Right of Redemption
Cross-jurisdiction doctrine page. Legal information, not legal advice. Last verified: 2026-06-01.
What it is
The right of redemption is the statutory (and sometimes constitutional or equitable) right of a property owner — and usually other parties with an interest in the property — to recover real estate after a tax delinquency by paying the amount owed plus statutory interest, penalties, fees, and the purchaser’s costs. It is the single most important deadline in tax-foreclosure work: while it is open, the former owner can defeat the purchaser’s title by paying; once it is extinguished, the owner’s only remaining money remedy is usually a surplus-funds claim (see Module 3 of each jurisdiction page) or an attack on the deed for defective notice (see due-process-notice).
Two distinct timing structures recur across the 56 jurisdictions:
- Pre-sale redemption (a/k/a equity of redemption, or “cure”): the right to pay the delinquency and stop the sale before it happens. Nearly every jurisdiction has this in some form.
- Post-sale redemption (statutory redemption): the right to undo a completed sale by paying the redemption amount during a fixed window. Whether this exists, how long it runs, and what it costs is where jurisdictions diverge most.
A third structure — post-deed redemption — is rare; most jurisdictions cut off all redemption when the tax deed is issued or the foreclosure judgment is entered. Where the deed conveys title with no post-sale redemption at all (e.g., florida after deed, california, michigan, maine), the redemption right is purely a pre-sale right.
Why each system matters for redemption:
- Tax-lien-certificate states sell a lien; the owner redeems by paying the certificate holder (through a public officer) and the holder’s return is the bid-down interest plus any statutory penalty. The deed only issues after the redemption period runs and the holder forecloses or applies for a deed.
- Tax-deed states sell title (often subject to a short post-sale redemption, or none); the “premium” the redeemer pays is a flat statutory surcharge to the purchaser, not bid-down interest.
- Redeemable-deed states (e.g., texas, georgia, tennessee, delaware monition counties) convey a defeasible deed at the sale, defeated by redemption within the statutory window; the redeemer pays the purchaser’s bid plus a statutory premium.
The governing framework
There is no general federal right to redeem; redemption is a creature of state statute. But three federal/constitutional doctrines now constrain how states run the surrounding process, and they interact directly with redemption:
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Surplus equity is constitutionally protected. In Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023) (decided May 25, 2023, 9-0, Roberts, C.J.), the Supreme Court held that a State that keeps the value of a tax-foreclosed home beyond the tax debt effects a “classic taking” under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The Court reasoned that the taxpayer “plausibly alleges that Hennepin County retained ‘far more than [the] taxes due’ on her property and ‘thereby effected a classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.‘” Practical effect on redemption: where the redemption period has expired and the property is sold for more than the debt, the former owner is entitled to the surplus — so a lapsed redemption right no longer means the State may pocket the equity. See tyler-v-hennepin-county, surplus-funds. — Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyler_v._Hennepin_County ; https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/tyler-v-hennepin-county-minnesota/
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Notice must be “reasonably calculated” to reach interested parties. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) sets the due process baseline: “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.” Because the redemption clock in many states is started or ended by a statutory notice, defective notice can toll or revive the right of redemption (see maine 3-month defective- notice cure; georgia barment notice; iowa 90-day notice; minnesota 60-day notice of expiration). See mullane-v-central-hanover, due-process-notice. — Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/462/791 (discussing Mullane standard)
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Returned mail obligates additional steps; mortgagees get actual notice. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) holds that when the State learns its mailed tax-sale notice was returned undelivered, due process requires “additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.” Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) requires mailed (actual) notice to a mortgagee of record whose identity is reasonably ascertainable — and that case turned on a mortgagee who learned of the sale only after the redemption period had run. Together these mean a redemption period that closed on the back of constitutionally deficient notice may be void or voidable, reopening redemption. See jones-v-flowers, mennonite-v-adams. — Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/220/ ; Mennonite, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/462/791
How jurisdictions diverge
State-by-state specifics live on each jurisdiction page’s Module 2 (“Right of Redemption”); this is the map. Every statement of law below is summarized from a jurisdiction page whose Module 2 carries the primary citation; the controlling statute/case is named in the Notes column.
Post-sale redemption length (the headline number)
| Pattern | Jurisdictions | Notes (controlling authority) |
|---|---|---|
| No post-sale redemption (pre-sale only) | florida, california, michigan, maine, north-dakota | FL: right ends when deed issues, Fla. Stat. § 197.472(1). CA: redeem only until close of business day before sale, RTC §§ 3707, 4101. MI: redeem only through March 31 after foreclosure judgment, MCL 211.78g/.78k. ME: 18 mo from recording, no post-foreclosure redemption, 36 M.R.S. § 943. ND: title passes to county Oct 1, only “repurchase” remains, NDCC 57-28-08. |
| ~60 days | connecticut, delaware (monition counties) | CT: 6 months — see below (often grouped); DE monition: 60 days from court confirmation of sale, 9 Del. C. § 8729. |
| 6 months | connecticut, kentucky (conditional) | CT: not later than 6 months after sale; 60 days if abandoned, § 12-157(e)–(f). KY: 6 months only if sale brings < 2/3 appraised value, KRS 426.530(1). |
| 180 days | texas (non-homestead/non-ag/non-mineral) | Tex. Tax Code § 34.21(e). |
| 12 months / 1 year | georgia, south-carolina, indiana, delaware (Kent & Sussex), rhode-island, tennessee (≤5 yr delinquency) | GA: ≥12 mo and until barment notice, O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40. SC: 12 mo from sale, S.C. Code § 12-51-90. IN: generally 1 yr (120 days for some), IC 6-1.1-25-4. DE subch. IV: 1 yr from sale, 9 Del. C. § 8776. RI: ≥1 yr, until foreclosure petition filed, §§ 44-9-21, 44-9-25. TN: 1 yr if ≤5 yr delinquent, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2701(a). |
| 2 years | texas (homestead/ag/mineral), new-jersey (until foreclosure), mississippi | TX: 2 yr, Tex. Tax Code § 34.21(a). NJ: holder cannot foreclose for 2 yr (6 mo if municipality), redemption open until final judgment, R.S. 54:5-86. MS: 2 yr from sale, closes 5:01 p.m. on the anniversary, Miss. Code § 27-45-3. |
| 2.5 years (general) | illinois | 2.5 yr general; 1 yr for vacant/commercial/7+-unit; holder may extend to 3 yr max, 35 ILCS 200/21-350, 21-385. |
| 3 years | arizona, colorado, minnesota, louisiana | AZ: 3 yr, open until treasurer’s deed/foreclosure, A.R.S. § 42-18152. CO: until treasurer’s deed executes (functionally 3 yr), C.R.S. § 39-12-103(3). MN: 3 yr from tax-judgment sale to State, Minn. Stat. 281.17. LA: 3 yr from recordation of certificate (peremptive), La. Const. art. VII § 25(B)(1); 18 mo if blighted/abandoned. |
| 4 years | wyoming | 4 yr from sale; deed barred after 6 yr, Wyo. Stat. § 39-13-108(e). |
| 3 years to indefinite | alabama | 3 yr statutory (third-party buyer); longer if State holds; judicial redemption indefinite while owner retains possession until purchaser’s 3 yr adverse possession, Ala. Code §§ 40-10-82, -83, -120. |
What starts the clock (“runs from”)
| Trigger | Jurisdictions | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Date of the tax sale | georgia, south-carolina, indiana, mississippi, illinois, arizona, wyoming, rhode-island, connecticut | Most common trigger. |
| Date the purchaser’s deed is filed for record | texas | Tex. Tax Code § 34.21(a), (e). |
| Date of recordation of the lien certificate | louisiana, maine | LA: La. Const. art. VII § 25(B)(1). ME: 18 mo from filing, 36 M.R.S. § 943. |
| Court confirmation / judgment, not the auction | delaware (monition: confirmation), tennessee (order confirming sale), michigan (March 31 after foreclosure judgment) | DE: 9 Del. C. § 8729. TN: § 67-5-2701(a)(1)(A). MI: MCL 211.78g. |
| Sale to the State at tax-judgment sale | minnesota | Minn. Stat. 281.17. |
| Statutory foreclosure date (Oct 1) | north-dakota | NDCC 57-28-02. |
How the right is extinguished
| Mechanism | Jurisdictions | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Issuance/recording of the tax deed | florida, california, indiana, arizona, colorado, south-carolina, wyoming, connecticut | Deed conveys title free of redemption. |
| Entry of a foreclosure judgment / decree barring redemption | new-jersey, maryland, rhode-island, illinois, arizona | NJ: R.S. 54:5-87. MD: TP § 14-844. RI: § 44-9-30. IL: 35 ILCS 200/22-40. Redemption stays open until judgment. |
| Completed statutory notice + waiting period | iowa (90 days after service), minnesota (60 days after notice of expiration), georgia (barment notice), maine (auto at 18 mo, subject to defective-notice cure) | The clock does not self-execute; a notice must be served and proof filed. |
| Lapse of fixed period (self-executing) | mississippi (5:01 p.m. anniversary), texas, delaware | MS: Miss. Code § 27-45-3. |
| Adverse possession by the purchaser | alabama | Judicial redemption cut off only after 3 yr adverse possession, Ala. Code § 40-10-82. |
Who may redeem
The broad rule almost everywhere: the owner (including partial/co-owners, heirs, and personal representatives) and any person with a legal or equitable interest — typically mortgagees, lienholders, and judgment creditors. Notable variations:
| Pattern | Jurisdictions | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Owner + any interest-holder / lienholder (the norm) | florida, georgia, arizona, colorado, indiana, south-carolina, minnesota, tennessee, connecticut, rhode-island | Statutes use “any person having a legal or equitable interest.” |
| Read very broadly (“anyone interested in”) | mississippi | § 27-45-3; courts allow judgment creditors and arguably “virtually anyone”; redemption inures to the owner. |
| Enumerated statutory list (incl. deed-of-trust beneficiary, contract purchaser, Medicaid director) | nevada | NRS 361.585(4). |
| Owner / heirs / legal representatives only (mortgagee status unclear) | delaware | 9 Del. C. §§ 8729 (monition: owner or legal representatives), 8776 (subch. IV: owner, heirs, executors, administrators). |
| Defendant in fi. fa. + interest-holders / creditors | georgia | O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40. |
| Third-party investor may redeem only after intervening in the foreclosure | new-jersey | Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304 (2007); must pay owner more than nominal consideration. |
Redemption amount / premium structure
| Structure | Jurisdictions | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Flat statutory premium/surcharge to the purchaser | texas (25% yr 1 / 50% yr 2 for 2-yr property; 25% for 180-day), georgia (20% yr 1, 10%/yr after), delaware (15% monition / 20% subch. IV), indiana (110%/115% of min bid + 5%/yr on overbid), louisiana (5% penalty + bid interest) | Redeemable-deed model. TX: § 34.21(b)–(g). GA: O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42. |
| Escalating penalty by quarter/period | south-carolina (3/6/9/12% by quarter), illinois (penalty bid × 1–6 multiplier by 6-mo step), rhode-island (10% within 6 mo + 1%/mo) | SC: § 12-51-90. IL: 35 ILCS 200/21-355. |
| Fixed-rate interest (no separate premium) | iowa (2%/mo), colorado (9% over discount rate), wyoming (3% penalty + 15%/yr), mississippi (1.5%/mo + 5% damages), maryland (county rate), connecticut (18%/yr on full purchase price), kentucky (10%/yr to purchaser) | IA: § 447.1. WY: § 39-13-108. |
| Bid-down interest is the holder’s return | arizona (max 16%), new-jersey (≤18% + 2/4/6% penalty), florida (5% mandatory minimum) | Lien-certificate model; FL § 197.472(2). |
| Statutory redemption penalties only (govt keeps property) | california (1.5%/mo + 175 forfeiture fee), minnesota (taxes + penalties + costs) | Pre-sale cure model. CA RTC § 4103. MI MCL 211.78g. |
Special tolling (minors, incompetents, SCRA, bankruptcy)
| Pattern | Jurisdictions | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Statutory disability extension (minors/incompetents) | iowa (1 yr after disability removed, 3-yr outer limit, § 447.7), colorado (C.R.S. § 39-12-104), minnesota (Minn. Stat. 281.39), wyoming (§ 39-13-108) | |
| Statutory bankruptcy extension built into the redemption statute | indiana (IC 6-1.1-24-7), alabama (§ 40-10-197 extends 12 mo when court order bars foreclosure) | Beyond the federal automatic stay. |
| Equitable extension by courts | mississippi | Marathon Asset Mgmt. v. Otto, 977 So. 2d 1241 (Miss. App. 2008) — ~60-day equitable extension where redeemer was prevented through no fault. |
| Federal overlays only (no state disability statute located) | florida, georgia, texas, new-jersey, maryland, connecticut, delaware, kentucky, north-dakota, michigan, south-carolina, arizona, nevada | bankruptcy-automatic-stay (11 U.S.C. § 362) and SCRA apply by federal law; state-specific disability tolling flagged needs_verification on those pages. |
Leading cases
- tyler-v-hennepin-county — keeping surplus equity above the tax debt after a lapsed redemption is an unconstitutional taking (598 U.S. 631 (2023)).
- jones-v-flowers — returned tax-sale notice obligates additional reasonable steps before the redemption period can be extinguished (547 U.S. 220 (2006)).
- mennonite-v-adams — a mortgagee of record is entitled to actual (mailed) notice before the redemption period runs (462 U.S. 791 (1983)).
- mullane-v-central-hanover — notice must be “reasonably calculated” to reach interested parties (339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
- Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304 (2007) — a third-party investor must intervene in the foreclosure and pay more than nominal consideration to redeem (new-jersey).
Practical playbook
- Identify the system first (treasurer-sale vs sheriff-sale; lien-certificate vs deed vs redeemable-deed). It dictates whether you are paying a certificate holder, a deed purchaser, or a public officer, and whether any post-sale window even exists.
- Pin the trigger date and the length. Confirm whether the clock runs from the sale, the deed recording, court confirmation, or a statutory notice. Use the jurisdiction page’s Module 2 and re-verify the cited statute — these change.
- Confirm whether the right self-executes or requires notice. In notice-driven states (iowa, minnesota, georgia, maine) the window stays open until the purchaser/officer completes statutory notice — defective notice can keep redemption alive (and can void a deed under due-process-notice).
- Compute the redemption amount to the penny (bid + statutory interest/penalty
- subsequent taxes + allowed costs). Many states bar partial payment (mississippi, texas).
- Pay the correct payee — often the public officer (treasurer/clerk/collector), sometimes the purchaser directly (texas, delaware monition).
- If the window has closed, pivot to a surplus-funds claim (post-tyler-v-hennepin-county, the former owner is entitled to equity above the debt) and check third-party-recovery-rules before any recovery-agent engagement.
- Always confirm against the primary statute/case before acting — the cited sources, not this summary, control.
Cross-links
tyler-v-hennepin-county, jones-v-flowers, mennonite-v-adams, mullane-v-central-hanover, surplus-funds, third-party-recovery-rules, due-process-notice, sheriff-sale, treasurer-sale, bankruptcy-automatic-stay
Sources
- {case, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyler_v._Hennepin_County, 2026-06-01} — Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023): citation, 9-0 vote, “classic taking” holding (corroborated by SCOTUSblog case file).
- {case, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/tyler-v-hennepin-county-minnesota/, 2026-06-01} — Tyler procedural history and holding.
- {case, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/220/, 2026-06-01} — Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006): “additional reasonable steps” notice holding.
- {case, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/462/791, 2026-06-01} — Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983): mailed notice to mortgagee of record; discusses Mullane “reasonably calculated” standard (Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
- {statute, https://m.flsenate.gov/Statutes/197.472, 2026-06-01} — Fla. Stat. § 197.472: redeem “at any time after the tax certificate is issued and before a tax deed is issued”; 5% mandatory minimum interest; 15-business-day payout.
- {statute, https://codes.findlaw.com/tx/tax-code/tax-sect-34-21/, 2026-06-01} — Tex. Tax Code § 34.21: 2-yr (homestead/ag/mineral) and 180-day periods; 25%/50% redemption premium.
- {jurisdiction-pages, /Users/wyatt/projects/tax-foreclosure-wiki/jurisdictions/*.md (Module 2), 2026-06-01} — Divergence tables synthesized from the Module 2 sections of Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming; each cited rule traces to the primary statute/case named in those pages’ Module 2 citations.
needs_verification
- Statute-by-statute confirmation of the disability/minor/incompetent tolling provisions and the precise SCRA interaction was not independently re-fetched for every jurisdiction in this concept page; rely on each jurisdiction page’s Module 2 primary citation and re-verify before acting.
- Illinois post-sale period (2.5-yr general vs historical 2-yr/6-mo structure) carries an open question on the Illinois page re: pending legislation.
- Several Justia/SupremeCourt.gov primary URLs returned 403 to the fetch bot on 2026-06-01; holdings here are corroborated through the named reporter citations and alternate retrieved sources (Cornell LII, SCOTUSblog, flsenate.gov, findlaw).
Legal information, not legal advice. This page summarizes general doctrine and cross-jurisdiction patterns; it is not a substitute for the controlling statute, regulation, or case in any jurisdiction, and law changes. Verify every rule against the cited primary source and consult a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction before acting. Last verified: 2026-06-01.