignment of the surplus claim (or of the underlying redemption interest) by an insolvent owner for less than reasonably equivalent value is exposed to a creditor challenge under Washington’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), ch. 19.40 RCW (formerly the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; renamed by RCW 19.40.900). A transfer is voidable if made with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor” (RCW 19.40.041) or, as to existing creditors, without reasonably equivalent value while insolvent (RCW 19.40.051).
- SOL: a claim is extinguished unless brought within four years after the transfer (or, for actual-intent fraud, the later of four years or one year after the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered). (RCW 19.40.091, retrieved 2026-06-02)
Surplus-claimant notice:
- Yes — the treasurer notifies the record owner of available excess and provides a claim application (RCW 84.64.080(10); corroborated by King County Treasury practice). Chapter 84.64 does not separately require the treasurer to notify junior lienholders of the surplus beyond the priority for recorded water-sewer district liens. needs_verification — whether any WA authority requires affirmative lienholder notice of tax-foreclosure surplus.
5b. Title Advanced
Quiet title — when required vs. optional:
- Practical standard: a Washington treasurer’s tax deed does not convey immediately marketable or insurable title. Title insurers generally decline to insure a fresh tax title; practitioners obtain marketable/insurable title either by a quiet-title action under ch. 7.28 RCW in superior court or by waiting out the statutory color-of-title seasoning. (ch. 7.28 RCW, retrieved 2026-06-02; Rowley Legal / Tax Title Services practice guidance, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- Statutory seasoning (color of title + 7 years’ taxes): a person in actual, open, and notorious possession under claim and color of title (the tax deed) who pays all taxes for seven successive years is “adjudged to be the legal owner … to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title” (RCW 7.28.070); a parallel seven-year rule covers vacant/unoccupied land paid under color of title (RCW 7.28.080). Many insurers will underwrite on the strength of this seven-year seasoning where possession and tax payment are clean.
- Judicial confirmation before deed issues? No. The tax foreclosure judgment is entered before the treasurer’s sale, but the sale and deed do not require a separate post-sale court confirmation (RCW 84.64.080). (Judicial mortgage sales under ch. 61.12 are confirmed by the court — see §4.)
Action type and court:
- Quiet title is a judicial action in superior court in the county where the land lies, under ch. 7.28 RCW (RCW 7.28.010 brings recovery/quiet-title actions in “the superior court of the proper county”; RCW 7.28.280 permits a possessor to quiet title against adverse claimants). (ch. 7.28 RCW, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- For county-held tax-title land, the county (or its successors, assigns) may bring a special action under RCW 36.35.160 in superior court to correct defects and determine adverse claims. (RCW 36.35.160, retrieved 2026-06-02)
Typical timeline and cost:
- Uncontested: roughly 3 months at the fast end; commonly 6–12 months with service by publication on unknown/unlocatable parties.
- Cost: commonly $4,500+ for an uncontested action (attorney fee + filing + title report
- publication); contested cases run higher. (Practice estimates — Rowley Legal / Tax Title Services / investor-title guidance, retrieved 2026-06-02; not a statutory figure.)
Does quiet title cure all pre-sale defects?
- A properly served quiet-title judgment extinguishes joined claims and clouds. It does not necessarily cure a jurisdictional notice defect that rendered the foreclosure void (defective statutory notice deprives the court of jurisdiction — see §6, In re King County), which can be raised against a void judgment notwithstanding the estoppel statute (RCW 84.64.180).
Marketable Title Act:
- Washington has no Marketable Record Title Act (no 30/40-year root-of-title statute of the Florida/Ohio/Michigan type). Title marketability is governed by the recording act, common law, the ch. 7.28 seasoning/adverse-possession provisions, and the tax-title cure action in RCW 36.35.160. needs_verification — no WA MRTA statute located; flagged as an honest gap.
Deed seasoning — title-insurer requirements:
- Insurers commonly require either a completed quiet-title action or the seven-year color-of-title-plus-taxes seasoning (RCW 7.28.070/.080) before underwriting a tax title; an expedited “tax title certification” product is offered by specialty firms as a quiet-title alternative. needs_verification of specific named-insurer underwriting guidelines (market practice, not statute).
- Tax deeds carry no title warranty (RCW 84.64.080), so they are insured (when at all) on the strength of curative work, not the deed’s covenants.
Chain-of-title cure depth:
- A quiet-title judgment cures clouds from all pre-deed adverse claims properly joined and served. The tax deed itself conveys the property free of the former owner’s interest, but does not by its own force clear a federal tax lien where the United States was not § 7425- noticed (§7b) or a jurisdictional-notice voidness.
5c. TRO & Injunctive Relief
Recognized grounds to halt a sale:
- Notice / due-process defect — failure of the RCW 84.64.050 statutory notice “reasonably calculated to inform” the owner and recorded interest/lien holders (Mullane; Jones v. Flowers; In re King County).
- Payment / redemption dispute — a timely pre-sale tender refused or misapplied (RCW 84.64.070).
- Constitutional — taking-without-just-compensation (Tyler-type), though WA already refunds surplus to the record owner.
- SCRA — active-duty servicemember protections → see scra-protections.
- Bankruptcy automatic stay — sale in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362 → see bankruptcy-automatic-stay.
Legal standard:
- Washington’s general injunction grounds are codified in RCW 7.40.020 (relief restraining an act that “during the litigation would produce great injury,” or acts violating the plaintiff’s rights). (RCW 7.40.020, retrieved 2026-06-02) Washington courts apply a three-part test: a clear legal or equitable right, a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right, and actual and substantial injury (the Tyler Pipe formulation). needs_verification — controlling WA opinion stating the three-part test was corroborated via search, not retrieved as a clean slip opinion. Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed by CR 65.
- Bond: under CR 65(c) and RCW 7.40.080, the court generally requires security for costs and damages if the restrained party is wrongfully enjoined; the State and its officers may be exempt, and the amount is set by the court. needs_verification of the precise CR 65(c) bond text against a retrieved rule page.
Court with jurisdiction:
- Superior court in the county where the property lies. A tax foreclosure is already pending in superior court (the county’s in rem action), so a motion may be made in that case before the sale; a separate emergency action is also available.
Emergency timeline:
- An ex parte TRO meeting the CR 65(b) showing can be obtained on an emergency basis (often same-day or within 24–48 hours) at the court’s discretion, followed by an expedited preliminary-injunction hearing. needs_verification of any fixed WA time limit for the follow-on hearing.
Effect on a completed sale:
- After the gavel and the treasurer’s deed, undoing the sale generally requires a judicial action. A jurisdictional notice defect renders the foreclosure judgment, sale, and deed void and may be attacked despite the RCW 84.64.180 estoppel statute (In re King County, 1991); a mere irregularity does not. needs_verification of a retrieved WA holding squarely on the effect of a post-deed TRO on a completed tax sale.
Non-judicial (mortgage) note — the key Washington distinction:
- A non-judicial trustee’s sale under the Deeds of Trust Act can be halted only through the statutory restraining-order procedure of RCW 61.24.130, which is the exclusive method. The applicant must give the trustee five days’ notice of the application and, as a condition of the order, pay into the court clerk the sums that would be due on the obligation as if it were not being foreclosed (the periodic payments, or accruing interest on a fully-due obligation), plus court-set security. (RCW 61.24.130, retrieved 2026-06-02) Failure to use this procedure (or to enjoin the sale before it occurs) generally waives challenges to a completed trustee’s sale — a materially higher bar than halting a judicial tax foreclosure.
Leading cases: in-re-king-county-foreclosure-of-liens-1991 (notice-defect voidness), jones-v-flowers (due-process standard).
7b. Lien Survival & Purchaser Exposure
IRS 120-day redemption (26 U.S.C. § 7425):
- Applies. Where a federal tax lien is recorded junior to the tax lien being foreclosed, the party conducting the sale must give the United States written notice not less than 25 days before the sale; if properly noticed, the federal lien is discharged but the Secretary may redeem within 120 days of the sale (or the local-law redemption period, whichever is longer). If the United States is not noticed, the federal lien survives the sale. (26 U.S.C. § 7425, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- Redemption amount: the United States pays the price prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2410(d) (generally the sale price plus interest and certain costs) and records a certificate of redemption. Practical exposure: an un-noticed federal tax lien is the most common way a Washington tax-deed buyer takes subject to a surviving senior federal claim — a federal-tax- lien search before bidding is essential. See federal-tax-lien-redemption.
HOA / condominium super-priority:
- Washington has a six-month HOA/condo assessment super-priority over mortgages, but it does not override real-property tax liens, and it is forfeited if the association forecloses non-judicially.
- Condominium Act (RCW 64.34.364): the association’s assessment lien is “prior to the mortgages” for common-expense assessments that would have become due in the six months immediately preceding a sheriff’s/trustee’s sale — but the lien is prior to all liens and encumbrances except “liens for real property taxes and other governmental assessments or charges against the unit.” And “if the association forecloses its lien … nonjudicially pursuant to chapter 61.24 RCW, the association shall not be entitled to the lien priority” super-priority. (RCW 64.34.364, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- Survives a tax sale? No. Because the assessment lien is expressly junior to real- property tax liens, a Chapter 84.64 tax foreclosure (enforcing the ad valorem tax lien) takes priority, and the HOA/condo assessment lien does not survive ahead of the tax title. needs_verification — no retrieved WA appellate decision squarely holding the assessment lien is extinguished by a tax-foreclosure deed (the statutory carve-out for tax liens supports it, but a case is not retrieved).
- Survives a mortgage foreclosure? The six-month super-priority portion can prime a first mortgage in a judicial foreclosure; the balance is subordinate. (The HOA-Act counterpart, ch. 64.38/64.90 RCW, follows the same six-month-priority pattern — needs_ verification of the parallel planned-community citation.)
Environmental / CERCLA liens:
- A federal CERCLA lien (42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)) is a federal claim; as with a federal tax lien, § 7425-type notice to the United States governs whether it is discharged by the sale. CERCLA owner/operator liability runs with the land regardless of how title was acquired, so a tax-deed purchaser of a contaminated site can face cleanup liability independent of any recorded lien. Washington’s Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA, ch. 70A.305 RCW) imposes strict, retroactive cleanup liability on current owners. needs_verification — no WA-specific authority retrieved on CERCLA/MTCA lien survival of a Chapter 84.64 tax deed; whether MTCA creates a tax-title-priming super-lien is unresolved.
Municipal code / utility liens:
- The surplus waterfall pays recorded water-sewer district liens ahead of the record owner (RCW 84.64.080(10)), signaling those utility liens are treated as priority claims paid from the proceeds. Whether municipal code-enforcement / nuisance-abatement liens survive a Chapter 84.64 tax deed is not resolved by retrieved primary authority. needs_verification.
Mechanic’s liens:
- A mechanic’s/materialman’s lien (ch. 60.04 RCW) is a private statutory lien; its priority against a tax title turns on recording dates and the superiority of the ad valorem tax lien. needs_verification — no retrieved WA authority squarely on whether a perfected mechanic’s lien survives a Chapter 84.64 tax deed.
Junior-mortgage exposure:
- A Washington tax foreclosure enforces the ad valorem tax lien, which is generally superior to private mortgages; a properly conducted tax deed conveys free of junior and senior private mortgages, provided the required RCW 84.64.050 notice ran to the owner and every recorded interest/lien holder. Common mistake: assuming the tax deed wipes everything — it does not clear a federal tax lien where the United States was not § 7425-noticed, and failure to notice a recorded mortgagee can be a jurisdictional defect that voids the foreclosure (In re King County; RCW 84.64.050).
Due-diligence checklist (WA tax-deed buyer):
- Federal tax lien search (county lien index / IRS) — § 7425 notice / 120-day redemption.
- Recorded-interest / mortgagee check — confirm RCW 84.64.050 notice ran to all of record (failure may be jurisdictional / void).
- Notice-chain review — service/publication + certified mail under RCW 84.64.050.
- Water-sewer district & municipal lien search — utility liens are paid ahead of the owner from surplus; code-lien survival unresolved.
- HOA / condo status — junior to the tax lien; confirm any separately recorded interests.
- Bankruptcy search on the owner — active stay at the time of sale?
- Probate / heirs check — unprobated estates and cotenancy interests are a frequent notice and quiet-title issue (note In re Foreclosure of Liens, 1996, on cotenant notice).
- Environmental check — CERCLA / MTCA cleanup liability runs with the land.
- SCRA servicemember check on the owner.
- Physical inspection / occupancy — title vests in the grantee on the deed (RCW 84.64.080).
10b. Purchaser Obligations During the Redemption Period
Washington has no general post-sale redemption period for ordinary owners, so the tax- deed purchaser has no “during redemption” obligations of the lien-certificate type. The narrow exception is the three-year window for minors and legally incompetent persons (RCW 84.64.070); this module addresses obligations in that window and the purchaser’s post-deed posture.
Subsequent taxes:
- Because there is no certificate-holder system, there is no “subs” accrual. After the deed, the tax-deed grantee holds title and is responsible for subsequent taxes as any owner. During the minor/incompetent three-year window the purchaser holds the deed and pays taxes as owner; if redemption occurs, the redemptioner pays the purchase amount plus statutory interest and the reasonable value of good-faith improvements (less value of use) — see “costs collectible” below (RCW 84.64.070).
Owner-expiration notice:
- Chapter 84.64 places the pre-sale notice burden on the treasurer/county (RCW 84.64.050), not on a purchaser. There is no statutory obligation on a tax-deed purchaser to notify the owner that a redemption right is about to expire (the ordinary right expires at close of business the day before the sale). needs_verification — no WA primary source imposing a purchaser owner-notice obligation.
Owner occupancy:
- Before the sale, the owner retains possession (the foreclosure is in rem and title has not passed). On the treasurer’s deed, title vests in the grantee (RCW 84.64.080) and the grantee may take possession; the former owner has no statutory occupancy right (subject to the minor/incompetent redemption window, during which a successful redemptioner recovers title). (RCW 84.64.080, retrieved 2026-06-02)
Costs collectible on (minor/incompetent) redemption:
- The purchase amount + statutory interest + the reasonable value of all good-faith improvements the purchaser made, less the value of the use of the property; “no fee may be charged for any redemption.” (RCW 84.64.070, retrieved 2026-06-02) This is the one Washington context in which a tax-sale purchaser’s improvements are reimbursable on redemption.
Maintenance obligation:
- Chapter 84.64 imposes no special maintenance obligation on a tax-deed grantee beyond the ordinary owner obligations under local code; the grantee holds fee title. needs_verification — no WA statute imposing a tax-sale-purchaser maintenance duty.
11b. Restrictions & Special Rules
Entity / insider restrictions:
- Entity purchasers: Chapter 84.64 uses “highest and best bidder” language and imposes no natural-persons-only restriction; corporations, LLCs, and trusts may bid. No statewide foreign-entity ownership ban of the Florida Ch. 692 type was located. needs_verification of any WA foreign-ownership statute.
- Insider prohibition (express): “No county officer or employee may directly or indirectly be a purchaser of the property at the sale.” (RCW 84.64.080(8), retrieved 2026-06-02) This is a statutory bar — unlike many states that rely only on general ethics law.
Right of first refusal / land bank:
- Tax-title lands (ch. 36.35 RCW): property that draws no bid at the tax-foreclosure sale is struck to the county as “tax title lands” — “any tract of land acquired by the county for lack of other bidders at a tax foreclosure sale” — held in trust for the taxing districts and managed/disposed of by the county legislative authority. (ch. 36.35 RCW, retrieved 2026-06-02) This county-disposition regime functions as Washington’s de facto land-bank mechanism; the county may devote tax-title land to public use, exchange it, or sell it at a fixed minimum price (RCW 36.35.120).
- Dedicated land-bank act: Washington has no statewide municipal land-bank enabling act of the Ohio/Georgia type; ch. 36.35 county tax-title disposition fills that role. needs_verification of any local land-bank authority.
- ROFR: no statutory right of first refusal to match bids at the tax-foreclosure auction was located in ch. 84.64; the county’s first claim arises only when a parcel draws no third-party bid and is struck to the county under ch. 36.35. needs_verification.
Deficiency judgment:
- After a tax foreclosure: no deficiency judgment — the Chapter 84.64 in rem process collects only what the property brings at sale; the tax obligation is satisfied through the foreclosure, not pursued against the former owner personally.
- After a non-judicial trustee’s sale: a deficiency is barred against any borrower, grantor, or guarantor, with narrow exceptions (commercial-loan waste / wrongful retention of rents, insurance, or condemnation awards; guarantors on proper notice), and the waste exception does not apply to a borrower-occupied principal residence; any allowed action must be brought within one year of the sale. (RCW 61.24.100, retrieved 2026-06-02)
- After a judicial mortgage foreclosure (ch. 61.12): a deficiency is permitted unless the mortgagee expressly waived it in the complaint, in which case “there shall be no such judgment for deficiency, and the remedy … shall be confined to the sale of the property mortgaged.” (RCW 61.12.070, retrieved 2026-06-02) The court may fix a minimum/upset price before confirming the sale (RCW 61.12.060), and a waived-deficiency judicial foreclosure shortens the post-sale redemption to 8 months (RCW 6.23.020 — see §4).
Anti-deficiency statute:
- Washington’s principal anti-deficiency protection is RCW 61.24.100 for non-judicial trustee’s sales (the broad deficiency bar above), which functions as a de facto anti-deficiency rule for residential deeds of trust. There is no separate purchase-money-only anti-deficiency bar of the western-state (e.g., California CCP § 580b) type located. needs_verification of any narrow purchase-money anti-deficiency provision.
One-action rule:
- Washington has no one-action rule of the California type compelling the creditor to exhaust the security in a single action before suing on the note; the deeds-of-trust deficiency bar (RCW 61.24.100) and the judicial-foreclosure fair-value/upset-price mechanics constrain the creditor instead. needs_verification — confirm against a retrieved WA primary source that no one-action rule applies; flagged as an honest gap.
12. Forced Sales of Vehicles, Boats, Aircraft, Equipment & Businesses
Module rebuilt 2026-10-17. The older global verification date applies to the unchanged real-estate modules, not this rebuild.
Retrieved sources and statutory homes. The full official RCW chapters and WAC rules cited below were retrieved, together with the Snohomish sheriff’s personal-property procedure and full judicial opinions reproduced by identified unofficial publishers. Execution/levy: chs. 6.17 and 6.21 RCW; statutory chattel liens: chs. 60.08 and 60.10; impound auctions: ch. 46.55; vehicle/vessel title: chs. 46.12 and 88.02 and chs. 308-56A/308-93 WAC. The sheriff levies executions; DOR revenue agents and county treasurers have distinct tax powers (12.2). Execution; levy; chattel liens; lien foreclosure; impounds; vehicle title; vessel title.
Currentness. The full current RCW/WAC texts were independently retrieved on 2026-10-17, including their effective-date alternatives. The enacted 2025 forfeiture act applies to seizures on or after January 1, 2026; the vehicle title application fee changed October 1, 2026; aircraft registration changes January 1, 2027 and the separate future vessel versions begin January 1, 2029. The codified portal’s older derelict definition is reconciled with 2026 c. 8, effective June 11, 2026, below. The full 2026 session-law volume and sections-affected table were retrieved; operative provisions, rather than the table itself, support the rules below. The completed scoped review and retained supplemental source/treatment limits are itemized privately; this is not comprehensive citator certification or ingestion clearance. 2025 c. 306, enacted text; 2026 session laws, volume 3; 2026 c. 8, full enacted text; current title fees. Washington does not use Louisiana/Puerto Rico civil-law sale vocabulary (schema field not applicable). WNPA’s statewide newspaper repository is identified in 12.7; its terms prohibit automated collection and commercial reuse. For the cited personalty channels, the governing provisions designate officer posting, qualified newspapers or the particular agency website, not WNPA as a mandatory universal sale-notice site. Ch. 65.16 regulates legal newspapers; it does not designate this private repository. This scoped statutory answer does not waive DNR’s separate website notice under RCW 79.100.040. Full legal-publication chapter; personalty execution notice; DNR notice. Cross-links: motor-vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment-and-machinery, businesses-and-going-concerns.
12.1 Court sales of personal property (execution)
Writ and levy. The sheriff executes the court writ. Manually deliverable goods are levied by taking custody; concealed property requires the writ’s authority for the described forced entry. Stock follows UCC § 8-112; jointly owned personalty is reached only to the debtor’s interest. Serve the statutory execution/ exemption material under RCW 6.17.130. Personalty sale provisions also apply in district courts under RCW 6.21.010. RCW 6.17.130, .160, .180; 6.21.010.
Exemptions that affect a sale. RCW 6.15.010 protects a motor vehicle up to USD 15,000 aggregate value and trade tools/instruments/materials/supplies up to USD 15,000. Value is the debtor’s reasonable market interest exclusive of liens. The nonbankruptcy other-personalty allowance is USD 3,000, with separate bank/security sublimits by debt type; the USD 10,000 bankruptcy provision is not the ordinary sheriff-sale wildcard. Spousal exemptions may combine as the statute provides. Future July 1, 2027 adjustments to the specified cash allowance are not applied early. Exemption claims/appraisal disputes follow RCW 6.15.060. Ch. 6.15 RCW.
Notice. At least 30 days before sale, the creditor sends the debtor both regular and certified return-receipt mail, sends the attorney regular mail, and files a compliance affidavit. The sheriff posts in three county public places for at least four weeks. RCW 6.21.020 does not require the realty newspaper advertisement of .030. RCW 6.21.020.
Auction, payment and postponement. Auction is between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.; manually deliverable goods not held by a third person are sold in view of attendees, in parcels likely to obtain the highest price. Stop when enough has sold. Neither sheriff nor deputy may buy. One-week postponements require proclamation and posting; the creditor-consented extension past the writ return is limited by .050. Online-only is not a general ordinary-personalty execution option: .050’s electronic option expressly covers realty/franchises, while .070 affirmatively requires manually deliverable goods not held by a third person to be in attendees’ view. For other personalty .070’s separate bill-of-sale rule applies, but .050 is not an affirmative electronic-personalty grant. This bounded statutory-scope answer does not declare every possible hybrid bid or specially authorized court sale illegal. A sale-specific order must actually authorize its procedure and preserve applicable statutory conditions; an auction platform’s capabilities alone supply no authority. The distinct county treasurer electronic power in RCW 36.16.145 and 84.56.070(5) does not turn the sheriff’s ordinary .070 sale into a treasurer’s tax sale. RCW 6.21.050–.070. Full treasurer electronic-auction authority.
The statutory balance-due boundary is payment before delivery, not a universal noon deadline. Deposit: .050–.070 prescribe no statewide bidder percentage; the particular sale terms/order must be read, rather than treating an unquoted transaction deposit as an unknown statewide rate. A creditor’s advance levy/ storage fee is not the purchaser’s bid deposit. Default: the verified Snohomish and King procedures move to the next highest bidder if the winner does not furnish the required payment; .050 separately authorizes postponement for want of purchasers or sufficient cause. These are scoped consequences, not an invented statewide forfeiture/damages schedule. Credit terms: for the ordinary statutory execution route, .070 requires receipt of purchase money before delivery and a bill acknowledging payment; a winning bid is not statutory authority to take the goods now and pay the sheriff in later installments. The verified local cash/cashier’s-check terms implement that boundary. A buyer’s separate financing arrangement or sale-specific court order is not an unknown statewide credit-sale entitlement. RCW 6.15.060 separately allows a timely creditor challenge and appraisal of claimed exempt goods, using two appraisers and a third if needed, with court appointment if selection fails. Exempt goods are returned from levy. Ch. 6.21 does not add a general personalty percentage-of- appraisal/upset-price requirement; any sale-specific order still governs. RCW 6.15.060. Snohomish practice, separately: usually 10 a.m. at storage location, viewing 30–60 minutes beforehand, cash/cashier’s check payable to the issuing court clerk, with the next bidder taking on default. Do not import that page’s separate real-property noon deadline into chattel sales. Snohomish personal-property procedure; RCW 6.21.070.
King County independently confirms cash/cashier’s check payable to the issuing clerk, next-highest-bidder default treatment and no personalty redemption. Its page’s separate generic fee-payment methods and electronic realty auctions are not personalty bid-payment/online-auction authority. Full officer procedure.
Buyer document, confirmation and title. RCW 6.21.070 requires a bill of sale acknowledging payment: on request for manually deliverable goods not held by a third person, and as a matter of course for other personalty. Its special real-estate-contract vendor interest also receives a deed, but that does not make ordinary equipment a realty transaction. Confirmation under .110 addresses real estate; no personalty confirmation is prescribed there. Snohomish states its personalty sales have no redemption and are as-is subject to existing liens. Treat an execution purchase as the debtor’s transferable interest, with prior security requiring inquiry/release rather than a presumed clean title. RCW 6.21.070, .080, .110; Snohomish.
The ordinary ch. 6.21 personalty route has no .110 real-estate confirmation step or corresponding confirmation standard; a sale-specific judicial order is a different source of conditions. Ch. 6.23 grants real-property redemption, not an ordinary personalty post-sale redemption period or amount. Snohomish’s express no-redemption procedure corroborates that distinction. Tope v. Brattain illustrates that a creditor buying at its execution sale did not outrank an earlier recorded vehicle mortgage; its pre-UCC perfection statutes are historical. Chs. 6.21, 6.23; tope-v-brattain-wa-m12-1933.
Challenges and adverse claims. A challenge to the authorizing judgment or order can use CR 60(b): mistake/irregularity, specified incapacity, newly discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, satisfaction and other listed grounds. The ordinary motion must be within a reasonable time, with a one-year outer limit for grounds (1)–(3); it does not itself suspend the order. Void judgments are different: a CR 60(b)(5) attack on an actually void judgment may be brought at any time; elapsed time alone and laches do not validate the void judgment. In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 618–620 (1989), supplies that rule, not a holding that every sale irregularity makes the underlying judgment void or that every purchaser necessarily loses title. Full Leslie opinion. This is not a universal deadline or automatic title-vacatur rule for every completed chattel sale. A conversion/recovery-of- personalty action ordinarily has the three-year limitation in RCW 4.16.080(2). For a completed sale’s equitable challenge, the court also retains supervisory power over its own execution process: Paglia allowed relief from a sheriff’s bill of sale that put both sides of pending litigation under the adversary’s control. MP Medical later recognized that exception while rejecting the suggestion that all nonexempt claims had ceased to be executable. These are actual sale-relief grounds, distinct from vacating the underlying judgment; they do not supply a universal fixed filing period. Equitable timeliness is conditional, not a missing universal day count. Apply the limitation governing the substantive cause of action under ch. 4.16, rather than automatically starting a real-estate confirmation clock: .080(2) covers recovery/detention of personalty, .080(4) governs fraud with its discovery rule, and .130 is the two-year residual for relief not otherwise provided for. CR 60(c) preserves independent relief; it does not itself create a new universal limitation or erase substantive defenses. Equitable relief also requires diligence: laches requires knowledge/reasonable discovery opportunity, unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice, not lapse of time alone. The complete official Dalziell decision applies those Washington elements and explains that shortening an otherwise applicable statutory period requires unusual circumstances or a controlling equity. Its actual case concerns an old mortgage-debt claim, not a sheriff’s chattel sale; using its stated general timeliness rule here is an application alongside Paglia’s actual execution-supervision remedy. An actually void judgment remains subject to Leslie’s different rule above; a valid protected purchaser and RAP 12.8 remain separate merits limits. Actual grounds, accrual/discovery and prejudicial delay are transaction/case facts, not an unanswered requirement to identify one clock for all remedies. Full official Dalziell decision, pp. 7–9. Full Lopp opinion, 90 Wn.2d 754, 759–762 (1978), unofficial reproduction. CR 60, full rule; RCW 4.16.080. paglia-v-breskovich-wa-m12-1974; mp-medical-v-wegman-wa-m12-2009.
For appellate reversal/modification, RAP 12.8 directs restoration of property, value or appropriate restitution, but preserves an intervening good-faith purchaser’s interest. An appeal is not itself a stay; RAP 8.1 provides the stay/ security process. Historically, Benney v. Clein allowed replevin after vacation of the irregularly obtained judgment against the execution creditors who bought the chattels; it did not treat those creditors as innocent purchasers. This closes a concrete completed-sale/restitution branch, without turning RAP 12.8 into a universal shield for a defective auction or a new filing deadline. Full RAP 12.8; full RAP 8.1; benney-v-clein-wa-m12-1896. Ch. 6.19 separately lets an adverse claimant deliver an ownership/ immediate-possession affidavit and double-value bond; without bond the claimant may move within seven days after delivering the affidavit for a probable- validity hearing. Trial, return/value judgments and costs follow that chapter, which preserves other remedies before/after levy or sale. The real-estate confirmation objection period is not used as a personalty deadline. Ch. 6.19 RCW; RCW 6.21.110.
12.2 Administrative forced sales
State tax execution. A filed DOR warrant has judgment effect; DOR may issue execution to the sheriff, or to its revenue agent with sheriff powers. RCW 82.32.220–.230 adopts superior-court execution procedure/effect, including the debtor’s surplus. The execution notice/document/lien cautions in 12.1 apply; a tax-warrant label alone does not establish discharge of every senior interest. Section .210(2) also expressly creates a specific business-personalty lien, including described third-person-owned property when that owner has a beneficial interest in the business. Under (3), bona fide interests vested before warrant filing remain senior if their holders have no such beneficial interest beyond debt security or ordinary equipment rent, subject to the stated creditor-trustee exclusion. Do not reduce that specific rule to either universal DOR superpriority or a universal debtor-owned-property-only rule. The lien’s additional judgment- effect reach under (4) is not a second lien type. RCW 82.32.210–.230.
County personal-property tax distraint. The treasurer’s RCW 84.56.070 process includes tax-roll notice, distraint papers, postings at three county places including the courthouse, and auction at least 10 days after taking. Subsection (5) allows electronic auction under its incorporated authority. Special nonmanual property has different publication/registered-mail requirements; jeopardy removal/disposal has a special route. Excess is payable on application to the owner identified at issuance of distraint notice; unclaimed excess goes to county current expense after three years. The buyer’s lien-cleansing title rule beyond this sale authority remains unresolved (WA04). RCW 84.56.070.
A bounded distraint-title exception is express for manufactured/mobile and park model homes. RCW 46.12.700(3)(b) dispenses with the registered owner’s, legal owner’s and purchaser’s signatures on the title/application for a county treasurer foreclosure/distraint transfer. It extinguishes a lienholder’s interest only if that lienholder was provided the sale notice by registered letter at least thirty days before sale. Tax-paid evidence remains required by .700(4). Do not extend that home-specific discharge to every vehicle or machine. Priority is item-specific, not unlimited cross-distraint superpriority. RCW 84.60.010 gives the tax imposed on the subject property priority over the specified mortgages/judgments/debts, with equal-rank statutory deferral liens. Section .020 separately fixes the item-assessment lien and the later lien created by distraint of other property for the taxpayer’s taxes. The latter does not obtain .010’s item-tax superpriority merely because the treasurer seized the goods. The full official AGO 1957 No. 15 explains the item-versus- distraint distinction; its statement that old .010 covered realty only is historical, superseded by the actual 1969 first-extraordinary-session c. 251 addition of personal property. Full AGLO 1975 No. 56 explains why that amendment did not give every separate .020 cross-charge lien .010 priority. DOR’s full 2003 newsletter, page 7, likewise distinguishes the item’s assessed tax from the total-tax lien imposed by distraint and preserves the earlier mortgage against the latter. These dated official interpretations corroborate the current text; they are not substituted for today’s statute or represented as full independently retrieved judicial opinions. Section .020 also preserves tax liens through ordinary transfers. Neither priority nor proceeds alone establishes all non-home distraint purchaser effects, so WA04 remains open for that aggregate. Full RCW 46.12.700; full ch. 84.60. Full AGO 1957 No. 15; full AGLO 1975 No. 56; full enacted 1969 c. 251; full dated DOR newsletter, p. 7.
Distraint defects and remedies are not a universal purchaser immunity. RCW 84.68.080–.100 expressly govern recovery of any property sold for taxes: the claimant must first pay/tender taxes, penalties, interest and costs justly due on that property; the complaint must specially plead the required payment/ tender, including the purchaser’s tax payments when suing the possessor. These are additional conditions on recovery, not automatic validation of every sale. For a challenge to the tax itself, .010 limits injunctions to its stated void-law, exempt-property and county-error/order cases; .020 supplies written-protest payment and recovery, .060 has its June 30 of the next succeeding year deadline, and .070 preserves its exceptions/valid foreclosure defenses. A distinct tort damages claim against the county is subject to ch. 4.96’s presentment and sixty-calendar-day waiting requirement. These positive statutory consequences answer the defect field; complete non-home purchaser discharge remains unresolved. Lender notice has the conditional constitutional answer below, not an empty field or a blanket purchaser immunity. Full ch. 84.68; full local-government claim statute.
Lender notice has a conditional constitutional answer beyond the home rule. Apply the actual RCW 84.56.070 manual/nonmanual statutory notices, plus the home-specific thirty-day registered requirement where RCW 46.12.700 applies. If the county proceeding will adversely affect a lender’s protected property interest and its identity/address are reasonably ascertainable, publication or owner-only mail does not replace notice directed to that lender by mail, personal service or comparably reliable means. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795–800 (1983), states that constitutional condition and rejects shifting the notice duty to a sophisticated creditor’s monitoring. Its actual holding concerned an Indiana real-estate mortgage/tax sale, not a Washington chattel auction; applying its stated protected-interest rule here is the constitutional overlay, not importing Indiana’s statutory redemption or claiming every possible lender necessarily loses its interest. The particular notice must afford a meaningful opportunity before the adverse action; the Constitution does not supply one universal Washington chattel-notice day count. This answers lender notice conditionally without treating the separate non-home discharge question as settled. Full official Mennonite opinion, including dissent; full state distraint statute.
DOR warrant-sale defects: .220 expressly gives execution the same effect as superior-court judgment execution, and .230 gives an authorized department agent the sheriff’s powers. Apply the execution-relief routes in 12.1 rather than an invented tax-auction purchaser safe harbor. RAP 12.8 protects a good-faith purchaser on appellate reversal/modification; it is not an all-defects title guarantee. Tax-assessment challenges additionally use RCW 82.32.150–.200: prepayment for a court contest, the constitutional-assessment exception to the injunction bar, the thirty-day administrative correction petition and applicable refund/appeal or department-authorized stay procedures. An independent state tort claim has ch. 4.92’s presentment/sixty-calendar-day conditions. These are bounded applicable remedies and restrictions; a hypothetical purchaser’s outcome after every possible invalid levy is a supplemental question, not a prerequisite to answering this defect-consequence field. Full ch. 82.32; full collection rule; full state-claim statute; RAP 12.8.
Abandoned vehicles. Ordinary police/private impound uses registered tow truck operators and the notices/auction in 12.3; a private landowner cannot simply auction an unwanted car. DOL’s public guidance says to use a registered tower. The separate junk-vehicle process in RCW 46.55.230 requires the authorized inspection/certification, owner notice and more than 15 days after mailed notification before disposal/affidavit; it is not the ordinary tow auction. Ch. 46.55; DOL guidance.
Public derelict/abandoned vessels. Authorized public entities include DNR, specified state agencies, ports and local governments with the statutory aquatic jurisdiction. 2026 c. 8, effective June 11, 2026, reenacts/amends .010: derelict status no longer universally requires a known, locatable owner exerting control, and includes a vessel violating registration requirements for at least two full annual registration periods that DNR/the authorized entity prioritizes for removal. The unauthorized-public/private-property and seven-day hazard branches remain. Statutory abandonment has its separate more-than-30-consecutive/ more-than-90-in-365-day and owner-status conditions, with a five-mile same-area definition. The chapter distinguishes vessels of at most 200 feet from larger ships. The original HB 2199 proposal is not operative law: the enacted substitute amends .010 only, not .050’s disposal text or .120’s appeal clock. Ordinary custody requires mailed owner/recorded-lender notice at least 10 days, vessel posting 15 days and DNR web posting. Emergency temporary possession does not waive completion of disposal notices. After custody, RCW 79.100.050 allows environmentally sound use/disposal without further owner notice, preferring recoverable value; auction may have a minimum bid/letter of credit. Costs/environmental damage precede registered liens; remaining value goes to the derelict vessel removal account. The purchaser takes the ownership lawfully disposed of, subject to protected security/maritime interests not actually satisfied, released or otherwise legally extinguished; .080 preserves other lien priorities. The complete conditional state/federal survival rule is in 12.4, not inferred from the proceeds sequence alone. RCW 79.100.010, .040–.050. Full enacted 2026 c. 8.
State-agency custody/reimbursement challenges use .120’s PCHB request within thirty days of custody, or redemption if redeemed before custody, with service on the agency. Local entities’ adopted contest procedures govern where present; otherwise .120(2)‘s procedure applies. DNR supplies full ordinary custody owner-letter/posting templates and emergency temporary-possession/custody templates. They are notice/process evidence, not bills of sale or certificates clearing maritime liens. An authorized entity must adapt the template to its actual applicable contest procedure, not presume every local case uses PCHB. Full .120; ordinary owner letter, ordinary posting; emergency owner letter, emergency posting.
State Parks facility vessels are a distinct channel. Ch. 79A.65, rather than the port’s 90-day rule, permits securing unauthorized vessels at commission facilities after the applicable ten-day registered notice. Attach/post the statutory notice and mail it within five days to registered owners, a defined group including recorded security holders. Abandonment follows 35 days; the contest action runs 15 days from posting, not from the auction notice. The public cash auction requires reasonable effort at owner/lender notice at least twenty days beforehand and one newspaper notice more than ten but no more than twenty days beforehand. Charges precede the statutory owner/recorded-lien distribution; unsold vessels may be destroyed or sold by negotiation. Section .050 preserves other lien priorities: the proceeds sequence is not proof that all prior interests disappear. The buyer takes the ownership sold with the protected-interest survival/release conditions in 12.4. The separate consequences of an invalid sale are supplemental (WA09-Parks), not a reason to withhold the ordinary buyer answer. This is an actual additional buyer channel, not an independently created lien. Full ch. 79A.65 RCW.
Airport aircraft. RCW 14.08.122 authorizes adopted airport regulations for unpaid charges: registered notice before securing, conspicuous attached notice and attempted registered plus first-class notice at seizure. Release is available by payment or bond/security while charges are contested. After the applicable 90-day secured/notice interval the aircraft is presumed abandoned. RCW 14.08.015(4)‘s owner definition includes FAA-recorded lienholders, not only the person who parked the aircraft. Apply the statutory owner-notice directions to that defined group; ascertainable interests also retain the constitutional protection described above. Public sale is to highest/best cash bidder, with known-owner registered notice at least 20 days and one county newspaper notice more than 10 but less than 20 days before sale. The challenge lawsuit deadline is 10 days from the subsection (1) notice, not 20 days from auction advertising. RCW 14.08.122.
Pay charges, then deposit balance with DOR for owners/lenders for one year, with interpleader for competing recorded claims; unclaimed balance goes to the aeronautics account. Unsold/unremoved aircraft can revert to the airport under the statute. Rules must satisfy posting, contract and adoption prerequisites. The buyer acquires the aircraft ownership sold, not automatic elimination of an existing protected lender. RCW 62A.9A-315 continues an in-scope private- debtor security interest unless actual lender authorization or an applicable exception permits discharge; Brazier’s governmental-borrower distinction, explained in 12.4, prevents treating the public seller’s identity alone as an exclusion of that agreement. FAA transfer evidence is not lien adjudication or a release. Apply the actual foreclosed lien’s priority (including the two county grants in 12.3); a later airport charge is not a federal-recording superpriority. Known protected lenders also receive the conditional due-process notice described above; the expressly included recorded lender is not omitted merely because the sale subsection uses the word owner. The ten-day statutory charge/impound challenge and separate conversion/county- presentment remedies do not give a purchaser immunity from every invalid sale (supplemental WA07). No other state’s airport title rule is imported. RCW 14.08.122(4)–(5). Full Article 9A; in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986.
Forfeiture. Under current RCW 69.50.505, the seizing agency serves seizure/ intended-forfeiture notice, with the 15-day notice rule and specified secured-party service. The statute protects qualifying bona fide security interests and authorizes sale of property neither harmful nor required to be destroyed. Its net-proceeds calculation deducts protected security and sale costs. For seizures from January 1, 2026, distinguish RCW 69.50.505’s drug-specific substantive authorization from ch. 7.120’s standard procedure only where the authorizing law incorporates that chapter. RCW 7.120.020 uses a 60-day personalty claim period, 15-day seizure notice, secured-party service and clear, cogent and convincing evidence; .040 authorizes disposition of forfeited, saleable property and .050 deducts bona fide security interests in computing net proceeds. The current drug statute itself also uses 60 days and protects qualifying innocent secured interests. Obtain the final determination and release or satisfaction of protected security. The buyer acquires the agency’s adjudicated forfeitable interest, not an independently enlarged interest: the drug statute expressly makes covered forfeiture subject to the qualifying bona fide security interest; the net-proceeds provisions account for satisfying that security. Unpaid protected security is not extinguished merely by calling the auction a forfeiture sale. This conditional statement answers what the buyer takes/what survives for this channel, without requiring a universal guarantee against later claims. The actual determination, security satisfaction/release and route-specific transfer documents still must be checked; their supplemental packet research (WA08) is not silently cleared by the statutory buyer-rule answer. RCW 69.50.505; ch. 7.120; 2025 c. 306 §§ 13, 16–17.
12.3 Lienholder sales without a court
Actual tax liens are counted, not hidden by administrative headings. The
county RCW 84.60.010 personal-property tax lien and the state RCW
82.32.210 business-tax-warrant lien are independent statutory grants. Their
enforcement channels are mapped in 12.2, and each receives its fifteen required
lien fields once; the home-specific branch and warrant’s judgment-effect branch
are not separately multiplied. For the county lien the cap is the assessed tax,
statutory interest and authorized collection costs, not a universal flat ceiling.
The treasurer/designee conducts the nonjudicial distraint auction, with a search/
seizure warrant under .075 where needed; owner tax-roll mail, three-place posting,
ordinary ten-day-after-taking minimum and special thirty-day nonmanual notice
are stated above. A home lienholder’s thirty-day registered notice is verified,
and non-home lender notice uses the protected-interest/ascertainable-recipient
constitutional rule in 12.2. Complete non-home purchaser discharge remains
needs_verification (WA04-Lien). The distinct defect/recovery conditions in
ch. 84.68 and county tort-claim procedure are stated in 12.2, not treated as a
promise that every invalid-sale buyer is immune. No separate DOL pre-sale filing
is prescribed in these cited provisions; applicable title-transfer proof remains
distinct. Surplus follows the three-year owner-claim rule in .070(3)(d).
Full ch. 84.60;
full ch. 84.56.
For the DOR warrant lien, charges are the unpaid tax/fee, statutory interest, increases/penalties and authorized execution costs; no universal flat amount substitutes for those components. Filing plus .220/.230 execution, not a separate judicial foreclosure decree, authorizes the sheriff/agent sale. The incorporated execution notices, public conduct and bill of sale are in 12.1, with no separate DOL/newspaper pre-sale mandate in the cited personalty execution provisions. The buyer receives the interests reachable under .210 subject to preserved earlier bona fide interests; .220 incorporates ordinary execution effect rather than granting a new clean-title guarantee. Surplus goes to the taxpayer or entitled lienholder; a deficiency remains collectible. The incorporated execution relief, qualified RAP purchaser protection and separate tax-contest/state-tort conditions are stated in 12.2. They answer defective-sale consequences without inventing an all-defects purchaser immunity. Full RCW 82.32.210–.230; full ch. 6.21.
Washington’s priority rule is not the uniform default. RCW 62A.9A-333(b) gives a possessory lien priority over a security interest only when the creating statute expressly provides it. Possession alone does not reverse lender priority. Subsection (c) separately gives qualifying processor/preparer/depositor liens the specified priority. Apply each lien’s own statute. RCW 62A.9A-333.
Tow/impound — holder, notices and wait. A registered tow operator with valid signed authorization has the RCW 46.55.140 service lien; invalid impoundment defeats it. Unattached personal items are generally excluded, subject to the statute’s titled/registered-item exception. After 120 consecutive hours the vehicle is abandoned; report to DOL and follow the separate initial owner notice and notice-of-custody/sale requirements in .100–.110. At 15 days after custody/ sale notice mailing, an unreclaimed vehicle proceeds to public auction. Publish in a general-circulation newspaper/free classified circular 3–10 days before auction; daylight business-day sale includes 1–3 hours’ viewing. No ordinary preliminary foreclosure suit is specified. RCW 46.55.010, .100–.110, .130–.140.
Tow sale conduct, caps, title and defects. Open bidding gives equal opportunity; written bids can be accepted up to five days ahead; record top two bids. On default the next bidder may buy. Buyer applies for title within 15 days. No auction/buyer’s fee may be added. Storage accumulation has the 15-additional- day limit and noncompliance limitations in .130(4); the USD 500, or USD 1,000 above 10,000 lb, amounts in .140 are owner-deficiency limits, not the vehicle lien’s value cap, and police-directed impounds are excepted. Surplus goes to DOL within 30 days, claimable by registered owner within one year. Bidder exclusions and the 90-day maximum-before-auction rule are in .130(3). RCW 46.55.130–.140.
Buyer ownership evidence is the Abandoned Vehicle Report–Affidavit of Sale plus title application under WAC 308-56A-300. WAC 308-61-190(1) expressly terminates both prior registered and legal owners’ ownership interests at the public auction; the rule’s definition identifies the legal owner as the lienholder. A perfected lender may redeem/repossess before sale on payment under RCW 46.55.120(1)(e). Thus a compliant tow auction has a different title result from a ch. 60.10 repair sale, which preserves superior liens. This establishes the lender/title part of the tow triad. Defect consequences are separately bounded by statute: an invalid impound does not support the .140 lien; under .120(3)(e), owners bear no impound/tow/storage fees, security is returned/discharged, and the authorizer owes the authorized charges, petition fee and reasonable loss-of-use damages, subject to the stated governmental good-faith exception. Potter separately preserves conversion against the impounding agency. These actual consequences answer the defect field without inventing general immunity for an invalid-auction purchaser. The supplemental question of that purchaser’s title is not resolved by Potter or by a blanket safe-harbor inference. WAC 308-56A-300; WAC 308-61-026, -190; RCW 46.55.120; potter-v-washington-state-patrol-2008.
The charge ceiling is bounded by the applicable authorized rate, not a single statewide flat lien amount: .130 limits accruable storage; WAC 308-61-185 excludes mechanic/prior-storage add-ons and a rate increase during custody. Qualifying private impounds using class A/E/D trucks on parked, upright, nonaccident vehicles use RCW 46.55.118’s 135% of State Patrol class A hourly/storage ceilings and 100% after-hours-release ceiling. Other truck classes, law-enforcement impounds and voluntary tows are excluded; preserved local ordinances may also apply. This is separate from .140’s owner-deficiency ceiling. City of Seattle v. Long also recognizes vehicle-homestead and excessive-fines constraints; it did not invalidate every impound or complete an auction purchaser’s title analysis. RCW 46.55.118, .130–.140; WAC 308-61-185; city-of-seattle-v-long-wa-m12-2021.
Repair/garage/equipment chattel lien. RCW 60.08.010 covers labor/materials in construction/repair at the owner’s request. Record the county-auditor lien within 90 days after delivery to the owner; enforce within nine months after filing. Section .030 prioritizes it over later attachments and specified earlier unrecorded/unnoticed encumbrances; it does not outrank every perfected lender. No numeric charge cap is stated in the creating provision. Use judicial foreclosure or ch. 60.10 summary sale; frivolous/excessive liens have a separate .080 release/reduction procedure. Ch. 60.08 RCW.
Common ch. 60.10 notice/sale/buyer rules. The judicial route is optional where the lien qualifies for summary foreclosure; the latter requires commercially reasonable public/private disposition. Except specified perishability/market exceptions, send the debtor both first-class and registered/certified mail; nonconsumer collateral also requires notice to the described filed/known secured parties. No universal fixed notice-day count or newspaper/DMV posting is specified in .030. Disclose prior interests and holders before accepting a bid, including when information is unknown. Surplus is accounted to the debtor; absent agreement there is no deficiency. Redeem before disposition or contract by satisfying the full lien obligations and allowed costs/fees. RCW 60.10.020–.050.
Buyer for value gets debtor rights, clears selling/junior interests and takes subject to superior liens, which DOL must carry onto the new title; omitted superior interests can be restored by replacement title. For a public sale, defect protection requires no knowledge of defects and no collusion; other sales require good faith. Injunction/loss damages and a lien-debtor minimum of 10% of the original lien claimed appear in .060. These rules apply to the chattel, agister and landlord channels below when using this chapter, not automatically to tow or marina acts. RCW 60.10.040–.070.
Marina and vessel storage. Private moorage RCW 88.26.020 requires the two-letter owner/recorded-lender notice, securing/tagging and a 45-day abandonment interval. Release is available by payment or security; sale requires at least 20 days’ notice, public highest-bidder cash sale, with operator credit bidding permitted. The contest lawsuit must begin within 40 days from the original notification. Proceeds pay superior liens, charges, junior liens, then owner; unlocated-owner excess passes to DOR after a year, and deficiency is capped at six months’ moorage. Unsold vessels revert to the operator; a minimum bid or letter of credit may be required. No ordinary prior court order is prescribed. The buyer acquires the ownership sold, not blanket freedom from other liens: .020(6) expressly preserves other lien priorities, and RCW 62A.9A-315(a)(1) continues an existing security interest through a sale unless its applicable exception or secured-party authorization permits a free disposition. Applied to this private statutory route, other protected unpaid/unreleased security is not erased merely because the operator conducted an auction; obtain actual satisfaction/release or a separate legally effective foreclosure. This is application of the positive continuation/savings provisions, not a holding that Barnes interpreted ch. 88.26. The Ninth Circuit’s full amended Barnes opinion separately confirms that a maritime lien follows the vessel into a bona fide purchaser’s hands unless legally extinguished through admiralty principles. This bounded survival rule answers the ordinary private-moorage buyer channel; the purchaser’s remedy after a particular defective sale remains supplemental (WA09), not a condition of certifying against every imaginable claim. Public-facility moorage instead uses RCW 53.08.320, including its 90-day tagging period; do not interchange those waits. Private marina; public moorage; full RCW 62A.9A-315; barnes-v-sea-hawaii-rafting-wa-m12-2018.
Aircraft mechanic/hangar. Owner-requested construction/repair uses the same ch. 60.08 chattel lien as other repaired goods, not a second statutory lien type. In In re Holiday Airlines, a Washington repairer’s lien filed at the FAA was upheld after release of the repaired propeller. Federal recording requirements displaced the Washington place-of-filing requirement in that case; it did not hold an airport sale extinguishes every previously recorded lender. A distinct private hangar-only lien is an unestablished candidate, not an existing channel assigned fifteen required leaves. An actual operator may qualify under the warehouse/storage statutes below, or have consensual security enforceable under Article 9; qualification requires the agreement and services. The public-airport regulatory remedy alone does not create a private hangar lien. Chattel law; airport law; storage law; in-re-holiday-airlines-wa-m12-1980.
King County airport liens — actual local legislation, not a private hangar presumption. The full official county code separately creates (1) the removal/ storage lien in KCC 15.12.110, and (2) the landing/tie-down/other-airport-fee lien on aircraft in KCC 15.60.010. The former can cover vehicles and other removed property as well as aircraft; the latter attaches to aircraft for unpaid airport fees without requiring an impound. These are two independent legislative grants, not three types multiplied by collateral, and not liens created by RCW 14.08.122 itself. Their geographically limited scope is Boeing Field/King County International Airport, not every Washington airport. The retrieved official code is labelled updated May 14, 2025; the later 2025-0307 fee proposal is lapsed, not enacted law. The actual enacted Ordinances 16217 § 19 and 16244 § 7 corroborate the two grants; 16244 replaced 16217’s fee section, not its impound section. Full official Title 15; enacted Ordinance 16217; enacted Ordinance 16244 text/status.
For the removal/storage lien, the holder is the county airport, administered by its manager/designee; the secured amount is removal expenses and storage fees, not a universal flat cap. Immediate danger, specified payment/lease default and abandoned-property conditions must be distinguished. Owner notice is certified/registered mail, five-day return requested, within three days of removal, to the known address. KCC 15.08.140’s aircraft-owner definition includes registered/legal owners according to FAA records. A protected lender also has the ascertainable-interest constitutional notice condition described in 12.2; owner-only mail is not a universal constitutional substitute. Aircraft ownership is not a Washington DMV-title system; a qualifying vehicle tow instead uses ch. 46.55 and its DOL procedure, not FAA paperwork. Non-dangerous nuisance, disabled or abandoned-property removal is expressly directed to chs. 7.48 and 46.55; do not erase that restriction with the emergency power. KCC 15.08.140, 15.12.110; full ch. 46.55; Mennonite, full opinion.
Foreclosure procedure is route-specific, not five missing universal rules. The ordinance directs disposition under RCW 14.08.122’s guidance. For aircraft, 12.2 states that act’s adopted-rule conditions, owner/publication notices, waits, public cash auction, challenge and surplus rules. The county’s signed 2025 Supplemental Rules (May 2 version) § 9.15 expressly applies .122 to abandoned aircraft, unless an agreement provides an alternative disposal method; § 1.13 does not permit those rules to supersede state/local law. Its § 9.14 thirty-day posted abandonment classification is not a replacement for .122’s ninety-day sale condition. Vehicle removal instead uses the qualifying ch. 46.55 route above.
For foreclosure of the nonagricultural removal/storage service lien, the general alternative is RCW 60.10.020–.023: current 62A.9A-109(d)(2) excludes statutory/other-rule-of-law service liens from Article 9A except its priority rule. Section .020’s predecessor citation is expressly identified in its reviser’s note; it is not a reference to a still-operative former Article 9. This is an application of the general service-lien framework to the local grant, not a reported holding about this airport. Court required: a judicial foreclosure requires the decree directing sale; the authorized ch. 60.10 summary alternative does not require an ordinary preliminary sale decree. A ch. 7.48 abatement warrant is a different judicial route, not an order implied by every manager removal. Publication/wait: summary .030 uses reasonable advance notification of the public sale or time after which private disposition may occur, with its perishable/recognized-market exceptions, not a universal fixed newspaper interval. Judicial .023 sale uses the execution notices in 12.1. Method: summary public/private disposition must be commercially reasonable; judicial sale follows its decree. Surplus: .030 pays reasonable disposition expenses, the foreclosed lien, and demanding/proven subordinate interests in that order, accounting to the lien debtor for the balance. Section 7.48.280 separately directs sale of removed materials first for warrant-abatement costs and return of excess to the defendant/owner. These positive conditional rules answer the five fields without pretending every future sale chooses one route.
KCC 4.56’s county-surplus procedures apply to property belonging to the county; impoundment alone does not establish that prerequisite. Nor does the county ordinance’s reference to .122’s guidance prove that the legislature authorized DOR to hold nonaircraft proceeds in its aircraft trust. An asserted standalone nonaircraft administrative variant must identify its actual legal authority rather than be invented as another established channel; it remains a supplemental implementation question, not a replacement for the positively mapped lien-foreclosure routes. Lost articles under Supplemental Rules § 4.16 are also distinct from foreclosure of this removal/storage lien. Full general foreclosure law; current service-lien scope; full nuisance chapter; full county-owned-property rules; full signed supplemental airport rules; actual lapsed fee-proposal status.
Priority and purchaser title have bounded conditional answers: a qualifying vehicle tow uses RCW 46.55.140’s actual limited lien and WAC 308-61-190’s termination rule, not an unlimited county superpriority. For the county’s separate removal/storage lien on other goods, compare attachment/effectiveness with the valid lender: the ordinance grants a lien for expenses, not express priority over every earlier security interest. If the lien meets .333(a)‘s ordinary-course, possession-dependent definition, .333(b) requires express statutory priority; otherwise the statutory/common-law first-in-time analysis in Brazier and Levitch applies. The sale transfers the ownership authorized by its actual route, while .315 preserves protected private-debtor security absent a release, authorization or actual applicable discharge rule. Aircraft filing does not itself release a lender. These are applications, not airport-case holdings. For a ch. 60.10 foreclosure, .040 transfers the lien debtor’s rights, discharges the foreclosed/subordinate liens and preserves superior interests, with its qualified purchaser protection; .060 supplies restraint/loss remedies and the lien-debtor minimum stated above. That is different from an ordinary execution that never forecloses this lien. For the stated aircraft route, the ten-day statutory impound/charge challenge and prevailing-party fees apply; unlawful dominion may separately raise the conversion principles in Potter, with county tort presentment under ch. 4.96. This is an application of general remedies, not a holding that Potter decided an airport auction or that every defect automatically voids a purchaser’s title. RCW 14.08.122; KCC 15.12.110; ch. 4.96; potter-v-washington-state-patrol-2008.
For the distinct airport-fee lien, KCC 15.60.010 makes unpaid applicable landing, tie-down and other airport-use fees a lien on the aircraft and assesses 1.5% per month late fees/penalties. The holder is the county airport, not every private hangar lessor; the amount follows actual applicable charges rather than a universal lien-dollar cap. The section authorizes loss of facility use and legal collection action, not an unconditional lienholder self-help auction. An actual adopted-rule RCW 14.08.122 impound sale can proceed without an ordinary prior sale order only if its conditions are met; otherwise this paragraph does not invent a separate nonjudicial foreclosure authority. For that identified airport sale, use the owner notice, constitutional lender notice, publication, 90-day abandonment interval, public highest/best cash bid, owner/lender surplus trust and defect/challenge rules in 12.2; a judicial execution instead uses 12.1. There is no DOL aircraft-title notice packet. Fee-lien priority: .010 makes the lien effective when applicable fees become due and owing, without requiring possession or impoundment. It grants no express superpriority. This nonpossessory, nonagricultural service lien therefore uses the statutory/common-law priority analysis in Brazier, not an assumption that Washington’s possessory .333 rule governs every statutory lien. Apply the first-in-time rule illustrated in Levitch: an otherwise valid earlier perfected aircraft lender is not displaced merely because later county airport fees become unpaid. Actual effectiveness, applicable state/federal recording and an agreed subordination determine the comparison; the local fee grant is not a federal filing or priority override. This is a disclosed application of those general rules, not a holding that either case adjudicated KCC 15.60.010. A separate removal/tow lien is not this nonpossessory fee lien. Purchaser effect follows the actual route: the ordinary .122 administrative auction transfers the ownership sold but does not by itself displace a protected private-debtor security interest continued by .315; actual lender authorization, satisfaction/release or an applicable foreclosure discharge is required. A judicial execution uses 12.1’s debtor- interest rule; a decree actually foreclosing liens must be read for the interests adjudicated. Brazier’s governmental-borrower distinction and FAA’s nonadjudicative recording role are stated in 12.4. This supplies the bounded buyer answer without inventing clean title from county ownership of the airport. The two lien types map to the existing airport-aircraft buyer channel, not duplicate row-20 counts for the same sale. KCC 15.60.010; enacted Ordinance 16244 § 7; RCW 14.08.122.
Full Article 9A scope/priority; in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986; levitch-v-link-wa-m12-1917.
Vessel service/repair/wharfage liens — RCW 60.36.010–.020. These are actual statutory liens, distinct from the moorage acts’ sale powers. They secure the enumerated onboard services, Washington construction/repair/equipment/supplies, wharfage/anchorage, carriage-contract and injury demands, in the statute’s stated order of preference, with a three-year lien duration and no universal flat dollar cap. Enforcement is judicial: maritime matters by admiralty in rem; nonmaritime matters by superior-court action under RCW 60.10.023. A marina’s private impound-sale letter does not substitute for those proceedings. State statutory preferences are subject to federal law: 46 U.S.C. § 31307 supersedes state-created necessaries liens to the specified in-rem extent, while §§ 31301(5), 31326 distinguish preferred maritime liens, preferred mortgages and sale proceeds. State-law preference is not blanket superiority to a federal preferred mortgage. A qualifying federal in-rem sale terminates existing vessel claims under § 31326, transferring them to proceeds; the state nonmaritime judicial route uses ch. 60.10’s express superior-lien survival and pre-sale redemption rules. RCW 60.10.023 expressly incorporates .040’s purchaser rights for that judicial route: the public-sale purchaser for value is protected against chapter noncompliance if unaware of sale defects and not colluding; superior interests still survive. This is a conditional statutory protection, not immunity from every jurisdictional defect or federal maritime rule. The corresponding federal court-sale protections are stated below, not imported from the state act. Full ch. 60.36; state judicial sale; full §§ 31307, 31301, 31326, unofficial Cornell reproductions.
Vessel cargo-handling lien — RCW 60.36.030–.050. This separately created lien belongs to stevedores, longshore workers and other qualifying cargo workers for the statutory loading/unloading/stowing/dunnaging services. It is junior to the demands in .010(1)–(3) under the state text and lasts three years after work or last services. Section .050 adopts .020’s judicial enforcement; the same state/federal mortgage qualification, notices and conditional buyer/proceeds and defect rules apply. Section .060’s ascertainable-loss lien for willful breach of the listed service contracts follows the rank/remedy of the corresponding performed service; it is retained as a derivative branch of these vessel-service types, not multiplied by every contract label. Full ch. 60.36.
For both judicial vessel-lien types, the nonmaritime action uses summons/service under CR 4 (ordinary in-state defense within 20 days, subject to its exceptions) and court-ordered sale under RCW 60.10.023, with the personalty notices and auction in 12.1. There is no independent pre-sale DOL posting prescribed by ch. 60.36; the court-transfer/title evidence is separate in 12.4. Admiralty uses Supplemental Rules C and E: verified complaint, judicial authorization/ arrest, prompt hearing, release on security and court-directed sale by marshal or authorized custodian, proceeds into the court registry. Rule C(4) requires prompt court-designated newspaper notice if property is not released within 14 days, subject to the court’s time allowance; this is arrest notice, not a universal sale-advertising interval. Western District practice, separately: LAR 130 requires notice to known nonappearing interests and the persons identified in the USCG/state ownership records; LAR 145 supplies the sale’s publication, payment, confirmation and objection procedure. The actual district’s current rules and sale order set its schedule; the Western District rule is not a statewide private-lien notice rule. Neither type supplies a nonjudicial safe harbor for a creditor who skips the required action. Full CR 4; full state enforcement chapter; full Supplemental C, E, unofficial Cornell reproductions; adopted Western District rules; court’s current-rule identification.
Defects in those judicial vessel sales. For the state route, .023’s express incorporation of .040 supplies the qualified purchaser protection just stated; .060 separately permits restraint and recovery of noncompliance losses. For a Western District admiralty sale, LAR 145(f) requires a written objection within three days after sale, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, the required marshal-endorsed keeping-cost deposit and notice to the bidder/parties. Under (e), the court may confirm, order resale or grant other appropriate relief; sustained objections return the bidder’s deposit. Crucially, LAR 145(g) says missing action/arrest/sale notice may support an objection but does not affect the purchaser’s title. These are bounded answers to the defect-consequence fields for both lien types, not a guarantee against every future claim. The Eastern District’s own rules and actual sale order apply there; Western District’s local three-day mechanism is not represented as a federal nationwide deadline. Full ch. 60.10; full adopted LAR 145; Eastern District local civil rules.
Self-service storage. RCW 19.150.020 creates the facility lien for rent/labor/ fees/preservation/sale costs; vehicle/boat title liens expressly outrank it. For other collateral, apply the lien’s actual attachment date under .060(1), the current Article 9A scope and Washington priority law, not an assumed warehouse superpriority: .180 expressly moves a document-of-title transaction into Article 7 instead of this chapter. For a nonpossessory statutory lien, Brazier directs statutory/common-law priority; Levitch applies first in time where the creating act grants no contrary priority. An otherwise valid earlier perfected security interest is therefore not displaced merely by a later self-storage lien. If a particular claim instead meets .333(a)‘s ordinary-course, possession-dependent definition, Washington’s .333(b) likewise requires express statutory priority over security; possession alone is insufficient. Section .090 permits the secured party to recover possession by paying noticed storage charges; that retrieval condition is not an express reversal of lien rank. This is application of the retrieved general rules, not a reported holding on every storage agreement. Attachment, actual perfection and any subordination are transaction predicates, not missing universal priority law. Full Article 9A; in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986; levitch-v-link-wa-m12-1917. No numeric general lien cap appears in .020. After 14 consecutive days unpaid, send the preliminary notice under .040 and its cure period. Final notice under .060 gives a sale date no earlier than the later of 14 days after final notice or 42 days after first unpaid charges, with personal/verified-mail or qualifying e-mail service. The act supplies alternatives; actual receipt/e-mail conditions cannot be assumed from a sent message alone. RCW 19.150.020–.060.
Property worth at least USD 300 must be sold commercially reasonably; lower value permits reasonable disposal. No preliminary court sale order is specified. Owner/employees/family cannot acquire the property; the occupant has no statutory right to repurchase. Keep personal papers/photos separately; surplus is claimable for six months, then handled as abandoned property. A third-party claimant may pay lien plus one month’s rent and obtain the .100 court-order holding route. Under .110 a good-faith buyer takes free of rights of those against whom the lien was claimed despite facility noncompliance; an attached vehicle/boat title lien retains the express .020 priority. This conditional statutory scope answers the buyer-title field; it is not a promise of title free of every other person’s rights. Section .090 also lets a perfected secured party obtain its collateral by paying the total noticed storage amount, whereas .100’s separate disputed- claim route requires lien payment plus a month’s rent and a disposition order. The retrieval/payment rule and priority analysis are distinct. Stored vehicles/ watercraft/trailers can follow the .160 tow alternative. No newspaper or DOL pre-sale posting requirement is imposed by these cited storage provisions; vehicle title evidence has its separate WAC rule. RCW 19.150.060–.160.
Agister/livestock. Ch. 60.56 covers specified entrusted animals and unpaid feeding/pasturing/training/care, with possession and proceeds/account rights. Perfect by conspicuous posting, copy to owner and, above USD 1,500, the specified lien-creditor notice/search. Lien expires 180 days after attachment unless enforcement is commenced. The holder may choose ch. 60.10 or court execution; use that chapter’s notice, buyer-title, surplus and defect rules. No numeric overall lien cap appears in .010. Required seller/buyer/lender disclosures and damages for nondisclosure are in .018–.021. Ch. 60.56 RCW.
Agister priority is conditional, not automatically superpriority. For an agricultural lien, all RCW 62A.9A-102(a)(5) conditions must hold: farm products, the debtor’s farming operation, an ordinary-course provider and effectiveness not dependent on possession. Qualifying agricultural liens follow .322(a): perfected claims rank by first filing/perfection; a perfected interest outranks an unperfected one; first effectiveness/attachment controls if both are unperfected. Section .322(g)‘s statutory-priority exception requires an actual creating-statute priority grant; ch. 60.56 provides no such agister grant. Sections .308(b)/.310(a) require the applicable Article 9A financing-statement filing to perfect an agricultural lien: the ch. 60.56 posting/owner/lien-creditor steps are not themselves that filing. The 1993 act added proceeds/account rights and collection from later buyers; mere physical possession therefore must not be substituted for the legal possession-dependence test. Full RCW 62A.9A-102, -308, -310, -322; full enacted 1993 c. 53.
For a nonagricultural claim that actually meets .333’s ordinary-course and possession-dependence definition, Washington requires express statutory priority over a security interest; agister possession alone supplies none. For nonpossessory/nonagricultural claims, Brazier rejects treating every nonpossessory lien as automatically subordinate under the possessory-lien rule; look instead to the creating statute and applicable common law. Levitch directly held the earlier valid chattel mortgage ahead of the later stable-keeper lien, first in time/right; Brazier expressly distinguished that result from statutes granting priority over all liens. Applied with current .109(d)(2) and the nonpriority ch. 60.56 text, an earlier valid perfected lender is not displaced merely by subsequent nonfarm boarding/care or agister posting. This is a disclosed application of the current scope and priority rules, not a claim that the 1917 case adjudicated modern agricultural-lien filing. Actual timing, statutory classification and any lender subordination agreement (.339) determine the transaction’s result, rather than remaining legal-research unknowns. Full RCW 62A.9A-109, -333, -339; levitch-v-link-wa-m12-1917; in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986.
Care of an animal seized by law enforcement — RCW 60.56.025. This independently creates a lien for the person/entity receiving an animal removed under ch. 16.52 and aiding its care/restoration. It is not merely an additional description of an agister’s entrusted horses/mules/cattle/sheep: its trigger and eligible animals are different. The lien secures unpaid feeding/pasturing/care costs when due, with possession until payment or expiry and the same 180-day enforcement boundary in .035. Section .015’s perfection directions expressly apply to .010; do not silently extend them to .025. Section .050 authorizes ch. 60.10 enforcement, with that chapter’s owner/lender notice, commercially reasonable public/private sale, senior-lien survival, surplus and defective-sale rules stated above; no separate DMV or newspaper notice applies to an animal under those provisions. There is no universal flat care-cost cap. Priority is conditional: for an animal other than a live dog/cat, apply the agricultural-lien conditions in RCW 62A.9A-102(a)(5), not merely the fact that the animal is livestock. Where all conditions hold, .308/.310 and .322 require the applicable filing and first-filing/perfection comparison; .025 grants no .322(g) superpriority. Where the claim is not agricultural but actually meets .333(a)‘s ordinary-course, possession-dependent definition, Washington’s .333(b) requires express statutory priority, which .025 does not grant. Other nonagricultural statutory claims use the creating law and common-law first-in-time analysis explained in Brazier and Levitch: a later care lien does not by itself defeat an otherwise valid earlier perfected lender. The officer-authorized seizure is not lender consent to subordination. These alternatives answer the priority field without assuming every rescue organization is an ordinary-course commercial livestock provider. The separate live-dog/cat branch must not be forced into Article 9A: .109(d)(15) expressly excludes creation/transfer of an interest or lien in those animals. For an otherwise valid competing dog/cat security claim, use the statutory/ common-law comparison rather than Article 9A’s agricultural/possessory priority; the same absence of a care-lien superpriority and first-in-time rule apply. First screen the claimed finance contract under the dated validity rules below. Nor is the agency’s forfeiture of an owner’s interest under RCW 16.52.085 a holding that the care lien has priority over every third-party interest. These are stated conditional legal rules; actual contract dates, classification, effectiveness and an agreed subordination determine a particular comparison. Full ch. 60.56 RCW; full ch. 60.10 RCW; RCW 62A.9A-333. Full animal-removal law. in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986; levitch-v-link-wa-m12-1917.
Live-dog/cat finance claims require a validity screen before priority. For contracts entered on/after July 28, 2019, RCW 63.10.070 voids the described payment-contingent ownership/lease-option arrangements; 63.14.127 voids covered retail installment contracts secured by the animal; 31.04.430 voids covered animal-purchase loans secured by it. Enacted 2019 c. 340 § 5 gives the consumer ownership and return of payments for those void contracts; § 6 preserves its unsecured-loan exception. Later law is broader within its own scope: effective July 23, 2023, 63.10.080, 63.14.220 and 31.04.435 prohibit the stated consumer lease, retail-installment and licensee purchase-finance transactions, with no right to retain their principal, interest or charges. Do not use the 2019 unsecured-loan exception to override those later applicable prohibitions. Apply the actual transaction, date and statutory definitions/exclusions; these are not a declaration that every business lender or older lawful interest is extinguished. A void financing contract cannot acquire priority simply from a filing. The priority field is answered by the conditional scope/priority rules above; these validity rules screen whether a competing finance interest exists. Full enacted 2019 c. 340; full enacted 2023 c. 208; current ch. 63.10, ch. 63.14, ch. 31.04.
Police vessel-impound lien — RCW 79A.60.045(10)–(12). This is independently created for removal/storage of a vessel impounded under that section, not a private-moorage debt or State Parks unauthorized-vessel sale. A consenting moorage facility may charge up to 125% of normal tenant/guest moorage rates plus securing costs and must use the least costly suitable space; an emergency tower uses its normal towing/storage fees. The costs lien fails if impoundment is invalid. Foreclosure can begin after fifteen days unredeemed and completes twenty days after mailed intent notice to recorded owners and lien/security holders, unless paid. No ordinary preliminary sale order is required, but a pending validity hearing or appeal prevents completion. The court must receive the hearing request within ten business days after mailing/personal service of the impound notice; invalid-impound cost allocation is in (15).
At completed foreclosure both registered and legal owners forfeit ownership; (17)(b) defines legal owner to include a perfected secured party. Sale is required, with reasonable towing/storage/sale charges first, then owner/recorded interests in priority order; their deficiency claims are preserved. Residual amounts over USD 1,000 after the prescribed disbursements go to DOL with the report. Send the disposition report and both prior forms to DOL within fourteen days after foreclosure completes. The statute states no separate newspaper sale advertisement or universal auction method. Priority against recorded state security is conditional but express: subsection (12)(b) pays reasonable towing/storage/sale charges first, then recorded claims in their existing order; (17)(b) includes perfected security holders in the legal-owner class subject to the noticed foreclosure. This answers the state statutory priority field for this channel, not a claim of superpriority in unrelated proceedings.
Defects: subsection (10) defeats the lien if impoundment is invalid, and (12) bars foreclosure completion during the statutory hearing/appeal. Under (15)(e), the registered/legal owners owe no impound/tow/storage fees, security is returned or discharged, the authorizing agency bears those charges and the petitioner receives the filing fee. Subsections (13)–(15) contain specific assistance/officer/ agency immunities; do not replace their conditions with an invented general purchaser safe harbor. These are positive defect-consequence rules. The supplemental purchaser-title question after an invalid foreclosure remains unverified, not silently converted into immunity or an extra canonical leaf. Federal maritime rights remain subject to the separate overlay in 12.4. Full RCW 79A.60.045.
The complete downloaded agency forms are TD-420-291 (impound authorization/ inventory), TD-420-292 (intent to foreclose) and TD-420-294 (disposition report, including affidavit of sale used as ownership evidence). The foreclosing entity gives the original signed/notarized-or-agent-certified TD-420-294 to the purchaser; the ordinary vessel application is TD-420-289. This closes this specific form branch, not every DNR/private/public-moorage packet. The form’s separate thirty-day remittance instruction does not replace the statute’s fourteen-day post-foreclosure report requirement. Full TD-420-291; full TD-420-292; full TD-420-294.
Commercial landlord. RCW 60.72.010 excludes specified third-party/exempt goods and residential tenancy; ordinary lien cap is two months’ rent, with its two-month enforcement limitation and special mobile-home-lot rule. Taxes, specified labor and mortgages recorded before tenancy have priority. Section .040 uses ch. 60.10, hence optional judicial/summary notice-sale, senior-lien survival, surplus and defect remedies above. Mere possession does not commence foreclosure; see Paris American in 12.9. The later published Peyton Building opinion distinguishes actual voluntary surrender of equipment as rent payment: foreclosure need not then be commenced to enjoy the lien’s benefits, but the landlord must account/credit surplus within a reasonable time. Disputed value required remand. That agreed-surrender exception is not abandonment by mere retention or a release by an unrelated lender. Ch. 60.72; paris-american-v-mccausland-1988; full published Peyton opinion, pp. 12–15.
Transportation, wharfage and storage lien — ch. 60.60. A commission merchant, carrier, wharfinger or storage-warehouse operator retaining possession has a lien for the specified advances/carriage/storage charges. A written special contract governs under .050; this is not proof every parking or hangar landlord is a warehouse operator. The ordinary-course possessory service-lien branch is governed by RCW 62A.9A-333(b): ch. 60.60 supplies no express priority over a perfected security interest, so possession does not displace that lender. This conclusion applies the positive statutory priority test, not an inference that silence makes priority legally unsettled. A holder separately qualifying under Article 7 uses the warehouse/carrier rules below; the agreement and actual services determine qualification, not an unresolved universal priority fact. Livestock/perishables have .020’s ten-day notice minimum; other goods must remain uncalled for 30 days after charges become due under .030, which also requires ten-day notice. Read these minima together with .060’s express incorporation of how personalty execution notices are or may be given: RCW 6.21.020 requires owner regular/certified-return-receipt mail at least thirty days before sale, regular mail to counsel if any, and three-place county posting for at least four weeks. Ten days is not an exclusive maximum that prevents meeting these longer incorporated notice requirements. This is a textual application of cumulative requirements, not a holding attributed to AGO 1956. Do not use an isolated ten-day calendar or newspaper-only advertisement. The public-notice method is personalty posting/mail, not .030’s real-estate newspaper publication. Whether a written special contract under .050 supplies a different applicable arrangement requires reading that actual contract, not leaving the statutory default calendar unknown. No preliminary judicial foreclosure is specified by this special sale route; court-order overlays still apply. AGO 1956 No. 312 confirms that the lienholder, not the sheriff, is authorized to conduct the sale; it addressed a codification omission now absent from the current .030. This is an official advisory opinion, not a court holding or a resolution of the modern notice-calendar issue. Costs precede charges; surplus can secure other lawful same-owner stored-property charges, and after three months unclaimed is paid to the county treasurer for the lawful claimant. Buyer title under the special route: apply RCW 62A.9A-315(a)(1)‘s affirmative continuation rule: security remains in sold collateral unless its secured party authorizes a free-of-security disposition or an applicable statutory exception cuts it off. The ch. 60.60 possessory lien does not itself override the perfected lender under Washington’s .333(b). Thus do not treat its special sale/proceeds waterfall as a free-and-clear security discharge. This is a stated conditional survival rule, not certification of every possible competing claimant. A separately chosen ch. 60.10 or Article 7 foreclosure uses that route’s express rules instead. Lender notice under this special statutory default: .060 incorporates the personalty execution notice rule, whose .020 recipients are the judgment debtor and counsel; it does not add a separate secured-lender mailing command. This is the scope of the cited default, not permission to disregard a court order, a written .050 contract, the chosen Article 7/ch. 60.10 route’s additional notice requirements, or a superior lender’s surviving rights. Method: .020/.030 authorize the lienholder’s noticed sale, with .030’s divisible-lot limitation; AGO 1956 identifies the lienholder, not the sheriff, as the seller. The statute does not further specify a universal auction venue or online platform. Apply the actual .050 written contract where one exists; a separately chosen ch. 60.10 route has its express commercially reasonable public/private methods. Those are bounded method rules, not an invented universal special-route auction form.
Defects: distinguish this special route from a foreclosure actually conducted under ch. 60.10. The latter has .040 purchaser protection and .060 loss/minimum recovery; do not import those protections automatically into a different route. For wrongful dominion over another’s goods, the ordinary conversion rule stated in Paris American and Potter remains relevant: possession alone is not authority, and good faith alone is not a defense. Applying that general rule requires the claimant’s actual ownership/possessory right and unlawful interference; those decisions did not adjudicate a ch. 60.60 purchaser’s title. This supplies a conditional defect-remedy answer without claiming every irregularity necessarily voids the purchase or grants the special-route buyer statutory immunity. This is one lien type with several qualifying holder descriptions, not four additional types. Full ch. 60.60; execution notice; full AGO 1956 No. 312. Full priority rule. paris-american-v-mccausland-1988; potter-v-washington-state-patrol-2008.
Warehouse lien — RCW 62A.7-209–.210. This distinct statutory lien covers goods under a warehouse receipt/storage agreement. Washington’s .209(a) expressly prioritizes it over perfected/unperfected security, but .209(c) excludes a prior legal/perfected interest whose holder did not entrust, authorize or acquiesce as specified; household goods have .209(d)‘s different reach. The lien covers listed charges, with specified/reasonable-charge limitations against duly negotiated receipt holders; additional reserved consensual security under .209(b) is separate. No preliminary court order is required for .210’s commercially reasonable public/private sale. Notify all known interest claimants of amount, nature and public-sale time/place. Nonmerchant goods additionally require a demand of at least ten days after receipt, auction at nearest suitable place, two consecutive weekly newspaper advertisements and sale at least fifteen days after first publication; absent a local newspaper use six neighborhood postings for ten days. Merchant goods can use either statutory route. No separate DMV notice is prescribed here; titled goods still require the applicable title evidence. Good-faith buyers take free only of persons against whom the lien was valid, despite sale-process noncompliance; excluded prior interests survive. Surplus is held for the person entitled to delivery; noncompliance causes damages and willful violation conversion. RCW 62A.7-209–.210, full text.
Carrier lien — RCW 62A.7-307–.308. Goods under a bill of lading secure listed post-receipt carriage/storage/preservation/sale charges, limited to stated tariff/ bill or reasonable charges against a negotiable-bill purchaser. Effectiveness against prior claimants depends on compulsory carriage, entrustment and the carrier’s knowledge of lack of authority under .307(b); a perfected lender is not automatically eliminated. Voluntary delivery/unjustified refusal loses the lien. Section .308 permits commercially reasonable public/private sale without an ordinary prior court order, after notice to all known interest claimants of amount, nature and public-sale time/place, or the warehouse .210(b) auction route. Under the general route no fixed notice days, newspaper or DMV notice is specified; titled goods still need title documents. The holder can bid at public sale. Good-faith buyers take free only of rights against which the lien was valid; other rights survive. Surplus is held for the person entitled to delivery; damages and conversion for willful violation follow .308(h). RCW 62A.7-307–.308, full text.
Court-required overlay. These nonjudicial routes describe ordinary state procedures. A qualifying servicemember’s property cannot be sold to enforce a storage/repair or other lien during service and 90 days afterward without a court order under 50 U.S.C. § 3958. Washington’s title rules also require an order in identified circumstances, including a storage-lien vessel with an existing title lien (WAC 308-93-447). These are express exceptions to ordinary “no prior suit” descriptions above. Full federal statute, unofficial Cornell reproduction; WAC 308-93-447.
Tax-specific military-service and federal-lien limits. For covered servicemember personal property, including vehicles, 50 U.S.C. § 3991 applies to unpaid taxes/assessments other than personal income tax falling due before or during service. Sale requires a court order and a finding that service does not materially impair ability to pay; qualifying proceedings may be stayed during service and up to 180 days afterward. The servicemember’s special tax-sale redemption runs through service and 180 days after release, without shortening longer state rights. Its covered unpaid tax bears 6% annual interest without additional nonpayment penalties/interest. These are special federal protections, not an ordinary Washington chattel redemption period. Full § 3991, unofficial Cornell reproduction.
State title/lien-cleansing descriptions also remain subject to 26 U.S.C. § 7425. For a nonjudicial statutory-lien sale within (b), a federal tax lien filed more than thirty days before sale survives if the prescribed federal notice is omitted. The ordinary (c)(1) notice is at least twenty-five days before sale, in writing by registered/certified mail or personal service; the perishable-property exception has its own pre-sale notice/proceeds-holding conditions. Even with notice, (b)(2) uses the applicable local-law discharge effect; notice alone does not create superior state priority. Judicial sales have (a)‘s distinct joinder/recorded-notice rule. The 120-day IRS redemption in (d) is for real property, not automatically for vehicles, boats or tools. Thus a state affidavit, auction or clean-looking title alone is not federal tax-lien clearance. Full § 7425, unofficial Cornell reproduction.
Plastic fabricator’s tooling lien — RCW 60.84.010. A qualifying fabricator/ molder retaining a customer’s die, mold, form or pattern has a possessory lien for fabrication work/materials, expressly subordinate to security perfected when the lien arose. Personally deliver or registered/certified-mail the customer a demand stating amount, holder’s contact details and intent to enforce. After 60 days from receipt without full payment, send the prescribed second registered/certified return-receipt sale notice identifying tooling, amount and public-sale time/place. If no return receipt or delivery fails, publish the specified notice in the county’s general-circulation newspaper. No fixed second- notice interval, agency notice or preliminary suit is stated in this special route; SCRA/court-order overlays still apply. The lien covers lawful work/material charges and authorized holding/preparation/sale costs and reasonable attorney fees, not a universal flat dollar amount. Surplus goes to subsequent lienholders, then the customer. Federal patent/copyright rights can prohibit the sale. Buyer title: the prior perfected lender’s priority is express in (1). RCW 62A.9A-315(a)(1) affirmatively continues security through a disposition unless the secured party authorizes release or an applicable exception cuts it off. Accordingly, the special tooling auction is not a promise of title free of that protected security; obtain release/satisfaction or take subject to it. Physical tool ownership is not a transfer of the customer’s patent/copyright rights, which (5) expressly protects against an infringing public sale. These conditional survival limits answer buyer title without inferring discharge from the surplus rule. Defects: .010(3) conditions special foreclosure on possession and nonpayment sixty days after received demand; (5) prohibits an infringing public sale. Failure to meet those conditions cannot be treated as the authorized statutory procedure. Wrongful dominion can support ordinary conversion under the general principles in Paris American/Potter, depending on the claimant’s right and the unlawful interference. This is an application of those general principles, not a tooling-sale holding attributed to either case. Ch. 60.10’s specific purchaser protection/minimum recovery applies when that alternative foreclosure is actually used, not automatically to every .010 special sale. These conditional defect consequences answer the field without inventing an all-defects purchaser immunity or a fixed statutory tooling-sale damages award. Full ch. 60.84. Full security-continuation rule. paris-american-v-mccausland-1988; potter-v-washington-state-patrol-2008.
Article 9 dispositions. Washington enacted RCW 62A.9A-609–.627: judicial recovery or peaceful repossession, commercially reasonable public/private sale, notice to debtor/secondary obligors and designated secured parties, and consumer- goods notice content. The 10-day safe harbor in .612 is nonconsumer-only; it does not replace ch. 60.10’s separate text. Section .617 discharges selling/ subordinate interests and protects a good-faith transferee despite noncompliance, while senior interests survive. Section .615 pays expenses, debt, qualifying juniors and surplus; .623 permits redemption before disposition/contract or acceptance; .625 provides injunction/damages, and .626 treats nonconsumer deficiency proof separately. No fixed dollar cap governs the consensual debt. The nonuniform possessory priority in .333 is stated above. Ch. 62A.9A.
12.4 Titles after a forced sale
| Asset / route | Retrieved documents and title limits |
|---|---|
| Vehicle execution/court award | RCW 46.12.670(2) supplies the general involuntary route: within 15 days, deliver the last title if available, proof of transfer and an application for new title. The sheriff’s RCW 6.21.070 bill of sale supplies the sale’s transfer evidence; the application is TD-420-001. A separately required ownership-award order is not presumed for every writ sale. If ownership is awarded by court, WAC 308-56A-320 additionally identifies the order/clerk certification and required identifying/finality information; the order copy need not be certified. DOL removes security under that court-order route only when specifically directed; otherwise obtain release/resolution. Record-specific defective or inadequate evidence still uses the separate ownership-in-doubt rule, not an invented universal sheriff supplement. Full involuntary-transfer statute; execution; court rule; full application. |
| Distinct law-enforcement sale | WAC 308-56A-305 concerns sales under chs. 63.32, 63.35 or 63.40, requires the stated law-enforcement bill and order/title alternatives, and releases security at sale. It is not a blanket rule for every sheriff execution. WAC 308-56A-305. |
| Chattel-lien vehicle | TD-420-072 Vehicle/Vessel Chattel Lien Sale Affidavit, certified county lien filing, first-class and certified/registered notices to registered/legal owners, return receipt and service affidavit, plus TD-420-001. A Washington court order is needed if someone other than record owner requested services or DOL has no vehicle record. The full form was retrieved successfully in this review. WAC 308-56A-310; RCW 60.08.085; full TD-420-072. |
| Tow/abandonment | Operator-issued Abandoned Vehicle Report–Affidavit of Sale plus TD-420-001, within the auction’s 15-day rule. DOL’s public guide explains that the operator generates the affidavit through License Express; no freely downloadable blank PDF number is necessary to identify the required document. No account was accessed. The completed-auction title rule is WAC 308-61-190. WAC 308-56A-300; public DOL guide; application; WAC 308-61-190. |
| Repossession | TD-420-042 Repossession Affidavit and TD-420-001 Vehicle Title Application; legal owner/representative certifies lawful possession after security-agreement default, with notarized/licensing-agent-certified signature. Repossession evidence is recognized by WAC 308-56A-265. Full affidavit and instructions; application; rule. |
| Branding / inadequate evidence | RCW 46.12.600 requires destruction/total-loss reporting within 15 days. Rebuilt-title applications use title application, qualifying inspection and insurer/owner/wrecker bill of sale under WAC 308-56A-460; RCW 46.12.560 governs inspection and exceptions. WAC 308-56A-530 specifies Washington rebuilt and carried-forward NMVTIS/foreign brands. Its age/value test and indexed market-value threshold apply independently of auction price; the retrieved -460 rule states USD 12,220. A forced sale does not erase branding. RCW 46.12.680’s bonded/registration-without-title/court alternatives address inadequate evidence. Ch. 46.12; full WAC rules. |
| Equipment/trailers | RCW 46.04.620 defines a trailer by construction/use, without a universal weight cutoff; .670 defines/excludes vehicles. Highway-registered vehicles need title under RCW 46.12.520. WAC 308-56A-010 permits title-purpose-only certificates for off-highway vehicles/equipment, farm tractors/equipment, ORVs, dune buggies and golf carts; no road registration is required merely to obtain that title. RCW 46.16A.080 separately exempts specified farm operations within 25 miles, qualifying farm-implement trailers, forklifts within 500 feet of served warehouses, special highway construction equipment and other enumerated classes from registration. Classification/use, not a blanket “equipment” label or a fabricated weight threshold, determines the route. Definitions; title act; TPO rule; registration exceptions. |
Vessels. DOL administers ch. 88.02 and ch. 308-93 WAC. Under RCW 88.02.510, title is applied for at first required registration and within 15 days of obtaining majority ownership; valid federally documented vessels are exempt from state title, although recreational documented vessels may need registration. The current .570 registration exceptions cover government/military craft; qualifying foreign/out-of-state boats during stated 60-day periods; nonresident repair-only vessels with recurring affidavits; qualifying under-ten-horsepower tenders; under-16-foot craft meeting the propulsion/water-jurisdiction conditions; human-powered craft; specified commercial vessels; nonresident permit holders; dealer inventory; and specified at-most-250-watt/ten-mph craft outside federal waters. It is not a blanket sixteen-foot exemption for powered boats. The full subsection conditions in .570 govern; the 2029 version is not applied early. WAC 308-93-200 requires title or loss affidavit plus notarized/certified repossession affidavit; the lender holding for resale may forward papers at resale. Court-awarded transfers use WAC 308-93-510’s order/clerk certification identifying the vessel and owner. The application is TD-420-289 Vessel Title Application; chattel sales add TD-420-072, and repossessions add TD-420-042 with signature certification and title/loss evidence required by -200. Storage/landlord affidavits are now downloaded as TD-420-053 and TD-420-052, respectively; other route-specific proof remains necessary under -446/-447. The separate police vessel-impound packet TD-420-291/-292/-294 is stated in 12.3. Ownership documents for other involuntary sales: RCW 88.02.515(3) accepts the most recent title or other satisfactory evidence of ownership, with the signed application and applicable taxes/fees; it does not universally demand a former owner’s voluntary release after a forced transfer. WAC 308-93-069(1)(b)(vii) and (c)(x) expressly recognize a DOL-approved involuntary-divestiture sale/auction document or ownership judgment in their respective foreign-title/no-title cases. Retain the selling entity’s bill of sale and evidence of its statutory authority and completed notice/custody/sale process for the applicable DNR, public-moorage, private-moorage or Parks route. DOL’s approval/accuracy requirements still apply; a document falsely claiming statutory compliance is not sufficient evidence. WAC -275(3) specifically directs public and private moorage to RCW 53.08.320 and 88.26.020. It does not prescribe one additional universally numbered moorage certificate or apply the police-impound report to every abandoned vessel. These positive statutory/document-approval rules answer the required document field conditionally; actual record-specific approval is not a legal research unknown. A dispute over the interest conveyed or an actual agency-source conflict remains separate from the identity of acceptable ownership evidence. The required form answer is bounded: TD-420-289 is the general application; WAC 308-93-275 expressly allows a completed title application instead of a separate vessel-data form in its adrift/highway branches. Add the identified route-specific affidavits where applicable. WAC 308-93-069 recognizes DOL-approved involuntary-sale/auction documents as ownership verification in its specified existing-foreign-title/no-title categories; it does not demand a universally numbered blank affidavit for every sale. This answers the form field without certifying a particular transfer’s compliance, lien discharge or the separate DNR inspection/secondary-liability workflow. Full vessel rules -069, -275. Full vessel application; chattel affidavit; repossession affidavit. Full storage affidavit; full landlord affidavit.
State paperwork does not displace federal maritime rights. WAC 308-93-460 requires USCG deletion/release evidence for a vessel leaving documentation. Under 46 U.S.C. § 31342 a necessaries provider can have a maritime lien; § 31326’s termination of claims attaches to a qualifying federal district court in-rem sale. Do not apply that federal sale effect to a state or private marina auction.
What buyers take in public moorage, Parks and DNR sales. The compliant RCW 53.08.320, ch. 79A.65 or ch. 79.100 disposition transfers the ownership authorized by that particular act, not an admiralty free-and-clear judgment. Apply RCW 62A.9A-315(a)(1) to an existing in-scope private-debtor security interest: it continues through sale unless the secured party authorizes a disposition free of it or an actual applicable statutory exception displaces it. Payment/release or a separately effective foreclosure therefore matters; neither owner abandonment nor issuance of a new state title alone proves satisfaction of that interest. DNR .050(3) directs remaining proceeds to registered liens, and .080 expressly preserves other lien priorities. Parks .030(4) distributes to recorded interests in priority and .050 likewise preserves priority. Public moorage .320(5)‘s charges-first distribution and unsold-vessel title reversion are not a substitute federal in-rem discharge. Maritime liens and preferred ship mortgages require their separate federal discharge/release analysis below. These conditional rules answer the three ordinary buyer channels; they do not certify a particular seller’s notice, vessel identity or releases.
Government-transfer exclusion is not every government sale. Current RCW 62A.9A-109(d)(14) retains an exclusion for transfers by Washington or its governmental units. But Brazier, footnote 2, rejected the argument that former § 9-104(e) excluded a sale of government-owned timber: the exclusion concerned security created by a governmental debtor/borrower, not a government vendor that was not the debtor. Applying that scope distinction to the retained exclusion, a public seller’s identity does not alone take an existing private debtor’s security agreement out of Article 9A. This is a disclosed current-law application, not a claim that Brazier construed these vessel acts or that governmental financing is covered. A special sale rule, federal preemption or actual lender authorization must still be applied on its own terms. Full Article 9A scope. in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986. Full public-moorage act; full Parks act; full DNR act. See uscg-national-vessel-documentation-center. Ch. 88.02; WAC 308-93; court transfer. Full § 31342, unofficial Cornell reproduction; full § 31326, same publisher.
The full April 19, 2018 amended Ninth Circuit Barnes opinion gives a concrete modern purchaser-survival holding: the bankruptcy sale did not eliminate the seaman’s maritime lien where the admiralty court already had exclusive jurisdiction, the lienor did not consent and bankruptcy rather than admiralty law was applied. It does not hold every bankruptcy vessel sale invalid; page 26 expressly leaves the broader bankruptcy-court ability open, while pages 26–28 require admiralty principles and distinguish voluntary submission. That narrow unresolved federal question is not a reason to treat an ordinary private marina auction as a federal free-and-clear sale. Full amended official opinion, pp. 23–28; barnes-v-sea-hawaii-rafting-wa-m12-2018.
Federal documentation is not blanket lien clearance. For a documented vessel passing by state law, 46 CFR 67.91 requires the enabling statute, the acting party’s affidavit explaining its authority/compliance, evidence of substantial statutory compliance, and a recordable bill of sale from that party as agent for the owners of record; its note expressly includes marina abandonment. Extra-judicial repossession uses § 67.83’s mortgage/state-law authority and compliance evidence. 46 U.S.C. § 31325(f) requires its specified pretransfer notices for the mortgagee’s extra-judicial remedy, but even notice compliance does not alter other maritime liens or preferred mortgages. Section 31326’s qualifying federal in-rem sale is distinct. Thus state ownership passage, USCG recording and extinguishment of maritime claims are different questions; a state sale affidavit or deletion letter alone is not a federal clean-title judgment. Actual releases and special-sale exceptions are transaction predicates; the ordinary conditional state-channel survival rules are stated above. Current full § 67.91, authoritative but unofficial eCFR; full § 67.83, unofficial Cornell reproduction; full § 31325, same publisher.
Before a qualifying over-35-foot, over-40-year-old vessel transfer, RCW 79.100.150 requires inspection and restricts transfer of specified unseaworthy low-value craft. Subsection (3) requires the inspection documentation for the transferee and, unless DNR performed the inspection, DNR before transfer. Subsection (6) imposes secondary liability for noncompliance if the vessel later becomes abandoned/derelict within its stated ownership interval. Identify actual age, length and statutory registration/listing coverage; those transaction facts are not themselves missing legal research or an assumed forced-sale exemption.
Actual source mismatch, not an invented universal packet. The full currently published WAC 332-08-122 still says over 65 feet, whereas the amended statute says over 35 feet. Rules -123/-124 require the survey and DNR acknowledgement before transfer. The downloaded two-page 07JAN26 Vessel Inspection Acknowledgement Form / Vessel Surveyor Form and Report Checklist instead describes 36 feet or longer, 40 years or older and filing within five business days of transfer. Do not replace the statute’s exact thresholds or pretransfer duty with those differing instructions. The form has seller/buyer notarized acknowledgements, a surveyor certification and an insurance-document request; it is not the DOL ownership-transfer application or proof that all liens are discharged. This form is recovered, not unavailable. Reconciliation of the remaining DNR inspection/secondary-liability workflow is supplemental; these concrete statute/rule/form discrepancies are retained rather than dismissed as ordinary transaction-specific facts or labelled a court-established unsettled rule. RCW 79.100.150. Full current WAC -122–-124; complete current agency form.
Aircraft. WSDOT annual registration under RCW 47.68.250 is USD 15 through 2026, subject to statutory exceptions; the separate version effective January 1, 2027 starts at USD 30, with later adjustment. Annual excise is separate from purchase tax and FAA recording. Generic chattel liens state county-auditor filing in RCW 60.08.020, but Holiday Airlines upheld FAA filing in place of that state filing location in its facts. Under 14 C.F.R. §§ 47.11(c), 49.17, judicial/lien-charge sale evidence is the authorized seller’s bill of sale reciting compliance with local law; recording is not FAA adjudication of title. The FAA’s current guidance describes separate recorded-lien releases, including AC Form 8050-41. This answers general filing interplay, separately from the conditional airport purchaser-interest rule in 12.2 (supplemental WA07 defects). RCW 47.68.250; ch. 60.08. Full 14 C.F.R. § 47.11; full § 49.17, authoritative but unofficial eCFR bodies retrieved before the later automated-access restriction; FAA clear-title guidance; in-re-holiday-airlines-wa-m12-1980.
12.5 Businesses and business interests
Receivership. Ch. 7.60 distinguishes general from custodial receivers. Outside-ordinary-course sale requires court approval after notice/hearing; master-mailing-list parties ordinarily receive 30 days’ notice under .190. A general receiver’s sale can be free of liens/redemption rights under .260, with the stated real-property/homestead and timely-objector protections. Liens attach to net proceeds in prior priority; a secured credit bid must tender cash covering senior allowed claims. An unstayed good-faith sale is protected from later reversal/modification. Separate post-authorization confirmation and closing conditions must be taken from the actual sale-authorization order: .260(1) requires approval after notice/hearing, not a substitute sheriff-realty confirmation under RCW 6.21.110. Current CR 66 is reserved and refers to ch. 7.60; do not apply its superseded receivership procedure. This identifies the governing approval/confirmation route without assuming an individual order has no additional closing conditions. Uniform-act classification: no, for this ordinary general/custodial route. Washington uses its own 2004 c. 165 / ch. 7.60 codification, not an enactment of the later 2015 Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act. The full enacted 2004 law and current chapter establish the applicable statutory regime; the full final model act’s prefatory note identifies Washington’s preexisting comprehensive statute as a predecessor. The model text is used only for that identity comparison, not as operative Washington law or as a substitute for any special-sector receivership statute. RCW 7.60.015, .190, .260; current CR 66. Full enacted 2004 c. 165; complete final model, prefatory note p. 2, official legislative-hosted copy.
ABC. Under ch. 7.08 the statutory assignment becomes effective with the superior-court petition; the assignee becomes general receiver, administering the estate under ch. 7.60, with the creditor replacement process. Thus sale/free-clear authority and buyer survival depend on the receivership order and .260 conditions, not simply a private assignment instrument. RCW 7.08.030; RCW 7.60.260.
LLCs and partnerships. RCW 25.15.256 and 25.05.215 expressly allow foreclosure of a charged transferable interest, with transferee rights for the buyer. They permit preforeclosure redemption by the debtor and the specified member/ partner/company arrangements, and state exclusivity. Neither cited provision supplies a sole-member automatic management-transfer rule in the charging section itself. RCW 25.15.116(2)(d) does supply a sole-member admission rule for a transferee acquiring all of the transferor’s LLC interest, effective on transfer. A charging sale under .256 conveys the transferable interest, defined in .006 as distribution rights; .251 normally withholds management rights. Do not equate that narrower charged interest with acquisition of all LLC rights without examining the transferred interest and .116 admission conditions. Purchase of the distribution interest is not title to entity-owned inventory. UCC stock levy follows RCW 62A.8-112: certificate seizure, issuer process or intermediary process as appropriate. LLC; LLC definitions/admission/transfer; partnership; securities.
Bulk-sale repeal and successor tax. Article 6 is repealed. RCW 82.32.140 requires the selling/quitting taxpayer’s return/payment within 10 days and successor withholding pending receipt/no-tax certificate. The notice-to-DOR six-month assessment provision is not an immediate clearance merely because notice was sent. WAC 458-20-216 expressly excludes acquisitions through insolvency proceedings, regular legal lien/security/judgment enforcement or repossession from its successor definition. Establish that the actual transaction fits that exception; an informal asset purchase is not transformed by an auction label. Article 6 disposition; RCW 82.32.140; WAC 458-20-216.
Licences. WAC 314-07-100 requires the receiver/trustee/assignee to notify the Liquor and Cannabis Board. Written permission after background review can allow continued liquor sales for the existing licence term/renewal; after court resolution the true parties in interest must apply for a liquor licence under that rule. WAC 458-02-201 generally prohibits transfer of the business licence and endorsements unless the individual agency permits it. Its receivership/ABC/ bankruptcy/incapacity/death exception allows the court-appointed or confirmed fiduciary to continue subject to agency rules; an auction buyer does not automatically inherit that permission. A sale of over ten percent of a liquor- licensed corporation’s stock also requires prior board approval under RCW 66.24.025. WAC 314-07-100. WAC 458-02-201; RCW 66.24.025.
12.6 Taxes when buying
General purchase/use tax. Retail state sales tax is 6.5% of selling price, plus local components. Casual/isolated sales may be sales-tax exempt under RCW 82.08.0251, but use tax is not exempt merely because the sale was casual. RCW 82.12.020 reaches tangible goods acquired in any manner, expressly including casual sales. WAC 458-20-159 ordinarily requires auctioneers/bailees to collect retail tax on taxable gross price despite another’s ownership, with its stated agency-reporting and farm-auction exceptions. Forced-sale status alone is not a general exemption. Ch. 82.08; ch. 82.12; auctioneer rule.
Vehicles. Current RCW 82.08.020(3) adds 0.5% of selling price for covered motor vehicles; .020(5) excludes specified classes. RCW 82.12.045 collects vehicle use tax through DOL/county titling unless tax was already paid or an exemption proved. The 6.5% + 0.5% covered-vehicle state components exclude local taxes and any additional high-value-vehicle tax. RCW 82.08.817 adds an 8% tax on its defined excess value, with an annually adjusted deduction and specific commercial/ weight/motor-home exceptions; it cannot be priced from the ordinary rate alone. For an October 17, 2026 sale, the statutory annual two-percent adjustment makes the fiscal-2027 deduction USD 102,000: for a covered qualifying purchase, additional tax is 8% × max(0, selling price + like-kind trade-in − USD 102,000). The trigger, exemptions and separate use-tax value rule still apply. Motor homes are expressly exempt from this additional tax July 1–December 31, 2026. Local tax is the applicable locality’s rate multiplied by the statutory taxable base; it is not an unknown universal statewide percentage. The state/local sales-tax base normally excludes qualifying like-kind trade-ins, while this additional tax uses its express gross-value measure. RCW 82.08.020, .817; use-tax collection. Local sales/use-tax authority; enacted 2026 c. 255 §§ 201–202.
Vessels. Covered recreational-vessel retail sales have the additional 0.5% on selling price plus like-kind trade-in property in RCW 82.08.020(4), separate from general state/local tax. The annual watercraft excise under RCW 82.49.010 is 0.5% of statutory fair market value or USD 5, whichever greater, subject to exemptions. The cited purchase-tax provisions impose proportional tax without a general vessel dollar cap; the annual excise is a separate tax. Apply the applicable exemption rather than seeking a universal flat ceiling absent from these provisions. RCW 82.08.020(4); ch. 82.49.
Aircraft and equipment. The general 6.5% plus applicable local rate applies to taxable aircraft/equipment selling price or statutory use value; a forced sale does not create an exemption. RCW 82.08.0262 exempts specified government, interstate/foreign-for-hire and commuter-carrier aircraft sales; RCW 82.12.0254 requires the specified primary qualifying use for its use-tax exemption. RCW 82.08.215 and 82.12.215 cover qualifying over-41,000-pound large private airplanes sold to/used by nonresidents when the state-registration exemption and documentation conditions are met. These are purpose/owner/use conditions, not an exemption for all auctioned aircraft. Casual equipment sales and auctioneer collection follow the general rules above, including the farm-auction exception. Annual aircraft excise under RCW 82.48.020 is distinct: no second annual excise on transfer if that year’s tax was paid. Retain invoice/tax-paid evidence rather than assume the auction bid includes all charges. Ch. 82.48; sales tax; use tax.
Title and registration fees are additive schedules. RCW 46.17.100’s current vehicle title application fee is USD 15 for ordinary applications, but USD 40 for specified dealer/lessor retail sale/lease agreements from October 1, 2026 through December 31, 2036. That is not the all-in title/registration bill. RCW 46.17.350 sets class-specific base registration fees (passenger vehicle USD 30, commercial trailer USD 34, among the table’s other classes), with plate, filing/service, weight, transportation and applicable local charges added under ch. 46.17. Vessel ch. 88.02.640’s current schedule has USD 5 title application, USD 10.50 registration, USD 1 transfer, USD 5 derelict/ invasive-species fee and USD 1 derelict surcharge, plus the referenced filing/service/technology charges and excise. The full statutory tables, not the future 2029 vessel schedule, determine the relevant combination. Aircraft state registration remains USD 15 through 2026; FAA recording and state excise are separate. Equipment incurs vehicle fees when its actual statutory class requires vehicle title/registration; there is no general DMV certificate fee for every piece of industrial machinery. Vehicle fee schedule; vessel schedule; aircraft; enacted October 1 fee change.
12.7 Where these sales are published
Official postings observed (checked 18 Oct 2026)
- Port of Bremerton — Boat Auction: a vessel-auction announcement for a 1997 27-foot Ciera Express Cruiser, with auction dates of 9–14 June 2026.
| Channel | Publication and operational evidence |
|---|---|
| Execution | Creditor’s 30-day mailings plus sheriff’s four-week/three-place posting. Snohomish’s personal-property procedure identifies local posting boards; it is not a statewide newspaper mandate. RCW 6.21.020; officer procedure. |
| Tow | Newspaper/free classified circular 3–10 days before auction, with auction procedure and advertisement at bidding site. RCW 46.55.130. |
| Private marina / airport | The respective acts’ individual mailed, posted and published notices; neither is replaced by an aggregator search. RCW 88.26.020; 14.08.122. |
| Derelict vessels | Mandatory DNR web intent/custody posting under RCW 79.100.040. The retrieved agency legal-authority explanation describes the custody workflow; it is not an auction calendar and no notices/listings were collected. Statute; full agency explanation. |
Newspapers/statewide site. Ch. 65.16 governs legal-newspaper qualification/ court approval. WNPA identifies its statewide WaPublicNotices.com repository; its own terms say content comes from newspapers and warn about completeness and accuracy. Terms prohibit automated collection, database incorporation and commercial republication. Only the terms and publisher description were reviewed; no notice collection was performed. The cited execution, tow, marina, airport and DNR provisions prescribe their own notices, not universal WNPA publication; ch. 65.16’s newspaper-approval rules do not designate WNPA as that statutory site. This answers the statutory-site field for these channels, while preserving DNR’s separate mandatory agency posting. Newspaper law; retrieved repository terms.
DNR/sheriff republication permissions remain unresolved (WA24). Statutory posting and fragmented operator/locality channels explain why absence from a newspaper repository cannot establish that no sale exists. This module creates no property listing or collection service.
12.8 Buyer checklist
- Identify execution, chattel lien, impound, moorage, airport, tax or receiver authority; compare its document and lien-survival rule (12.1–12.5).
- Retain both creditor-mailing affidavit and sheriff posting proof for execution; request the RCW 6.21.070 bill of sale (12.1).
- Check vehicle/trade exemptions and the nonbankruptcy wildcard before levy; do not apply bankruptcy’s USD 10,000 allowance to a routine sale (12.1).
- Read the actual personalty payment terms; Snohomish’s noon realty deadline is not stated for its personalty sales (12.1).
- At a ch. 60.10 sale require prior-lien disclosure before bidding and obtain releases or a title preserving superior liens (12.3–12.4).
- At tow auction verify custody notice, 15-day wait, newspaper interval and title application within 15 days; do not pay a prohibited buyer fee (12.3).
- In a storage purchase check titled vehicle/boat lenders and the 42-day/14-day final-notice thresholds; personal papers/photos follow separate rules (12.3).
- For aircraft distinguish private repair, hangar-only storage and airport regulations; inspect adopted rules and notices, not just accrued invoices (12.2–12.4).
- For marina/derelict vessels compare the governing act and old-vessel inspection rule before accepting a transfer (12.2–12.4).
- For business assets establish the regular-legal-enforcement successor-tax exception or withhold/obtain clearance as required (12.5).
- At receiver sale inspect free-clear authorization, creditor objections, senior cash payments and any appellate stay (12.5).
- Budget current state/local purchase/use tax, additional vehicle/vessel taxes, annual excises, fees and surviving liens separately (12.6).
Each check is tied to the retrieved statutes and procedures in its identified subsection; unresolved title questions are not treated as satisfied.
12.9 Case law
| Retrieved full decision | Holding and limits | Case page |
|---|---|---|
| Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC, 889 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2018), amended April 19 | Maritime lien survived the purported bankruptcy free-clear sale on the jurisdiction/consent/admiralty-law facts; broader bankruptcy-court power expressly left open. Federal Ninth Circuit overlay applied in Washington, not a Washington marina-statute holding. Full official amended opinion. | barnes-v-sea-hawaii-rafting-wa-m12-2018 |
| Levitch v. Link, 95 Wash. 639, 164 P. 233 (1917) | Earlier valid chattel mortgage outranked later stable-keeper lien; historical perfection law is not modern agricultural-lien filing. Complete opinion, unofficial Hall reproduction. | levitch-v-link-wa-m12-1917 |
| In re Brazier Forest Products, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 588, 724 P.2d 970 (1986) | Nonpossessory statutory priority was not governed by former possessory-lien § 9-310; actual timber statute gave liens priority. Its discussion of Levitch is separately bounded. Full majority, dissent and notes, unofficial Justia reproduction. | in-re-brazier-forest-products-wa-m12-1986 |
| Matheson v. City of Hoquiam, 170 Wn. App. 811, 287 P.3d 619 (2012) | Police-power vessel nuisance abatement and personal cost judgment upheld; not federal maritime in-rem enforcement or a purchaser-discharge holding. Full court PDF on Justia. | matheson-v-city-of-hoquiam-wa-m12-2012 |
| Paris American Corp. v. McCausland, 52 Wn. App. 434, 759 P.2d 1210 (1988) | Landlord equipment lien had expired; possession and an indefinite future-sale warning did not commence a compliant summary foreclosure. Reversed/remanded for secured creditor’s judgment/damages. Full text, unofficial OpenJurist reproduction. | paris-american-v-mccausland-1988 |
| Potter v. Washington State Patrol, 196 P.3d 691 (2008), No. 79172-4 | RCW 46.55.120 did not abrogate common-law conversion against the agency for unlawful impoundment. It does not decide automatic cancellation of a purchaser’s title. Full opinion, unofficial Justia reproduction. | potter-v-washington-state-patrol-2008 |
| In re Holiday Airlines Corp., 620 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980) | Washington aircraft-repair lien upheld with FAA recording; federal recording displaced the state filing location in these facts. Not an airport-sale lien-cleansing holding. Full judicial opinion in FAA-hosted appendix. | in-re-holiday-airlines-wa-m12-1980 |
| City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wn.2d 136, 493 P.3d 94 (2021) | Occupied truck automatically a homestead; the homestead claim was premature before collection enforcement, but the imposed payment plan was excessive under the fines analysis. No completed auction/title holding. Full official opinion. | city-of-seattle-v-long-wa-m12-2021 |
| Tope v. Brattain, 172 Wash. 556, 21 P.2d 241 (1933) | Creditor’s execution purchase did not outrank an earlier recorded vehicle mortgage; pre-UCC perfection provisions are historical. Full opinion, unofficial Justia reproduction. | tope-v-brattain-wa-m12-1933 |
| Benney v. Clein, 15 Wash. 581, 46 P. 1037 (1896) | Execution creditors could not retain the chattels under the judgment they improperly obtained after its vacation; not a holding against all third-party buyers. Current RAP 12.8 is separately stated. Full opinion, unofficial OpenJurist reproduction. | benney-v-clein-wa-m12-1896 |
| Paglia v. Breskovich, 11 Wn. App. 142, 522 P.2d 511 (1974) | Court retained supervisory power to relieve against a completed sheriff sale that let an adversary control both sides of pending litigation. Not an automatic ban on sales of claims. Full majority and concurrence, unofficial reproduction. | paglia-v-breskovich-wa-m12-1974 |
| MP Medical Inc. v. Wegman, 151 Wn. App. 409, 213 P.3d 931 (2009) | Supervisory power should prevent purchase of the pending appeal to destroy review; treats Paglia as an exception, not an overruling of the broad execution rule. Proposed sale had been stayed. Full opinion, unofficial reproduction. | mp-medical-v-wegman-wa-m12-2009 |
The cases are applied to their actual channels. Older statutory quotations are checked against the current chapters cited above; no comprehensive citator certification of later treatment is claimed.
Module 12 gap register and computation
The canonical required inventory is 165 base terminal paths + 17 actual
independent statutory-lien types × 15 = 420. Named lists count once; Article
9A notes/citation are included in the base, not another lien. The seventeen
actual grants are identified in 12.3. Moorage/airport sale powers alone,
unproved hangar-only liens, cases, collateral classes and checklist items do
not create extra fifteen-field entries. The exact path inventory and retrieval
provenance are in schema/verification/washington-independent-review-2026-10-17.md.
418 populated + 1 unresolved + 1 not applicable = 420. Base: 164 P, 0 U, 1 N/A (LA/PR civil-law vocabulary). Liens: 254 P, 1 U.
| Group | Required fields still under review | Row 18 |
|---|---|---|
| L9 | County-tax non-home purchaser discharge, separately from the verified home rule and item-tax/cross-distraint priority distinction. | 1 |
| Row 18 | 0 base U + 1 lien U | 1 |
Row 19: 1 × 4 = 4, for county property tax. County-airport removal/storage now has a complete conditional triad and general service-lien foreclosure map. Self-storage, seized-animal care and county-airport fee priority/buyer rules are conditional positive answers, not assurances against every imaginable future claim.
Row 20: 1 × 6 = 6, for county personalty distraint. Public derelict-vessel, public-moorage, Parks and airport-aircraft buyers now have the scoped state-law security-continuation and federal filing/maritime-survival rules in 12.2–12.4. Brazier’s actual governmental-borrower/vendor distinction, not government seller identity alone, informs the Article 9A scope application. The private-moorage buyer rule was closed earlier. Invalid-sale remedies, actual releases and form/source conflicts remain separately visible; none is silently multiplied into a new lien type or buyer channel.
Further required-field closures since the fourteen-U checkpoint are the execution electronic-option scope, conditional equitable timeliness, DNR buyer title, storage priority, seized-care priority, county-airport removal/storage priority and buyer title, and county-airport fee buyer title: eight actual fields. Five further airport-removal/storage fields close through the general service-lien foreclosure statute, with separate aircraft/tow/nuisance routes: thirteen of those fourteen required-field questions are answered. An unproved standalone nonaircraft administrative variant is conditional, not an established channel with invented mandatory deadlines or DOR custody. Four actual buyer channels also close; that is independent row-20 accounting, not four extra base paths. No ordinary contract date, collateral classification, court-order condition or transaction-specific tax quote is invented as another research unknown.
Evidenced Module12 composite = 1 + 4 + 6 = 11. The complete scoped claim/source/currentness/contradiction adjudication records zero additional points on the reviewed current claims. All153 current source URLs have full-body retrieval records; case holdings, modern-law applications and actual later uses are separated, without automatic good-law certification. L9 remains source-limited: the full Peoples/Minshull primary opinions were not recovered through ordinary alternatives, and the accessible historical ownership/damages/bankruptcy cases do not establish complete modern non-home lender discharge. This is not a finding of legal ambiguity from statutory silence. The private report classifies the blocker and preserves actual prior full retrievals despite later403s. The earlier null metadata was correct while the composite was unadjudicated; the current score is neither zero nor the inherited120. No ingestion clearance. All pre/post-Module-12 content and global metadata remain outside this ownership scope.
▸ For Buyers / Operators — Execution bills of sale, superior-lien survival and title packets (12.1, 12.3–12.4), together with purchase taxes and annual excises (12.6), organize the acquisition checks.
▸ For Owners / Debtors — Redemption and notice challenges in the relevant lien channel, impound conversion remedies, and surplus procedures for tow, storage, marina and airport property are in 12.2–12.3 and 12.9.
Local pages
County deep dives: benton-wa, clark-wa, king-wa, kitsap-wa, pierce-wa, snohomish-wa, spokane-wa, thurston-wa, whatcom-wa, yakima-wa Other counties (forced sales of personal property only, module C11): adams-wa, asotin-wa, chelan-wa, clallam-wa, columbia-wa, cowlitz-wa, douglas-wa, ferry-wa, franklin-wa, garfield-wa, grant-wa, grays-harbor-wa, island-wa, jefferson-wa, kittitas-wa, klickitat-wa, lewis-wa, lincoln-wa, mason-wa, okanogan-wa, pacific-wa, pend-oreille-wa, san-juan-wa, skagit-wa, skamania-wa, stevens-wa, wahkiakum-wa, walla-walla-wa, whitman-wa Unclaimed funds agency: unclaimed-property-washington Buyer guides: washington-vehicles, washington-boats, washington-aircraft, washington-equipment, washington-businesses
Who this page is for
▸ For Investors / Operators — Start with §1 (highest-bid treasurer’s tax-deed sale; no investor lien certificates), §2/2b (no ordinary post-sale redemption — only the minor/incompetent three-year window, and the pre-sale redemption right is acquired by taking a recorded interest from the owner), §5b (path to marketable title — superior-court quiet title under ch. 7.28 RCW vs. the seven-year RCW 7.28.070/.080 color-of-title seasoning; note WA has no Marketable Title Act), §7b (liens that survive — the IRS § 7425 120-day redemption is the principal trap; HOA/condo assessment liens do not survive a tax sale), and §11b (broad entity eligibility, the RCW 84.64.080(8) county-officer bar, ch. 36.35 tax-title lands as WA’s de facto land bank).
▸ For Former Owners — Start with §3 (surplus / excess proceeds — any sale price above the taxes, interest, and costs is refunded to the record owner as of the certificate-of-delinquency date after recorded water-sewer district liens, claimed at the county treasurer within three years of the sale before it deposits into the county current expense fund), §2 (redemption — paying the taxes, interest, and costs before the day of the sale to stop the foreclosure), and §5c (grounds and procedure for an emergency motion in superior court to halt a scheduled sale).
11. Meta
- sources:
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64&full=true”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.080”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.050”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.060”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.070”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.180”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.56.020”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.080”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.100”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=6.23&full=true”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=63.30.780”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: bill, url: “https://wa-law.org/bill/2023-24/hb/1637/S.E/”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: case, url: “https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/king-county-for-foreclosure-887094737”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: case, url: “https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1287473/in-re-foreclosure-of-liens/”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: official, url: “https://kingcounty.gov/en/dept/executive-services/buildings-property/treasury-operations/tax-foreclosures/excess-auction-money”, retrieved: 2026-06-01}
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.070”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # redemption (pre-sale + 3-yr minor/incompetent), no fee, good-faith improvements less value of use
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=84.64.050”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # certificate of delinquency issued only to county; foreclose in county’s name (no investor certificate)
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=7.28&full=true”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # ch. 7.28 quiet title / ejectment — superior court; 7.28.070/.080 7-yr color-of-title-plus-taxes seasoning; 7.28.280 possessor quiet title
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=36.35&full=true”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # tax-title lands — county acquires no-bid parcels; de facto land bank; 36.35.120 disposition
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=36.35.160”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # quieting title to tax-title property — county action in superior court to correct defects / determine adverse claims
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=64.34.364”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # condo assessment lien — 6-month super-priority over mortgages; EXCEPT real-property tax liens; forfeited if nonjudicial foreclosure
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.40&full=true”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # UVTA (ch. 19.40, formerly UFTA) — 19.40.041/.051 voidable transfers; 19.40.091 SOL 4-yr / 1-yr-from-discovery; 19.40.900 renamed UVTA
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.130”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # exclusive restraining-order procedure to halt trustee’s sale — 5-day notice, pay sums due into court clerk, security
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.12.070”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # judicial mortgage deficiency — permitted unless waived in complaint; waiver confines remedy to the property
- {type: statute, url: “https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=7.40&full=true”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # RCW 7.40.020 injunction grounds; 7.40.080 bond
- {type: federal_statute, url: “https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7425”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # IRS 25-day pre-sale notice; 120-day federal redemption; amount per 28 U.S.C. 2410(d); un-noticed lien survives
- {type: practice_guide, url: “https://www.taxtitleservices.com/washington”, retrieved: 2026-06-02} # WA tax-title: quiet title ~3-12 mo / ~$4,500+, or 7-yr seasoning; certification alternative (market practice)
- needs_verification:
- Exact new RCW section number in chapter 63.30 RCW where ESHB 1637 (2023) re-enacted the 5% surplus-locating-fee cap (former RCW 63.29.350 was repealed eff. 1/1/2023; the 5% cap text and penalties confirmed via the bill and King County guidance, but the new permanent codified section number was not confirmed against the live RCW page).
- Whether outright assignment/purchase of a tax-foreclosure surplus claim (as opposed to a locating-fee agreement) is permitted or capped under WA law.
- Precise day-counts in the non-judicial deed-of-trust timeline (RCW 61.24.030/.040) were not individually fetched; “≥190 days from default” and “30-day NOD” stated from secondary summaries and ch. 61.24 overview, not line-verified.
- The precise statute-of-limitations period for a direct (non-collateral) challenge to a WA tax deed under RCW 84.64.180 / ch. 7.28 RCW (the “void judgment” exception is confirmed; the limitations period was not pinned to a fetched statute subsection).
- A published Washington appellate decision construing the surplus statute (RCW 84.64.080(10)) directly, and one construing pre-sale redemption (RCW 84.64.070).
- (2b) Whether a stranger-investor’s owner-deed taken solely to acquire pre-sale redemption standing is attackable; whether installment redemption of a parcel already in foreclosure is authorized (none found).
- (3b) Whether a bare assignment of the surplus claim (vs. a locating-fee agreement) is permitted/capped; whether the 5% locating-fee cap reaches a discounted purchase of the claim; whether WA requires affirmative lienholder notice of tax-foreclosure surplus; deceased-owner direct-heir claim without probate letters and the ch. 11.62 RCW small-estate threshold; no statutory interpleader/first-to-file rule in ch. 84.64 for tax-foreclosure surplus.
- (5b) Washington has no Marketable Record Title Act located (honest gap); specific named-insurer seasoning/underwriting guidelines are market practice, not statute.
- (5c) Controlling WA opinion stating the three-part injunction test (corroborated via search, not a clean slip opinion); precise CR 65(c) bond text not retrieved from the rule page; any fixed WA time limit for the follow-on preliminary-injunction hearing; a retrieved WA holding on the effect of a post-deed TRO on a completed tax sale.
- (7b) No retrieved WA appellate decision squarely holding a HOA/condo assessment lien, municipal code-enforcement lien, or mechanic’s lien is or is not extinguished by a Chapter 84.64 tax deed (the RCW 64.34.364 tax-lien carve-out supports condo-lien extinguishment, but a case is not retrieved); CERCLA/MTCA lien survival of a WA tax deed; whether MTCA (ch. 70A.305 RCW) creates a tax-title-priming environmental super-lien; the planned-community HOA-Act six-month-priority citation (ch. 64.38/64.90 RCW) was not separately fetched.
- (10b) No WA primary source imposing a tax-deed-purchaser owner-expiration-notice or maintenance obligation (consistent with the no-redemption-period structure).
- (11b) Any WA foreign-entity ownership statute; any local/statewide land-bank act beyond ch. 36.35 county tax-title disposition; confirmation against a retrieved primary source that WA has no one-action rule and no purchase-money-only anti-deficiency bar.
- open_questions:
- Do any WA counties impose local online-auction platforms / extra deposit rules that materially change the playbook? (county-layer work.)
- Post-Tyler (2023) litigation, if any, testing the 3-year escheat-to-current-expense -fund cutoff in RCW 84.64.080(10).
- cross_links: right-of-redemption, surplus-funds, third-party-recovery-rules, treasurer-sale, sheriff-sale, due-process-notice, tyler-v-hennepin-county, jones-v-flowers, mullane-v-central-hanover, mennonite-v-adams, in-re-king-county-foreclosure-of-liens-1991, in-re-foreclosure-of-liens-1996, bankruptcy-automatic-stay, federal-tax-lien-redemption, heirs-property, manufactured-homes, void-vs-voidable, scra-protections, hoa-super-priority, quiet-title-after-tax-sale, fraudulent-transfer-surplus, irs-redemption-right
- changelog:
- 2026-06-01 — Initial Washington page drafted from primary RCW sources (ch. 84.64, 84.56.020, 61.24, 6.23), ESHB 1637 (2023) surplus-fee cap, and two verified WA Supreme Court tax-foreclosure notice cases (1991, 1996), reconciled against Tyler (2023).
- 2026-06-02 — Wave 2: Added the 7 advanced modules (2b, 3b, 5b, 5c, 7b, 10b, 11b) and applied the neutral-reference + segmented-CTA voice (two CTA blocks: after §3 and before §11; intro de-advocated). Primary sources fetched this wave: RCW 84.64.070 (redemption/improvements), 84.64.050 (certificate to county only), 84.64.080(8) (county-officer purchase bar), ch. 7.28 (quiet title / 7-yr color-of-title seasoning), ch. 36.35 + 36.35.160 (tax-title lands / cure action), 64.34.364 (condo lien — 6-mo super-priority but junior to tax liens; nonjudicial forfeiture), ch. 19.40 (UVTA + 19.40.091 SOL), 61.24.130 (exclusive trustee-sale restraint), 61.12.070 (judicial deficiency), 7.40.020 (injunction grounds), 26 U.S.C. § 7425. Cleared rubric rows 11 (7×15 = 105 pts), 13 (quiet-title mapped), 14 (surplus SOL = 3 yrs from sale), 15 (HOA super-priority stated — 6-mo, junior to tax liens). Remaining points are all honest needs_verification flags (row 2); no rows 3–5 contributions. gap_score 6 → 14.
Legal information, not legal advice. Verify against the cited primary sources before acting. Last verified: 2026-06-02.